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In Search of Coherence and Consistency in European Contract Law: A Way Forward 
 
By Sarah McKeown 
 
In 2001 the European Commission began a far reaching consultation to ascertain 
whether obstacles arise for the proper functioning of the internal market and for cross-
border trade from the existing divergent and fragmentary state of European contract 
law at the EU and national levels. This question was answered in the affirmative. 
Action was needed to simplify the regulatory environment for cross-border trade; to 
provide businesses and consumers with a single, comprehensive, and directly 
applicable contractual framework for cross-border transactions in the internal market.  
 
This thesis offers a solution to the current obstacles to cross-border trade on the basis 
of the Commission’s principal proposals for future action; the review of the acquis 
communautaire, the creation of a Common Frame of Reference, and the adoption of 
optional instruments of European contract law. It undertakes a chronological and 
critical assessment of the proposals and progress to date, in order to determine the 
most appropriate way forward for European contract law. It seeks to do so against a 
wider debate which highlights the economic, socio-cultural and political issues and 
interests which bear on the suitability and desirability of the Commission’s proposals 
and which must be accommodated within the final response. It also draws on existing 
examples of trade regulation, in particular, harmonised instruments, which share the 
objective of facilitating cross-border trade, at the international level. Such 
examination assists the understanding of the regulatory approach that must be taken to 
European contract law, and more particularly determines the extent to which the 
objectives of action at the European level can be realised within the internal market. 
 
It is against this background, and at a time when the EU is looking to the internal 
market, and the facilitation of cross-border trade as a means for Europe to emerge 
from economic crisis, that this thesis presents necessary action for the immediate 
development of the European contract law project. It concludes that the adoption of 
optional instruments present the most appropriate way forward. This is not, however, 
an absolute solution. The review of the acquis and the resulting proposal for a 
Consumer Rights Directive has an integral part to play moving forward. In search of 
coherence and consistency in European contract law however the CFR, both as a 
legislative toolbox and basis for the optional instruments, must underpin the future 
regulatory response. It is clear that all three of the Commission’s proposals must 
figure in the way forward.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
“Jacques Delors once said that nobody falls in love with the single market. Sadly, one 
of the EU's main problems is that citizens don't see the benefits of the single market – 
the crown jewel of our Union's integration.”
1  
One issue standing in the way of businesses and consumers alike seeing the benefits of 
the single market is the present state of European contract law, which is characterised by 
fragmentation and divergence at the EU and national levels. The result is a non-tariff 
barrier to trade, impeding the proper functioning of the internal market and rendering it 
more difficult and costly for businesses and consumers to engage in cross-border 
contracts. Although action has been taken at the European level to harmonise national 
contract law in order to facilitate cross-border trade, contracts of sale between contracting 
parties in different Member States cannot be treated as if they were trading within a 
single state. Yet today the EU is looking to the internal market and thus to cross-border 
trade as means for Europe to emerge from the economic crisis. Action is, therefore, 
necessary to simplify the regulatory environment for cross-border trade, and to make it 
easier and less costly for businesses and consumers to contract with partners in other 
Member States. In this way, citizens will “see” the benefits of the internal market.
2  
The current emphasis, and the need to take action in the area of contract law in order to 
facilitate cross-border trade, is part of an ongoing debate at the EU level, dating back to 
1989 and 1994, when the European Parliament called for work to begin on the possibility 
of drawing up a common European Code of Private Law.
3 The European Parliament 
stated that harmonisation of certain sectors of private law was essential to the completion 
of the internal market. The European Commission responded with a consultation on 
                                                 
1 Viviane Reding Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights 
and Citizenship, Making the Most of the Internal Market: Concrete EU Solutions to Cut Red Tape and to 
Boost the Economy Brussels, 24 February 2010 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/42&type=HTML. 
2 Ibid. and Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 a strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, COM (2010) 2020, 18-19.  
3 Resolutions of the European Parliament in 1989 and 1994, OJ C 158, 26.6.1989, p. 400 (Resolution A2-
157/89); OJ C 205, 25.7.1994, p. 518 (Resolution A3-0329/94).   2 
European contract law in 2001, which sought to confirm the presence of obstacles to 
cross-border trade arising from the present state of European contract law, and to 
encourage debate on the way forward based on a number of proposal contained therein.
4 
The Communication was concerned with obstacles to cross-border trade at two levels: 
firstly, those arising from divergence in contract law at the national level. The enquiry 
was then narrowed to obstacles that may be created by the existing legislative approach to 
contract law and the facilitation of trade at the European level. As a result, and further 
elaboration in two subsequent Communications from the Commission on European 
contract law in 2003
5 and 2004,
6 the debate on future action now advances on the basis of 
three principal proposals, which form the basis of discussion in this thesis. The proposed 
response to obstacles existing at the European level is the review of the acquis 
communautaire in the area, and the creation of a Common Frame of Reference for 
European contract law (CFR). Together, the proposals share the objective of creating a 
simplified regulatory environment at the European level, characterised by a high degree 
of consistency and coherence in the existing and future acquis communautaire. At the 
national level, the proposed response has been the creation of a harmonised body of 
European contract law in the form of an optional instrument, in order to overcome the 
existing divergence at this level and thus to facilitate cross-border trade.  
The Commission’s Communications recognised the belief already held by the academic 
community that obstacles exist to the proper functioning of the internal market due to the 
existence of divergent national contract laws and the inadequacies of trade regulation in 
the internal market. This had prompted private harmonisation initiatives at the European 
level, resulting prominently in the Principles of European Contract Law
7 (PECL) by the 
Commission on European Contract Law. This restatement pursued a number of 
immediate and long-term objectives
8 linked to the facilitation of cross-border trade, and 
                                                 
4 2001 Communication on European Contract law COM (2001) 398 final.   
5 2003 Communication: A More Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final. 
6 2004 Communication: European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, 
(COM) (2004) 651 final. 
7 Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) Parts I-II prepared by the Commission of European 
Contract Law, O Lando and H Beale (eds.), The Hague, Kluwer, 2000. 
8 Outlined, Ibid. Introduction xxiv.    3
was again directed at contract law obstacles at both the national and European levels.
9 In 
the short term, it were intended for immediate use by parties making contracts, by courts 
and arbitrators in deciding contract disputes and for national and European legislators in 
drafting contract rules. The long term objective was to help bring about the harmonisation 
of general contract law within the EU.
10 To this end the ongoing academic work 
continues today in the elaboration of the draft CFR, undertaken by the Co-PECL Network 
of Excellence (Network of Excellence), and is based in part on a revised version of the 
PECL. The academic efforts, therefore, underpin the Commission’s debate and proposals.  
 
While the academic debate has advanced the case for harmonisation on the basis of 
facilitating cross-border trade and has on the whole accepted, in terms of the 
Commission’s debate, that European integration may require further legal measures to 
this end, it has also sought to highlight the wider socio-cultural, economic and political 
issues and interests that are involved in this debate.
11 There is a wider debate that must 
also be addressed in the discussion as to the way forward and accommodated in the final 
response to the existing obstacles. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the achievement of the EU’s principal economic aim, and 
thus first and foremost with the creation and proper functioning of the internal market. It 
seeks, therefore, to offer a regulatory solution to the current obstacles to cross-border 
trade arising from the present state of contract law, at both the national and European 
levels. It does so on the basis of the Commission’s proposals for further action and in 
view of the progress that has been made to date. In this respect it reflects legal 
developments up to 31 March 2010. A chronological approach is taken to the 
development of the Commission’s debate and assessment of the proposals. This approach 
is warranted by the ongoing, dynamic nature of the contract law project, which since 
2001 has undergone significant changes in priorities, in the governing European 
                                                 
9 I.e. not only a response to the divergence in national contract law, but also to the shortcomings in the 
existing EU legislative approach. PECL was intended to provide a necessary legal foundation for measures 
adopted by the EU at this level, PECL introduction, xxii – xxiii.  
10 PECL Introduction xxiv.  
11 A notable example being the Study Group on Social Justice in European Private law, a Manifesto: Social 
Justice in European Contract Law (2004) European Law Journal 653.    4 
Commission and in Directorates-General. All of this has impacted upon the proposals, the 
way in which they have developed and, therefore, the extent to which it is possible today 
to conclude which proposal(s) serve(s) as the way forward for European contract law.  
 
The regulatory solution must be provided against the background of the wider debate, in 
light of the issues and objectives which impact upon the desirability of future courses of 
action. The way forward concerns not only the need to act to facilitate cross-border trade, 
but also the desirability of further integration and harmonisation of national contractual 
systems for economic ends. The thesis thus asks: what is the most appropriate way 
forward for European contract law? This is to be assessed, in the first place, in terms of 
the suitability of the proposals to overcome identified obstacles to cross-border 
contracting and thus to facilitate cross-border trade. The proposals must then be assessed 
in terms of their ability to address and accommodate, as part of the regulatory response, 
the wider issues and objectives involved in the debate, which bear on their desirability as 
the way forward.   
 
To this end, Chapter 2 begins with the internal market hypothesis: the argument 
traditionally advanced for further action, specifically harmonisation, at the European 
level in order to overcome existing obstacles to cross-border trade. There is, however, a 
need to validate such claims. Attention turns to the Commission’s debate and, 
significantly, empirical evidence, which seeks to answer three key questions and which is 
necessary from three perspectives. Firstly, the EU’s competence to pursue further action 
in European Contract Law; secondly, the understanding of the contractual obstacles to the 
completion of the internal market; and finally, as a result, the ability to ascertain a 
suitable solution to facilitate cross-border trade. In order to determine an appropriate 
response, the analysis of the empirical evidence is further narrowed to ascertain whether 
specific market actors, i.e. businesses, small and medium size enterprises (hereafter 
SMEs) and consumers, experience the same obstacles, and to the same extent. Since 
consumers and SMEs form important constituents of the EU’s internal market and policy 
objectives in this area, it will be particularly important for the regulatory response to 
facilitate cross-border trade for these groups.    5
Chapter 3 moves on to consider the wider issues and objectives which have impacted on 
the European harmonisation debate in general and, now, on the Commission’s proposals 
for future action. In particular, since the Commission continues to seek a harmonised 
instrument of European contract law, although narrowed in the current debate to an 
optional form, the appropriateness of this course of action must be considered. The 
chapter thus presents the wider economic, social, cultural and political considerations 
affecting the approach to be taken, which have not been equally apparent in the 
Commission’s debate to date.  
 
In the first place, the chapter questions the economic goal of harmonisation. It asks 
whether, in economic terms, this is the most suitable and desirable way forward for 
facilitating trade in the internal market, and whether the ‘level playing field’ that 
centralised regulation seeks can be achieved in the internal market. This is particularly 
important when differences in national contract law are just one factor acting to obstruct 
cross-border trade and render such transactions more difficult and costly. An alternative 
to harmonisation is thus considered – regulatory competition – as a means by which to 
ensure the greatest satisfaction of wants and needs of the internal market participants, 
while also resulting in greater convergence between the national legal systems. It 
becomes apparent that a hybrid response, such as the optional instrument, which can 
combine the benefits of centralised and decentralised regulation, may present the most 
appropriate way forward in these terms.  
 
From there, Chapter 3 highlights that the creation of a harmonised European contract law 
is more than a technical exercise. Harmonisation must result in more than a tool to 
facilitate cross-border trade. A harmonised instrument must represent a fair balance 
between contractual freedom and the needs of social solidarity and fairness. The risk is 
that the narrow, market-orientated agenda of the Commission’s debate will not achieve 
this balance.  The immediate issue for consideration is, therefore, the extent to which this 
balance is achieved in the existing draft CFR (DCFR), which will serve as the basis for 
the review of the acquis communautaire and for the elaboration of an optional instrument 
of European contract law. This determines the extent to which the wider issues and   6 
objectives involved in the creation of a harmonised instrument can be represented in the 
Commission’s final proposals. Chapter 3 goes on to emphasise the political nature of the 
harmonisation process and the political decisions that will have to be made in the creation 
of the CFR. The final CFR, in pursuing its envisaged functions, will, therefore, require 
political endorsement and regulatory legitimacy. This ultimately demands, in its creation, 
a representative and accountable process. The chapter considers the extent to which this 
is being achieved in the Commission’s debate and in the ongoing creation of the CFR, 
and whether the political issues and concerns involved are being adequately addressed.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 are, therefore, intended to establish the parameters for the assessment of 
the Commission’s proposals, in terms of their suitability to overcome the existing 
obstacles to trade, and their desirability in terms of the wider debate. The assessment 
begins in chapter 4 with the review of the acquis communautaire and the creation of the 
CFR, which provide a response to obstacles at the European level.  
 
The chapter provides an overview of the proposals and their objectives, before giving 
more detailed consideration to the progress made to date. Regarding the review of the 
acquis, the chapter assesses the Commission’s Green Paper and proposals advanced for 
the review of the acquis from two perspectives. First, to ascertain the extent to which the 
proposals for reform can satisfy the objective of the review, which seeks to address the 
causes of fragmentation at the European level, and thus simplify the regulatory 
environment for cross-border trade. Second, the Commission’s consultation under the 
Green Paper will be examined in light of the earlier parameters set in Chapter 3 in regard 
to the political nature of the process, and the extent to which the Commission has 
maintained a representative and transparent consultative process. Focus then turns to the 
outcome of the public consultation: a proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive (CRD). 
An overview of the proposal is provided, in order to ascertain whether it meets the 
Commission’s objectives in conducting the review and, ultimately, whether it provides 
the regulatory solution to the current obstacles to cross-border trade arising from the 
present state of contract law at the European level. 
   7
Chapter 4 goes on to assess the suitability of the draft CFR: first, as a basis for the 
Commission’s proposals for future action, and thus as the basis for the regulatory 
solution; then, the suitability of the draft text to be utilised in the political selection 
process to create the political CFR will be considered. Attention turns to the final CFR, 
and the instrument that can be expected to result from the current selection process, in 
light of the present views of the EU institutions regarding the need for and intended 
functions of this instrument. In view of the relationship and shared objectives of the 
proposed review of the acquis and CFR, the chapter ends with consideration of the 
ongoing work on these proposals. It reflects upon their existing relationship and, moving 
forward, their necessary interaction as part of the regulatory response.  
 
In a break in the assessment of the Commission’s proposals, Chapter 5 draws on the 
existing international regulation of trade, to assist in the understanding of the regulatory 
approach that must be taken to European contract law. In particular, when the EU is 
looking to the creation of a simplified regulatory environment at both European and 
national levels through further harmonisation, the chapter considers an example of an 
existing harmonised instrument: the United Nations Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods. The chapter examines the range of regulatory choices that are available to the 
Commission in meeting the objective of facilitating trade in the internal market, drawing 
on the international regulation of trade in general and the approach of the CISG in 
particular. The discussion seeks to identify the successful use of particular regulatory 
approaches as well as to demonstrate the limits of harmonisation in both practical and 
political terms. Such limitations apply equally to the Commission’s proposals, and impact 
upon the extent to which the objectives of action can be realised within the internal 
market. They thus bear on the most appropriate way forward for European contract law.  
 
Chapter 6 returns to the assessment of the Commission's proposals and considers the 
optional instrument. The chapter begins with an overview of the proposal, and of how it 
is envisaged that it could provide a direct response to obstacles arising for the internal 
market from divergent contract law at the national level. It is presented as an appealing 
and distinct regulatory option and means by which to achieve a simplified regulatory   8 
environment for cross-border trade in the internal market: significantly, one which, owing 
to the optional nature of the proposal, and to it being based upon the (D)CFR, can also 
accommodate the wider issues and objectives that arise in the debate as to the way 
forward. Attention therefore turns to whether the adoption of optional instrument(s) is 
possible. While political support has more recently fallen behind the proposal as a tool to 
facilitate cross-border trade, a number of issues must necessarily be addressed: first, the 
constitutional thresholds that must be surpassed for the adoption of optional 
instrument(s), before consideration of how effect would be given to the proposed optional 
contractual regime(s) within the European choice of law system.  
 
With the need to facilitate cross-border trade in both the B2B and B2C contexts in mind, 
in particular for SMEs, and also consumers, consideration is given to how optional 
instrument(s) could be developed in order to enable full participation of these distinct 
market actors in the internal market. In the B(SME)2B(SME) context, discussion is 
directed at the apparent need to address contractual imbalances that can arise for SMEs 
with their trading partner, serving to undermine their contractual positions and ability to 
participate effectively in cross-border trade. In the B(SME)2C context, where one 
manifestation of the optional instrument as a ‘blue button’ is considered, a comparison is 
made with the proposed CRD which seeks the same objective as the optional instrument 
in this context, i.e. a simplified regulatory environment for B2C trade. This is done in 
order to ascertain the more appropriate regulatory response, and thus the way forward for 
European contract law in this context.  
 
Drawing on the two initial debates, the review of the Commission’s proposals, and the 
lessons learnt from the international analogy, Chapter 7 seeks to offer, in conclusion, a 
regulatory solution to the current obstacles to cross-border trade arising from the present 
state of European contract law. While all three of the Commission’s proposal must 
necessarily feature as part of the regulatory response, the chapter concludes that the way 
forward is through the optional instrument. This proposal can best achieve the objectives 
of action at both the national and European levels. The adoption of optional instrument(s) 
is, however, not an absolute solution,  and cannot address the existing causes of   9
fragmentation where it is not chosen as the applicable law. It is clear that it must also be 
joined, in the B2C context, by the CRD and that further action in respect of that proposal 
is necessary if it is to form a consistent and coherent horizontal instrument of European 
consumer contract law which will also serve, in part, as a basis for the ongoing review of 
the acquis. While both instrument share objectives, govern the same transactions, and 
originate from within the same Directorate-General, however, coherence between the two 
as part of the future regulatory response must be achieved. It is clear in this respect that 
while developments in the European contract law project now mean that the CRD will be 
integral to the coherence of the regulatory response, the CFR still has a pronounced role 
to play moving forward in both its intended functions as legislative toolbox and basis for 
optional instrument(s). The relationship between the 3 proposals is thus clarified, and 
necessary future action is discussed if, almost ten years after the Commission began this 
project, the benefits of the internal market are to be realised.    10 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Commission’s Debate and Empirical Evidence 
 
The principal issue to be addressed in this chapter is whether there are in fact obstacles 
created for the internal market, arising from the existence of divergent national contract 
laws, which could be resolved through greater harmonisation of these laws. It will begin 
by presenting the internal market hypothesis, which is traditionally presented as the basis 
for further harmonisation. The chapter will go on to consider present attempts to validate 
such suppositions and calls for action. To this end, it will consider how and why the EU 
has become involved in a predominately academic and hypothetical debate, through 
consideration of the Commission’s Communications on the present state of European 
contract law. As a complement to this, the chapter will consider a noteworthy attempt to 
collect empirical evidence, the Clifford Chance Survey on European contract law, before 
presenting a comprehensive analysis of the results of both initiatives. The chapter ends by 
evaluating the significance of the results for the future approach to be taken to European 
contract law and whether they allow us to conclude that the case for further 
harmonisation, in these terms, is a sound one.  
 
2.1. Internal Market Hypothesis  
 
The theory behind calls for harmonisation is the belief that the existence of divergent 
national contract laws creates obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market. 
This undermines the EU goals of market integration and the completion of the internal 
market. At present, 27 individual contractual systems co-exist in the EU, subject to 
noteworthy, but focused, intervention by the EU. There has been harmonisation of 
Member States' contract rules through a series of minimum harmonisation directives, 
most notably in the area of consumer protection. These have been directed at specific 
problems within national regimes that have impaired the proper functioning of the 
market. The problem-specific nature of the intervention has, however, meant that the 
interaction of the consumer acquis communautaire with national law has been   12 
fragmentary. Thus although harmonisation to date has been intended to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, it has acted to exacerbate those already existing 
differences at the national level. As such, fundamental problems exist for the internal 
market where these two levels of regulation interact.
1  
 
The resulting belief is that market participants cannot utilise the internal market to its full 
potential. This is contrary to the fact that contract should act as the primary medium for 
the exchange of goods and services within a market. The present state of contract law is 
viewed as forming a non-tariff barrier to trade, and to the proper functioning and 
completion of the internal market. Until recently, however, this belief has been 
predominantly intuitive and led by academics rather than being based on empirical 
evidence or strong calls by the business sector for intervention.
2 It is clear, therefore, that 
not all those participating in the debate are convinced of the existence of such problems 
for the internal market, and the debate has also been described as a ‘solution in search of 
a problem’.
3 However, for those who are convinced of the existence of obstacles to the 
proper functioning of the internal market, the hypothesis can be broken down into three 
aspects, each of which will be discussed below: 
(i) Fear of legal surprise 
(ii) Transaction costs 
(iii) Problems of choice of law. 
 
2.1.1 Fear of legal surprise 
 
For those operating in the internal market, the existence of divergent national contract 
laws gives rise to the risk of legal surprise due to uncertainty about or ignorance of the 
applicable law. Parties cannot, therefore, advance contractual relations confidently 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Riedl, The Work of the Lando Commission from an Alternative Viewpoint (2000)  
European Review of Private Law, 71, 75.  
2 Some advance the view that too much weight should not be given to the internal market hypothesis, 
particularly as little empirical evidence has existed to substantiate the claims and where there are other 
factors and arguments for and against harmonisation, to be considered and weighed in the balance, see 
Chapter 3. 
3 Response of CBI to the Commission’s Communication on European Contract Law (2001), 4. 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/2.1.6.pdf.   13
without investing in legal advice on the content and effect of the applicable law. The 
concern is that the fear of legal surprise is such as to deter economic actors from entering 
the market. However, while many accept that this may well be the basic effect of the co-
existence of the contractual systems, it can also be argued that the predicted effect may 
well be exaggerated. The differences may not be as profound as feared. For example, 
previous harmonisation projects, notably the PECL, have demonstrated greater consensus 
in regard to legal outcomes between Member States than would have been imagined.
4 In 
many scenarios, despite differences in the legal rules and techniques of the contract 
systems, the Commission on European Contract Law found the legal result to be the 
same. It is the legal rules on their face which remain different and these perceived 
differences can be as damaging to the confidence of market participants as real ones.
5 
 
This has led others to argue that the problem for the internal market is not simply 
diversity as such, i.e. the co-existence of 27 contractual systems and thus 27 contractual 
rules of formation etc. Rather it is the intransparent or unpredictable diversity of contract 
law which is the key element of surprise.
6 This can be attributed to a number of 
peculiarities of national contractual systems which go beyond the differing content of 
contractual rules. One such cause is structural, in that national rules may appear in 
different places and under different names from those expected under individuals' own 
contractual systems. Contractual rules may not, therefore, be easy to discover and, 
although the rule may be similar in effect to that found in the parties' own national law, it 
may well not be recognised. Intransparency can, therefore, be as serious as substantive 
differences for those seeking to enter cross-border transactions.
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 For example, see Lando, Optional or Mandatory Europeanisation of Contract Law (2000) European 
Review of Private Law 59, 65. 
5 Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code to the 2001 Communication, para 11.  
(http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.23.pdf). 
6 Storme, Freedom of Contract: Mandatory and Non Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law (2007) 
European Review of Private Law 233, 235. 
7 Ibid.    14 
2.1.2 Transaction Costs  
 
Transaction costs arising from the need to obtain legal advice about the applicable law act 
as a further impediment to cross-border trade. It is advanced that there can be a 
substantial increase in transaction costs in all phases of commercial activity owing to the 
diversity of national contract laws.
8 This risk covers all phases, from planning and 
negotiations to the conclusion of the contract, through to issues of performance and any 
additional costs which may arise through litigation.
9 This means that many parties will be 
deterred from entering cross-border transaction. However, whether such costs form an 
insurmountable obstacle to an individual transaction will depend upon the cost of the 
contract(s) envisaged vis–a-vis the cost of instructing legal advice. Thus, such costs may 
well be inhibiting for SMEs, where the relatively low value of the transaction may render 
the cost of legal advice significant and the contract unviable.
10 By contrast, larger 
businesses will have the economic force and commercial infrastructure, e.g. the existence 
of subsidiaries in all states in which they trade, which renders the cost of finding out 
about the other party’s law insignificant in comparison to the value of the contract. For 
them, the associated cost of obtaining legal advice is unlikely to be any more inhibiting of 
trade than other additional costs incurred in cross-border commercial activity, e.g. 
transport costs or currency issues. 
 
The effect of transaction costs is thus exclusionary of certain groups with regard to access 
to the internal market, but depends upon the status of the parties to the contract and their 
ability to obtain the necessary information on a cost effective basis. For some, therefore, 
there is a need to avoid overstating this argument as a basis for harmonisation. It is still 
necessary to show empirically whether these costs are actually prohibitive of trade and, if 
so, whether harmonisation would reduce them.
11 
 
                                                 
8 Joint Response (2001), para 14.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Beale, The Future of the Common Frame of Reference (Paper delivered at the SECOLA Conference, 
Amsterdam, 2007), 11, (published in the (2007) 3 European Review of Contract Law 257).  
11 See, Collins, Transaction Costs and Subsidarity in European Contract Law, Chapter 18, An Academic 
Green Paper on European Contract Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2002), 276.   15
2.1.3. Problems of Choice of Law 
 
The favoured approach to dealing with cross-border trade and the variance in legal 
systems, in the absence of harmonised substantive rules of contract, has been the 
harmonisation of conflict of law rules. The aim of such rules, such as those in the EU 
regime contained in the Rome I Regulation,
12 is to designate with a high degree of 
certainty the law applicable to contracts containing a foreign element. There are, 
therefore, some who advance that the aforesaid obstacles to trade do not exist, or are 
significantly reduced, by the operation of the choice of law system. This is because, in 
accordance with the principle of party autonomy,
13 parties are free, by agreement and in 
advance, to submit their transactions to a legal order that can accommodate their needs 
and, more generally, the needs of international commerce.
14 On this basis it is argued that 
there is no legal uncertainty existing for cross-border contracts as to the applicable law.
15 
However, for a number of reasons to be discussed, it is clear that choice of law cannot 
sufficiently meet the needs of those wishing to engage in cross border trade while 
substantive differences continue to exist at national level.  
 
The first concerns the application of the chosen law, as the contract will be subject to 
both the dispositive and mandatory rules of that legal system. Dispositive rules do not 
pose a problem as parties can vary or exclude these in their contract, to avoid the 
application of national rules, to which they do not wish to subject their agreement. In this 
way the parties can overcome undesirable substantive differences in the applicable legal 
system.
16 It is the applicable mandatory rules, which form part of the proper law of the 
contract, which pose the problem, when parties are unaware of such rules, and where they 
conflict with those of their home state or the law under which they usually conduct 
                                                 
12 Regulation 593/2008/EC of the European Parliament and Council on the law applicable to contractual 
relations (Rome I).  
13 Central to the scheme of the Rome I Regulation, Article 3.  
14 See Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law (2000) 1 Uniform Law Review 177, 179. 
15 Rottinger, Towards a European Code: Recent EC Activities for a European Contract Law (2006) 
European Law Journal 807, 825.  
16 Although at least one party to the contract may not have knowledge of the applicable law, and would thus 
incur transactions costs in obtaining such information in the first place, see discussion on the principle of 
party autonomy.    16 
business. As the parties cannot vary such rules, this results in the associated uncertainty 
of cross-border contracts and prevents the use of mass-marketing strategies which are 
incompatible with the applicable law, i.e. as to rules on formation or formalities etc.  
 
The application of mandatory rules via choice of law becomes more controversial, 
however, when they do not form part of the proper law of the contract. This is where they 
have the potential to create distinct problems for the internal market. The application of 
such rules will arise, firstly, where they cannot be derogated from by the parties, 
irrespective of an effective choice of law. These are commonly mandatory protective 
rules, such as rules of consumer protection.
17 The second type are overriding mandatory 
rules, which are of such fundamental importance that they are applied irrespective of the 
applicable law, i.e. those political, social or economic rules of nations intended to protect 
the interests of the state.
18 These may be the mandatory rules of the forum, or of the 
country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been 
performed.
19 
  
The first type of mandatory rules have the greatest potential to affect the functioning of 
the internal market. Rome I operates so that, despite an effective choice of law, the 
mandatory rules of consumer protection of the consumer’s habitual residence will apply 
where a business has directed its commercial activities to this home state.
20 This means 
that in B2C context, businesses will not be able to direct their goods and services to 
consumers in other Member States, nor utilise uniform business practices, without prior 
knowledge of the consumer law of the Member States which they wish to target. The 
existing divergence between national laws has not been greatly improved by the EU’s 
                                                 
17 These can be categorised as ‘ordinary’ mandatory rules, such as those referred to in Article 6 of Rome I. 
On the categorisation of mandatory rules, Sinai, The Inclusion of Mandatory Rules in an Optional EC 
Contract Law Instrument (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 41, 42.  
18 Article 9 Rome I refers to them as overriding mandatory rules.  
19 Articles 9 (1) and (2). In the latter case they will only apply in so far as they render the performance of 
the contract unlawful. 
20 Article 6 (1) (b) Rome I. Article 6 (1) (a) provides that the consumer will be protected by the application 
of the consumer protection rules of their habitual residence where the contract has been concluded as a 
result of the professional pursuing his commercial or professional activities in that particular country. This 
situation is less controversial than (b), as it merely requires the application of the domestic mandatory rules, 
which should apply as part of the proper law of the contract, see recital 25.     17
legislative action in this field as the consumer directives have been based on minimum 
harmonisation. Member States have thus been allowed to adopt measures that go beyond 
the harmonised standard, which means that levels of protection continue to differ between 
national systems. The result is that businesses have to comply with all national protection 
provisions in the states where they wish to target their activities, possibly amounting to 
27 different consumer protection regimes. This could seriously hamper the provision of 
distance sales and services.  
 
A further shortcoming in the use of choice of law is concerned with the principle of party 
autonomy, which is central to the argument that choice of law overcomes much of the 
legal uncertainty involved in cross-border contracts. More specifically, this criticism is 
concerned with how this principle is exercised in practice, as often the governing law will 
be unknown to at least one of the parties. For example, it may be the case that the weaker 
party, due to the inequality of bargaining power, will have the applicable law decided for 
them by the stronger. Parties commonly also have difficulties in reaching agreement as to 
the applicable law, and thus may decide to apply a neutral law of a third state which may, 
therefore, be unknown to both. The result is legal uncertainty, which leaves at least one 
side open to legal risk and thus requires them to engage costly legal advice as to the 
applicable law.  
 
The fundamental flaw in the use of choice of law as a mechanism to overcome the 
presumed obstacles is that it can do little more than ensure that a contract is subject to the 
law of a particular state, and all the certainty this provides in the internal market. It 
operates to localise an otherwise international contract and transaction within a domestic 
system, which can be considered inappropriate. National laws designed and suitable for 
domestic transactions are less well attuned to the regulation and needs of international 
trade, in terms of content and suitability for purpose.
21 The general consensus is that 
choice of law cannot establish the legal uniformity necessary for the internal market.
22 It 
                                                 
21 McKendrick, Harmonisation of European Contract Law: The State we are in, Chapter 2, The 
Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal 
Practice (Vogenauer, Weatherill eds.) 2006: Hart.  
22 See the Joint response (2001), para 60.   18 
is clear that while substantive differences continue to exist between the national systems, 
parties will continue to experience difficulties, irrespective of their ability to choose the 
applicable law. It can be concluded that the operation of choice of law cannot count as a 
feasible objection to the harmonisation of European contract law by those who seek to 
rely on it.  
 
This section has comprised a short account of the obstacles which are believed to exist for 
cross-border trade in the internal market, arising from the existing state of European 
contract law. However, while it is confidently assumed by the academic community that 
these barriers to the proper functioning of the internal market exist, what is not known is 
their precise effect. The imperative questions therefore become whether these obstacles 
do in fact exist for the operation of the internal market; whether their effect is in fact 
prohibitive of trade and whether they can be resolved or alleviated through further 
harmonisation being undertaken at EU level. It is advanced that harmonisation – the 
existence of a European contract law containing common rules, principles and 
terminology – would enhance legal certainty, making it easier for parties in different 
states to conclude and perform contracts. It would enable them to accommodate known 
legal risks, without incurring the potentially prohibitive costs which exist at present. A 
European contract law devised for the needs of inter-state trade would further mitigate the 
problems associated with choice of law. It would avoid the present domesticisation of the 
contract as well as providing parties with a neutral law that is common to both. By 
placing the parties on an equal footing, and overcoming the limitations of party autonomy 
in this respect, it has potential to end the deadlock that exists at present and the associated 
transaction costs. Ultimately, a harmonised contract law would ensure that businesses, 
particularly SMEs, can operate more efficiently and viably in the market, stimulating a 
more competitive supply of goods and services to the benefit of both businesses and 
consumers. In this way it would contribute to the EU’s wider economic objectives, in 
improving the functioning of the internal market.  
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2.2. Empirical Evidence 
 
Despite the force of these assumptions, the predominately academic debate has been 
conducted on the basis of little empirical evidence to substantiate them. However, when 
the European Commission entered the debate, the need for such evidence became 
particularly acute. It was necessary to establish such evidence if further EU action in the 
area of European contract law was to be justified. In particular, it would have to be shown 
that the differences arising between the national contract systems had a direct and 
impeding effect on the proper functioning of the internal market, and that the 
harmonisation of these laws genuinely had as its object the improvement of these 
conditions.
23 However, empirical evidence was also required from the perspective of 
strengthening the ongoing debate. There was a need to gain a greater understanding of the 
effect of the supposed legal obstacles, as well as gathering views as to possible solutions.  
 
Previous attempts by the EU to gather information on cross-border transactions and the 
functioning of the internal market had been visibly influenced by the consumer focus 
which has dominated activities at this level in the area of contract law. The EU had 
conducted a number of public opinion studies to analyse both consumer and business 
experiences and perceptions of various aspects of B2C cross-border trade. Little attention 
had, however, been given to discovering the realities of B2B transactions within the 
market.
24 The scope of the debate in which the EU became involved did concern such 
transactions. This was reflected in the Commission’s 2001 Communication on European 
contract law, in which they called for information as to whether problems for the internal 
market result from divergences in contract law between Member States, without limiting 
the debate to the B2C context. A later survey, commissioned by Clifford Chance, focused 
solely on businesses and their experiences in the internal market. To this extent it can be 
considered as an important complement to the EU’s established consumer focus in this 
                                                 
23 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I- 8419 (Tobacco Advertising).   
24 See for example, Standard Eurobaromter 57.2- Flash Eurobarometer 128. Public opinion in Europe: 
Views of business to consumer cross-border trade, 
(http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/green_pap_comm/studies/index_en.htm), 
or Flash Eurobarometer 186, Business attitudes to cross-border sales and consumer protection. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/topics/flash_eb_186_ann_report_en.pdf).   20 
field. Both will be examined, in the first place, in terms of their object, scope and 
methodology.  
 
2.2.1. 2001 Communication 
 
The Commission issued the first Communication on European Contract to the EU 
institutions and all interested parties
25 with the principal object of gathering information 
on the need for farther reaching EU action in the area of contract law.
26 In particular, it 
sought to ascertain the extent to which the existing problem-specific and piecemeal 
development of contract law at the European level may be insufficient to solve the 
problems that might arise in the internal market.
27 The object of the Communciation was 
thus twofold. Firstly, it sought to identify whether problems arose for market participants 
resulting from the existence of diverging national contract rules which acted directly or 
indirectly to obstruct the proper functioning of the internal market. In the event that such 
obstacles were shown to exist, then the Commission sought views as to whether existing 
contract rules at national and EU level were meeting the needs of businesses and 
consumers in the internal market, or whether further appropriate EU action was 
necessary. To this end, the Communication’s second objective was to seek views on a 
number of proposals put forward by the Commission for possible solutions to the 
market's problems, if the existing approach of the EU was shown to be unsatisfactory.  
 
Regarding the first objective, the Commission conceded that despite EU action to 
facilitate the establishment and functioning of the internal market, which they maintained 
had allowed it to significantly reduce impediments for economic actors wishing to 
operate in the EU, it was still not operating as efficiently as it could be, to the detriment 
of all parties involved.
28 The potential obstacles identified as arising from the divergent 
state of national contract law were familiar to advocates of the internal market 
hypothesis. In the first place, the existence of uncertainty, in particular for consumers and 
                                                 
25 Consumers, businesses, professional organisations, public administrators and institutions, the academic 
world and all interested parties, 2001 Communication, para 11.  
26 Ibid. para 10.  
27 2001 Communication, 10.  
28 Ibid. Paragraph 25.   21
SMEs, to the extent that they do not know other contract regimes, which may act to 
increase the legal risk involved and thus act as a disincentive to cross-border trade.
29 Such 
uncertainty may result in higher information and litigation costs for enterprises in general 
and SMEs and consumers in particular. This has the potential to create a further 
impediment to cross-border trade and to form competitive disadvantages in the market.
30 
The problems of choice of law were also alluded to in the Commission’s account of 
potential obstacles. It refers to the possible conflict of different national mandatory rules 
and to the costs involved in ascertaining the content of the applicable law, when unknown 
to one or both parties.
31 Throughout this section of the Communciation the tone is one of 
acknowledgment; the Commission recognises that these obstacles exist within the 
internal market. As such the aim of the consultation process was to determine the extent 
to which the issues described created obstacles for the internal market.  
 
The Communication also sought information on what other issues, relating to contract, 
act to obstruct the functioning of the market.
32 Within the scope of the Communication 
and the Commission's definition of contract for this purpose, it concerns general rules 
such as formation, validity, performance and issues of performance and remedies. It is 
also concerned with those contracts which have significant economic importance to 
cross-border trade, including contracts of sale and all kinds of service contracts, including 
financial services.
33 Given the economic context and search for those rules which act to 
hinder cross-border trade, the scope of the Communication extended to issues of property 
law, i.e. securities in regard to moveable goods, and unjust enrichment as well as those 
aspects of tort relating to contract.
34  
 
The Communication presented the existing state of EU law and regulation in the area of 
contract as potentially creating a distinct problem for the functioning of the market. The 
Commission highlighted the piecemeal approach to harmonisation which has been 
                                                 
29 Paragraph 30. 
30 Paragraphs 31–32.  
31 Paragraphs 28 and 31. 
32 Paragraph 33. 
33 Paragraph 13. 
34 Ibid.    22 
pursued at this level to date. It has been characterised by inconsistencies both between 
directives and internally, as well as problems at national level in regard to the 
implementation and interpretation of EU measures.
35 The Communication thus sought to 
discern whether the EU could continue its existing piecemeal and fragmentary approach 
to harmonisation and to the specific problems arising within the market, or whether the 
desired and necessary consistency, at both European and national levels, required a 
different approach to be taken. The consultation thus sought information on the practical 
problems relating to contract that arose from the way in which EU rules were applied and 
implemented in the Member States.
36 
 
In the event that obstacles were shown to exist for cross-border transactions and that the 
EU’s existing case-by-case approach to resolving them was proved to be inadequate, the 
Communication’s second objective was to encourage discussion of the future measures 
which could be taken in order to remove them.
37 To this end four options were proposed 
for future EU initiatives as a means to generate debate, although the Commission noted 
that this was not an exhaustive list and other options could be envisaged.  
 
The first option proposed taking no EU action, thus leaving the market itself to respond to 
the problems that exist within it. The Commission envisaged that different incentives 
could be led by Member States and trade associations to offer assistance and advice on 
cross-border transactions as a means of overcoming many of the economic and 
psychological risks associated with cross-border activity.
38 The second option envisaged 
the EU taking on a coordinating role in the promotion of comparative law research. It 
would encourage cooperation between academics and legal practitioners to develop 
common contract principles which would lead to greater convergence of national laws. 
This option thus promoted the continuance of the restatement work undertaken by groups 
such as the Commission on European Contract Law, which formulated the PECL, and the 
                                                 
35 Paragraphs 34-39. 
36  Paragraph 40. 
37 Paragraph 41.  
38 Paragraphs 49–50.   23
Commission envisaged the use and development of this instrument in the proposal.
39 The 
Commission anticipated that these principles, which would represent the most common 
solution found in the national contract systems, could be used by parties at the drafting 
and execution stages of their contracts, as well as being of assistance to national courts 
and arbitrators in deciding legal issues in cross-border cases.  
 
The Commission’s third option was to improve the quality of existing EU legislation and 
represents a distinct solution to the problem identified by the Commission in regard to the 
acquis communautaire in this area. The Communication proposed to improve the quality 
of the acquis communautaire, while reducing the volume of existing regulatory 
instruments and remedying inconsistencies between legal instruments. This would 
improve the coherence of the EU legislation in this area.
40 The final option proposed the 
adoption of new comprehensive legislation at EU level; a harmonised text compromising 
provisions on general contract law, and on specific contracts of importance to the internal 
market.
41 The Commission laid down a number of parameters for discussion regarding 
the choice of legal instrument which would implement such a measure and, significantly, 
the binding nature that such a measure would have. Regarding the latter, a number of 
approaches could be envisaged. In the first place, the measure could be a purely optional 
model which could be chosen by the parties as the governing law of their contract and as 
such provide an ‘opt-in’ model. Alternatively, it could form a set of rules which would 
apply unless excluded by the parties to the contract and thus be ‘opt-out’ in nature. In 
either case the harmonised body of rules would co-exist with national contractual 
systems. The third approach, however, envisaged a mandatory European contract code, 
which would replace existing national law.  
 
While the proposal therefore encompassed the possible need for a comprehensive 
European contract law that would replace the law of the Member States, the ultimate end 
sought by the harmonisation debate, the proposals also looked to a less contentious 
alternative, with the proposal for an optional model. The proposals were further narrowed 
                                                 
39 Paragraph 52–56. 
40 Paragraph 57–60. 
41 Paragraphs 61–69.    24 
to address more specifically the inadequacies of the harmonisation approach that the EU 
had pursued to date. Whilst seeking to remedy this, they also provided a possible soft law 
option, through a restatement at European level attempting to bring about greater 
convergence in contract laws of Member States, thus furthering academic efforts to 
harmonise the law of contract.   
 
In order to generate an open and extensive debate on the questions and issues raised in 
the Communciation, it was published on the Commission’s Europa website. This acted as 
a forum for debate since contributions were, where permitted, also published.
42 The 
Commission received some 180 responses,
43 from within and outside the EU,
44 from the 
EU institutions, and from all stakeholders groups.
45 The largest number of these came 
from the academic and business communities
46, with 70 and 47 contributions 
respectively. The legal profession
47 also made a noteworthy contribution to the debate. 
There was, however, a more limited representation of only 4 responses from consumer 
associations, in contrast to the business sector. Although this may readdress the consumer 
focus that had prevailed at the EU level to date, it must also be considered when assessing 
the Communication’s results. Support for the initiative was received from other the EU 
institutions.
48 They requested that, as a follow-up to the initial consultation process, the 
Commission’s observations and recommendations for future measures be published. 
These are presented in the 2003 Action Plan. Within it, the Commission presented its 
conclusions and refined the proposals, in light of the collected results and opinions, as to 
the most appropriate future action that the EU could take in overcoming the problems 
identified. Because of the level of interest generated by the 2001 Communication and the 
apparent influx of scholarly publications which ensued, the Commission was confident in 
                                                 
42 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/communication2001_en.htm. 
43 2003 Communication, para 4. 
44 7 responses received from outside the EU. 
45 Governments, business community, consumer organisations, legal practitioners and academics. 
46 47 Representing the manufacturing industry, retail, financial services, media and others (see Annex I: 
List of all contributing stakeholders, Summary of responses to the 2001 Communciation, 1.  
(http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/summaries/sum_en.
pdf). 
47 27 responses. 
48 European Council, Response to the 2001 Communication on European Contract Law (2001) 
(doc.12735/01), and European Parliament resolution on the approximation of the civil and 
commercial law of the Member States, 15.11.2001, A5-0384/2001.    25
concluding that the ideas expressed in its first Communication had fallen on fertile 
ground. It provided them with the necessary mandate to pursue work in this field.
49  
 
2.2.2 Clifford Chance Survey on European Contract Law 
 
In 2005 a survey was commissioned by Clifford Chance LLP in an attempt to gauge 
business views on the Commission’s initiative and proposals to date, and to gain a greater 
understanding of the effect that divergent national laws had on businesses operating 
within the internal market.
50 While the law firm supported the Commission’s aim of 
improving the quality of EU legislation in the area, they had vocalised misgivings 
regarding the possibility of further harmonisation activity at the European level and the 
Commission’s proposals which they felt were related to this aim.
51 In particular, they 
were of the opinion that the case for a comprehensive European contract code to address 
the problems in cross-border transactions had not yet been made by the Commission.
52 
While it was conceded that in some cases obstacles arose from the diversity of national 
contract law and that these gave rise to costs for businesses, they did not consider a 
harmonised European contract law to be the appropriate response. 
 
The advancement of this opinion and the commissioning of the survey must be 
considered in view of Clifford Chance’s position in Europe. It is the largest exporter of 
legal services, benefiting from a broad client base, including leading banks, multinational 
and national commercial organisations and governmental and regulatory authorities. As a 
result, the law firm had an interest in maintaining the status-quo in European contract 
law, to the extent that law can be considered as a commodity. In the case that the 
harmonised rules formed a mandatory European code, parties could no longer choose 
between the 27 legal systems to govern their contracts, and in particular those systems 
which are particularly prevalent in international transactions, such as English law. This 
                                                 
49 2003 Communciation, para 8.  
50 Clifford Chance Survey on European Contract Law, April 2005. 
51 In particular the Commission’s proposal for a Common Frame of Reference, discussed in Chapter 4. See 
Clifford Chance’s comments on the European Commission’s Action Plan.  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/stakeholders/4-5.pdf. 
52 Ibid. para 7–11.   26 
could result in a considerable amount of international legal business being lost to non-EU 
states, and would risk serious damage both to individual law firms within the EU, and to 
a large sector of the European economy in general. It has thus been advanced that by 
2005, and despite two follow up Communications by the Commission, the questions first 
put forward by the 2001 Communciation had still not been conclusively answered.
53 The 
survey thus sought to determine whether the users of contract law, i.e. businesses, find 
that different national laws act as an obstruction to trade and, if so, whether they 
considered that a European contract law would help.
54 
 
Although the Commission’s consultation had attempted to substantiate this thesis and the 
theory behind the calls for harmonisation by seeking to ascertain the views and 
experiences of all interested parties, the Commission itself conceded that the process 
could not provide a complete picture of the problems in the internal market.
55 It remained 
the case that little research beyond this had been undertaken to establish whether the call 
for harmonisation was a sound one in the B2B context. It is pertinent to note in regard to 
the level and nature of the interest and awareness of the initiative that the Commission 
managed to generate, that most contributions from the business sector came from 
business associations and councils. The consultation process had failed to obtain the 
views of individual businesses: those who use European contract law on a regular basis. 
This trend was similarly apparent in the 2003 Communication where the Commission’s 
new proposals for European contract law, which were based on the findings of the former 
communication, were met with a fall in response by the business sector.
56 It was thus 
considered necessary to ask European businesses whether they thought a European 
contract law was necessary.
57  
 
                                                 
53 See, Vogenauer and Weatherill, The European Community’s Competence to Pursue Harmonisation of 
Contract Law – an Empirical Contribution to the Debate, chapter 7 in The Harmonisation of European 
Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice, Vogenauer & 
Weatherill (eds.), 117. The authors of this paper were the academic advisors to Clifford Chance for the 
survey and their account of the process of the survey forms the basis of this discussion.   
54 Survey, 2.  
55 2003 Communication, paragraph 15. 
56 29 responses, from 122 overall, this was also a general fall in responses from the 2001 Communciation 
(181). 
57 Survey, 2.    27
The survey was conducted amongst 175 businesses across 8 Member States.
58 The 
participants belonged to a wide range of industries,
59 and were large
60 and small in size. 
Some of them operated at national and European levels while others could be regarded as 
global players. It was considered important to ensure that SMEs were appropriately 
represented in the survey,
61 given the strong presumption that SMEs will suffer more 
acutely from the existence of differences between national contract laws, and therefore 
they represented approximately one fifth of the respondents. Those interviewed on the 
whole worked in the legal departments of their firms, or were directors, vice-presidents, 
company secretaries and similar.
62 
 
The survey was prepared in collaboration with the Oxford Institute of European and 
Comparative Law and all questions were approved and, in some cases, formulated by the 
academic advisors. However, before the participants were interviewed they were sent a 
background note, intended to provide those who were unfamiliar with the debate with an 
opportunity to reflect on the key issues that would be addressed by the questionnaire.
63 
This information and the framing of the debate was particularly important for the 39% of 
respondents who, prior to being contacted for the purposes of the survey, were unaware 
of the Commission’s initiative in this area.
64 It was, therefore, necessary for the academic 
advisors, who were also involved in the formulation of this information, to ensure not 
only that it was correct, but also that the issues were presented in a balanced and unbiased 
way.
65 Notwithstanding this academic objective, the information note provides an insight 
into the views which Clifford Chance held of the Commission’s initiative to date, and 
highlights the issues that they wished to address through the survey. Thus the information 
note takes as its starting point what is viewed as the end objective of the debate initiated 
by the Commission, namely a harmonised European contract law, be it a replacement for 
existing national legal systems or as valuable addition to them. In seeking business views 
                                                 
58 For a full account of the methodology see Weatherill & Vogenauer (2006), 60 and the Survey, 2. 
59 Survey Appendix, Table A2.  
60 At least 250 employees. 
61 19.4% (a fifth) were small (10- 49 employees) or medium (50- 294 employees) size enterprises. 
62  Survey, 2. 
63 See Weatherill & Vogenauer (2006), Appendix A: Background Information, 140. 
64 Ibid. 138 in footnote 61. 
65 Weatherill & Vogenauer (2006), 119.   28 
on the direction in which the Commission’s proposals have gone, they present the 
initiative to date as “tentative steps that could eventually lead to a European contract 
law”.
66 Whether this is a fair portrayal of the Commission’s Communications and 
proposals is questionable.  
 
In regard to the 2001 Communication, the information note presents a balanced view of 
the questions asked in that process and the proposals but forward by the Commission. 
The account is, however, somewhat biased in its description of the Communication, 
describing it as a consultation on the possible harmonisation of contract law, despite the 
fact that the content of this section demonstrates that harmonisation was only one of four 
possible solutions advanced by the Communication. Further discussion in the note refers 
to the subsequent communications,
67 including the responses in these Communications to 
the notion of a harmonised European contract law, and the proposals put forward therein. 
Significantly, nothing in this account reveals an explicit plan on the part of the 
Commission for the comprehensive harmonisation of European contract, be it mandatory 
or otherwise. Indeed, the note refers to a statement of the Commission stressing that it is 
not their intention to propose a “European Civil Code” which would harmonise the 
contract laws of the Member States.
68 This does not, however, prevent the tone of the 
information note appearing openly sceptical of the true intentions of the Commission in 
regard to several of its proposals in this area which, although not being their stated 
purpose, could ultimately lead to a harmonised European contract law.
69 One weakness in 
the otherwise factually correct account of the Commission’s Communications is, 
therefore, the importance that the background note attaches to the possible harmonisation 
of contract law. The survey sought to discover whether a European contract law would 
serve the purposes of business better than the existing individual national laws, or provide 
businesses with a valuable addition to them.
70 The information note is very clear; it is 
only if the existence of different contract laws within Europe do obstruct business that 
                                                 
66 Weatherill and Vogenauer (2006), Background Information, 140.  
67 2003 and 2004 Communications. 
68 Background Information, 142, See 2004 Communication, 2.3. 
69 Notably, the CFR and its connection to a possible optional instrument. 
70 I.e. should it take the form of an opt-in or opt-out instrument co-existing with national contract systems, 
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there is a powerful reason for a change in the direction of that proposed by the 
Commission. If, however it is shown through this survey not to be the case, then it is 
concluded that the Commission should direct its energies into other areas.
71  
 
2.2.3. Key Questions 
 
From the foregoing discussion of the Commission’s initial 2001 Communication and the 
Clifford Chance Survey, it is clear that the consultations share a number of objectives or 
key questions. First and fundamentally, they had to ascertain whether the co-existence of 
different national contract laws acted directly or indirectly to obstruct the proper 
functioning of the internal market. This question would have to be answered in the 
affirmative, if the Commission was to justify any further EU action in the area of contract 
law. In particular, such evidence is crucial in regard to the EU’s competence to pursue 
any further harmonisation in the area.
72 It would also be necessary, if the Commission 
was going to convince stakeholders and the users of contract law, who would potentially 
share the same scepticism as Clifford Chance, that further action was necessary in order 
to gain support for their proposals. The Clifford Chance Survey in this regard sought to 
extend the scope of the Commission’s Communication by considering the extent to which 
not only legal, but also non-legal, obstacles existed between Member States. It sought to 
discover the nature of such obstacles, whether financial or otherwise, and ultimately the 
extent to which they acted to deter cross-border contracting.
73 
 
The second common objective of the consultations was to determine whether existing EU 
legislation in the area of contract law, which is characterised by its sector-specific and 
minimum harmonisation approach, was an adequate response to such obstacles. The 
Clifford Chance Survey sought specifically to address those concerns raised by the 
Commission regarding differences in the implementation and interpretation of EU 
Directives across Member States. In particular, the survey was intended to determine how 
                                                 
71 Background Information, 143. 
72 Tobacco Advertising. 
73 Questions 2- 5 of the survey.    30 
significant the obstacles arising in this regard were across Member States, and the extent 
to which they impinged upon a business's ability to conduct cross-border trade.
74  
 
The third shared objective was to ascertain the views of stakeholders on the possible 
solutions proposed by the Commission to the problems experienced, in the event that they 
were shown to exist, and if the existing approach of the EU was shown to be 
unsatisfactory. The Clifford Chance Survey focused upon the creation of a harmonised 
European contract law, be it one which would replace existing national laws or one that 
would co-exist in parallel with them. In the limited alternative, the survey presented more 
uniform implementation and interpretation of EU Directives as the other possible course 
of action, or ultimately that none of the above would be the preference of businesses.
75 
Clearly, the options presented by the survey do not reflect the width of the debate on the 
future approach to be taken to European contract law, as presented by the Commission.  
 
2.3. The Findings 
 
This section presents the combined findings
76 of the Commission’s 2001 
Communication
77 and the Clifford Chance Survey. It presents an overview of the results 
in an attempt to answer those questions postulated in Section 2.2.3. It then considers the 
specific obstacles which are identified in the processes as arising for the respective 
market actors; businesses, SMEs and consumers, and the impact that they have on their 
ability to trade effectively with each other in the internal market.  
 
The results confirm the internal market hypothesis; the existence of obstacles and 
disincentives to cross-border trade arising, directly or indirectly, from divergent national 
rules of contract law. These are exacerbated by the limitations of the EU’s legislative 
approach to harmonisation in overcoming those problems.
78 Indeed, the Clifford Chance 
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Survey confirmed that 65%
79 of the total number of respondents experienced some form 
of obstacle to trade existing between EU Member States.
80 In terms of the nature of the 
obstacles, however, the survey sought to rank
81 the impact of legal obstacles within a 
wider range of factors capable of impeding cross-border trade. In this way the survey 
gives a greater understanding of the existing obstacles, as opposed to the contract law 
focus of the Communication.
82 Those factors presented could also be divided between 
policy and non-policy induced issues. Thus in the first instance, variations between legal 
systems, differences in the implementation of EU directives, the cost of obtaining legal 
advice, tax, and bureaucracy and corruption, could all be addressed through legislation. In 
the latter case, namely cultural differences and language, they could not.
83 The approach 
reflects that not all were convinced, at that stage, of the existence or the degree of impact 
that contractual obstacles were purported to have within the internal market. Indeed, 
many consider that there are other barriers to cross-border trade, such as language and 
differences in cultural traditions, which are more significant than the existing diversity of 
laws.
84  
 
In result, however, it was the policy induced factors that were viewed as slightly more 
significant by the respondents, although the results for all seven factors were closely 
collated around, or just below the central point, being 5.
85 Respondents noted appreciable 
impact on their ability to conduct cross-border transactions arising from the variation 
between legal systems, the associated cost of legal advice, as well as problems in the 
implementation of EU directives, as could be expected from the internal market 
hypothesis. However, the strong impact of tax suggests that it is not just contractual 
                                                 
79 Appendix, Table A3, 14% experiencing obstacles to a ‘large extent’, 51% experienced obstacles to ‘some 
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81 1= no impact, 10 = high impact. 
82 The Communication sought concrete examples of cases in which differences between the contract laws 
of the Member States had made cross-border trade more difficult, 2001 Communication, para 72.  
83 See Vogenauer & Weatherill, (2006), 126. 
84 For example, the reaction of legal practitioners to the Action Plan, 7.  
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divergences which detrimentally impact in trade. The impact of the non-policy factors of 
language and cultural differences were ranked only marginally lower on the impact scale. 
Nevertheless, the academic advisors to the Clifford Chance Survey concluded that the 
legal differences have a comparably strong adverse impact on cross-border trade. 
Although the survey therefore confirmed the existence of obstacles arising from the 
existing divergences in national contract systems, and from the impact of the EU’s 
legislative approach at national level, it becomes necessary to return to the 2003 Action 
Plan. This identified the specific nature of those obstacles arising from issues of contract 
law.   
 
2.3.1. The Effect of the Co-Existence of Different National Contract Laws on the 
Proper Functioning of the Internal Market 
  
The 2003 Action Plan identified the divergence of rules on fundamental issues of contract 
law as a specific and fundamental problem for the functioning of the internal market.
86 
Contributions confirmed that differences existed between contractual systems at all stages 
of the contracting process, from divergent rules relating to the formation of contract, to 
differences in regard to the validity, interpretation, and performance.
87 Respondents made 
clear that the only way to ensure legal certainty was to take local legal advice, which they 
viewed as being an expensive and inconvenient solution for an everyday act, as well as 
confirming that divergences lead to distortions in competition.
88 
 
Respondents further highlighted specific problems with the use of standard terms and 
conditions.
89 The Communciation identified the existence of divergent rules on their 
inclusion and application, that is to say, on incorporation, admissibility, and over the level 
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88 2003 Communication, para 34 and see Business reactions to the 2001 Communication in the summary of 
responses, 6. 
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of control that national systems will exercise over their use. It was concluded that these 
differences result in uncertainty for businesses and make it necessary for them to use 
different standard contracts in different Member States. As a result they incur additional 
administrative costs, despite the fact that the use of standard contracts is intended to 
facilitate cross-border trade.
90 Distinct problems are also identified as arising from the use 
of retention of title clauses and other securities. Reservation of title for example, is 
regulated differently between states, and thus the effectiveness of such contract clauses 
can vary between states.
91 Contributions identified this as an example of a significant 
aspect of this debate, which concerns the relationship between contract law with that of 
the law of obligations and the law of property.
92 These areas of law play an important role 
in the conclusion and performance of contracts, not only, for example, where the exporter 
of goods wants to ensure a security interest over their goods, but also interact with the 
law of sales, in particular the rules on the transfer of property. It is thus advanced that the 
lack of uniformity in the areas adjacent to the law of contract, combined with the 
diversity inherent in the latter, can itself create a significant obstacle to the proper 
functioning of the internal market. As such, it becomes apparent that the future of 
contract law cannot be advanced without proper consideration of its interaction with the 
laws of property, tort and unjust enrichment.
93  
 
A caveat must, however, be made as, as was discussed in regard to the problems 
associated with choice of law;
94 it is clear that not all (diverging) rules of contract law are 
capable of forming significant obstacles to trade. The findings begin with a distinction 
between mandatory and non-mandatory, or dispositive rules, as contributors stressed that 
the main problems of contract law in the market result from those provisions which 
restrict the parties’ contractual freedom.
95 While the Commission acknowledged the 
argument that many of the problems for cross-border trade can be avoided by choosing 
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95 2003 Communication, para 26 and see for example, the response of Orgalime (Industry) to the 2001 
Communciation. 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/2.1.7.pdf   34 
the appropriate applicable law, it also highlighted that the use of choice of law is not 
always a commercially realistic or desirable option. It is, for example, of little assistance 
to parties where the applicable mandatory rules are not those chosen by the parties as the 
applicable law,
96 or to the party which does have the bargaining power to impose their 
choice.
97 The Clifford Chance Survey confirmed that although 83% of respondents 
thought that it was important to be able to choose the applicable law of the contract, two 
thirds of those, unsurprisingly, opt for their own law in negotiations.
98 This evidences the 
belief that at least one party to the contract will be unfamiliar with the applicable law, or 
that in the case of deadlock, this will be both, if a neutral law is preferred. In either case, 
the Communication indicates that taking advice on the unknown applicable law will 
involve considerable legal costs and commercial risk for the affected party to the 
contract. The impact of such costs will be felt more acutely by SMEs where the cost of 
legal assistance, which will be proportionately higher than for larger enterprises, may 
discourage them from entering cross-border transactions.
99   
 
It is clear that most obstacles experienced by market actors can be overcome by legal 
advice, and the residual problem is cost. Respondents to the Clifford Chance Survey 
confirmed that the existing obstacles have a financial impact on their companies. 62% of 
those who felt that obstacles existed between states considered them to have a large or at 
least some financial impact on their trading capabilities.
100 It was, however, clear that 
these costs were not wholly prohibitive of trade. Only 27%, although still a significant 
percentage, were often or sometimes deterred from conducting cross-border transactions. 
The consensus appeared to be that the existence of differences, and thus the resulting 
costs, may determine whether a deal is viable or not, but that it would not stand in the 
way of a lucrative contract.
101 The effect would, however, presumably depend upon the 
parties to the contract, i.e. be they large or small businesses. Nevertheless, and returning 
to those key questions put forward, both the Commission’s Communication and the 
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Clifford Chance Survey confirmed the existence of obstacles to trade arising from the 
existing state of national contract laws. This raises the issue of how EU legislative 
intervention in this area had affected cross-border trade; whether it had reduced the 
obstacles to intra-state trade or, as feared by the Commission, had created a distinct group 
of problems for the internal market. 
 
2.3.2 Adequacy of the Existing EU Response to the Obstacles Experienced in the 
Internal Market 
 
The Commission’s Communication confirmed shortcomings in the EU’s existing 
legislative approach, owing to its preference for sectoral and minimum harmonisation. It 
identified problems within EU legislation in this area, as well as problems arising for the 
uniform implementation, interpretation and application of the acquis communautaire at 
national level. Internally, the acquis communautaire is shown to suffer from a number of 
inconsistencies. The Commission notes that it currently provides for the application of 
different requirements and consequences to the same commercial situation with the effect 
that similar situations are treated differently without relevant justification. In other cases 
it is possible for several directives to be applicable to the same circumstances, while also 
producing conflicting results.
102 So, for example, in some cases it is possible to apply 
both the Doorstep Selling Directive and the Timeshare Directive, both of which give the 
consumer a right of withdrawal; however, the time period in which they allow the 
consumer to exercise this right is different.
103 A further underlying and critical problem 
identified for the acquis communautaire is the use of abstract terms in directives: terms as 
fundamental to the law of contract as “contract” itself are often either too broadly 
defined, or not defined at all.
104 This is exacerbated by the absence of a common 
contractual vocabulary at European level, and thus a lack of common definitions of what 
can be new and often alien concepts, introduced into national contract systems. The 
present internal state of the acquis is thus not only a problem at European level but is also 
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capable of impacting upon the coherence and consistency of national contract law,
105 
resulting in great uncertainty for commercial and legal practice.  
 
Together with the prevalence of the minimum harmonisation approach, the result is that 
the acquis is not achieving the uniformity of solutions for similar situations that the 
internal market would require.
106 Member States are left with a large degree of discretion 
as to the implementation of EU legislation, resulting in fragmented levels of consumer 
protection. Inconsistencies will also occur between Member States in application and 
interpretation, owing to the internal state of the acquis, meaning that similar cases may be 
decided differently, depending on the State in which the law is applied. Indeed, the legal 
profession made clear in their responses to the 2001 Communication, that it was 
necessary, in advising their clients, not only to know the relevant EU law, but also how 
the directive had been implemented in the Member State in question.
107 Businesses noted 
that differences at the national level lead to distortions of competition, particularly in the 
context of consumer protection, where the implementing measure may exceed the 
minimum level of protection fixed by the EU measure.
108 These responses were 
confirmed by the Clifford Chance Survey, which indicated that six out of ten respondents 
had experienced significant differences in the implementation and interpretation of 
directives.
109 However, despite the foregoing, when asked how EU directives and 
regulation had affected cross-border trade and, in particular, whether it had reduced or 
increased obstacles, 59% of the Clifford Chance respondents held that they had in fact 
reduced obstacles, while 29% concluded that they had made no difference at all.
110  
 
Given these somewhat conflicting findings in regard to the existence of obstacles arising 
from the legislative action of the EU in the area, it becomes necessary to consider 
whether the existing approach to the harmonisation of European contract law has been a 
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sufficient response to the identified problems for the internal market, or whether other 
possible solutions would be more appropriate.  
 
2.3.3. Proposals for Future Action 
 
One of the principal conclusions that the Commission drew from the initial consultation 
was that it was possible to continue with the existing sector-specific approach to 
harmonisation.
111 However, in light of the above findings, and overwhelming support 
from respondents for Option III of the 2001 Communciation, and the improvement of the 
existing EU law in the area of contract law, it was necessary to take action to increase the 
coherence and consistency of the existing and future acquis in the area.
112 This measure 
also gained support from the Clifford Chance Survey, where the majority of 
respondents
113 opted for more uniform implementation and interpretation of European 
directives as the best means for achieving a more harmonised European contract law. The 
preference for maintaining the status-quo in the area, subject to improvement, by the 
respondents of both surveys therefore lends great support to the proposals for future 
action in the area.  
 
The Commission’s 2003 Action Plan presented a mix of non-regulatory and regulatory 
approaches
114 which could be taken in order to overcome some of the problems 
identified, with the improvement of the existing and future acquis being the key action. 
The Commission’s object was to achieve a European contract law with a high degree of 
quality and consistency in its drafting as well as implementation and application.
115 This 
would require the review of existing measures in order to remedy the identified 
inconsistencies, fill the existing gaps and simplify existing measures where necessary.
116 
Central to the implementation of such action would be the creation of a Common Frame 
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of Reference (CFR) for both EU and national legislators
 .
117 This would create an overall 
methodology and terminology for European contract law and would thus also serve to 
address the fragmentation of the acquis internally, as well tackle the problems identified 
as occurring at national level for the implementation and interpretation of EU 
measures.
118  
 
In addition to the improvement of EU legislation in the area, the 2003 Action Plan also 
proposed a number of other measures aimed at resolving the identified problems for the 
market. These included the elaboration of EU-wide standard terms to overcome the 
problems experienced by businesses wishing to utilise standard contracts as a means of 
facilitating trade in the internal market.
119 Significantly, the Commission would also 
continue to reflect on the opportuneness of non-sector specific measures, such as an 
optional harmonised instrument of European contract law, to facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services in the market.
120 This proposal gained support from the results of the 
Clifford Chance Survey, with 83% of all businesses asked viewing the concept of a 
harmonised contract law favourably or very favourably.
121 They were, however, drawn as 
to whether such a law should replace or exist in parallel with national contractual 
systems.
122 30% of businesses approved of the introduction of European contract law, 
while a similar number (28%) favoured an optional instrument. The Commission’s 
intentions to continue to reflect on such options in the Action Plan were therefore 
warranted. Indeed, the academic advisors to the Clifford Chance Survey, who concede 
that they are not uncritical enthusiasts of the Commission’s proposals in the area, 
concluded that their findings are more supportive of the Commission’s activities than 
they could have expected.
123   
 
However, to appreciate the most appropriate way forward for European contract law, it 
becomes necessary to consider the impact of the obstacles for the respective market 
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actors: businesses, SMEs and consumers. Although it is clear from the foregoing analysis 
that the existing state of European Contract law can act to render cross-border 
transactions less attractive for market actors, the level of dissuasive effect may vary 
according to the nature of the transaction and thus the contracting parties involved. It is 
thus common to distinguish between the impact of the obstacles on business to business 
(B2B) and business to consumer transactions (B2C). However, for reasons advanced 
above concerning SMEs, and in particular their ability to manage the associated 
additional costs of cross-border contracting, they will also be considered as a distinct 
group and transaction in the following sections.  
 
2.3.4. Business to Business Transactions (B2B) 
 
In response to the Communication, businesses confirmed that greater obstacles arise for 
the function of the internal market, where the contractual freedom of the parties is 
limited. Respondents noted that industry is able to deal with differences arising from non-
mandatory or dispositive national contract rules, and some highlighted the successful use 
of standard terms and conditions between the Member States to this end.
124 However, it is 
clear from the Commission’s 2003 Communication that this success is not one which is 
shared by all industries, and that many businesses experience obstacles to contracting due 
to divergence of national rules on the inclusion and application of standard contract 
terms.
125 The result is that few businesses have successfully managed to create EU-wide 
standard terms and conditions as a tool to facilitate trade.
126  
 
It is domestic mandatory rules, those forming the applicable law of the contract, which 
the parties cannot vary or exclude and which can conflict with their usual law of business, 
which create the most acute barriers to cross-border trade. Responses commonly 
identified different rules on formation, limitation periods, the use of exemption clauses, 
the validity and applicability of standard terms, and rules concerning the transfer of title 
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and security in goods, as adversely affecting the possibility of entering cross-border 
contracts. Orgalime noted a problem commonly experienced by businesses, which is the 
application by national courts and legislation of consumer protection principles to 
business contracts. This once again, and in this context quite unnecessarily, limits the 
parties’ freedom of contract.
127 Examples include the strict formal rules applied in Italy 
for the inclusion of general conditions in contracts, and the French principle that the seller 
cannot limit liability for a hidden defect (“vice cache”), even where the other contracting 
party is also a professional. They maintain that they create unnecessary problems in B2B 
contracts, and thus call for a strict distinction in the application of such rules in these 
contexts.
128  
 
The existence and impact of obstacles can, however, be seen to vary according to the 
nature of the industry in which the respondents are involved. For example, contributions 
from the manufacturing industry did not consider that the present state of European 
contract law resulted in significant obstacles to cross-border trade.
129 It was noted that in 
most cases private international law, international harmonised law, notably the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), and existing EU law provided 
adequate solutions to the existing diverging state of national rules. However, it could be 
advanced that by virtue of both European and international harmonisation, from which 
they benefit in this area, they are not experiencing the most severe obstacles arising from 
divergences in national systems. In contrast, the financial services sector pointed to 
fundamental problems in cross-border trade, owing to Member States'
130 different 
contractual requirements and approaches. A distinct problem for financial services is that 
the products are embodied by the contracts which form them. This means that the nature 
and availability of financial products will be determined in accordance with local legal 
requirements.
131 Thus businesses in the sector will be unable to provide cross-border 
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financial services because their products are state specific, or will be deterred from 
offering their services in other Member States because of different national rules which 
would result in excessive adaptation costs, or unacceptable uncertainty, and place them at 
a competitive disadvantage to local providers.
132 
 
However, in the B2B context, and across the areas of trade and industry in the 
consultation,
133 it was held that on the whole such problems can be overcome by the 
choice of the appropriate applicable law by the parties. Indeed, in this context, the use of 
choice of law will not suffer equally from the deficiencies in this approach described in 
preceding sections, as larger businesses contracting together are more likely to be of 
comparative bargaining power. This is not to say, however, that the negotiation process 
may not result in the adoption of a neutral law where the parties reach deadlock, and this 
in turn will potentially involve cost implication for one or both parties if they are 
unfamiliar with the chosen law.
134 It is, however, common for parties operating and 
contracting in a particular area of trade to agree to contract under a commonly used 
neutral state law, for example English law. Through repeated use and practice, this will 
become familiar to parties operating in the sector as the common governing law of their 
contracts. A spontaneous degree of harmonisation and certainty will result through the 
parties’ choice, and this will eventually overcome those fears of legal surprise and the 
associated legal costs arising from them which act as obstacles to trade. As discussed, a 
further example of what can be termed as private harmonisation of trade practices is also 
being brought about through the use of EU-wide standard contract terms and contracts, 
which are developed by trade associations to meet the particular needs of specific 
markets, although with varying degrees of success. In these ways, through the exercise of 
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contractual freedom in this context, commercial parties are overcoming the existing 
limitations of European contract law.  
 
Contracting parties are also increasingly turning to international commercial arbitration 
as an alternative means of resolving disputes and avoiding the application of national 
law.
135 This also allows them to avoid the deficiencies of choice of law, which simply 
acts to render an otherwise international contract subject to national contractual systems. 
Indeed, in so far as arbitration allows for the application of non-national, transnational 
harmonised standards, and the lex mercatoria,
 136 the increase in its use indicates that 
businesses are not necessarily committed to the resolution of their disputes in accordance 
with national laws.
137 The growth in the use of arbitration can therefore be seen as a sign 
of dissatisfaction with the traditional approach of national regulation. The current 
practices of international trade in overcoming obstacles to cross-border trade arising from 
divergent national contract rules is clearly an important facet of the contract law debate, 
which must be acknowledged in considering the most appropriate way forward for 
European Contract law in the B2B context.
138 
 
2.3.5. Business to Small and Medium Size Business Transactions (B2SME) 
 
Although SMEs will experience the same obstacles to trade arising from contract law as 
larger enterprises, it has been maintained that the impact of such obstacles may be more 
acute, owing to the difficulties for SMEs in offsetting additional associated costs in order 
to maintain viable and profitable cross-border transactions. Indeed, responses to the 2001 
Communication confirmed that, owing to the current divergent state of contract law, 
SMEs are particularly vulnerable to the significant transaction costs that can arise, and 
this is in part because they lack both the financial capabilities and the legal infrastructure 
possessed by larger enterprises.
139 Few SMEs will have the appropriate cross-border, in-
house legal advice enjoyed by larger enterprises, or the size or finances to establish 
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subsidiaries in the states of their principal trading partners, and thus also have access to 
the language capabilities necessary to support cross-border trade.  
 
The results of the Clifford Chance survey, however, gives rise to some doubt about the  
extent to which SMEs actually suffer more acutely than larger enterprises, as consistently 
throughout the survey the results for SMEs do not differ significantly from those of major 
enterprises.
140 When asked how far obstacles to cross-border trade exist between Member 
States, 65% of all businesses, including SMEs, said that they experienced obstacles to a 
large or some extent. The figure for SMEs alone
141 was surprisingly similar at 68%. 
However, in considering these results, as others within the survey, caution should be 
taken in comparing SMEs results against larger enterprises, as they accounted for only 
19% of the respondents.
142 This representation of SMEs was considerably out of line with 
the distribution of enterprises in Europe, where 85% of enterprises are deemed small, 
12% medium and only 3% large. It is surprising, in this context, that the latter category 
was the principal focus of the survey and accounted for 81% of respondents. SMEs are, 
therefore, significantly under-represented in the process and the usefulness of these 
results is questionable for those who wish either to substantiate or to invalidate the 
contention that SMEs suffer more acutely as a group from the present state of European 
contract law.  
 
As stated, the principal contention is that SMEs suffer more acutely from additional 
transaction costs inherent in cross-border transactions. The survey confirmed that 55% of 
SMEs who experienced obstacles to trade felt that they impacted financially to a large or 
to some extent on their organisations,
143 and, perhaps unexpectedly, a larger percentage 
of large enterprises
144 (65%) said that the obstacles impacted financially on them. The 
issue is, then, whether the financial impact of obstacles, which is felt to a significant 
extent by both groups, is such as to deter cross-border trade. In response to this question, 
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there is, once again, a surprising proximity in the results from between larger businesses 
and SMEs. 31% of SMEs who reported obstacles to trade concluded that these, and their 
financial impact, deterred them either often, or at least sometimes, from conducting cross-
border trade.  In comparison, 27% of larger enterprises were sometimes or often 
deterred.
145 These results may lead one to conclude that the presumed variance in impact 
may not be as great as articulated by those involved in the hypothetical debate. However, 
regard must also be given to the nature of the obstacles which deter trade for the 
respective groups, as SMEs ranked all policy-induced obstacles higher than the average 
results for businesses at large, including variations in legal systems, differences in 
implementation and the cost of obtaining legal advice.
146 Differences in language, culture 
and tax issues, on the other hand, figured more prominently across the wider business 
group. Thus, although the degree to which obstacles deter trade for larger businesses and 
SMEs does at first sight appear comparable, the evidence suggests that SMEs suffer more 
from, or at least perceive as more significant, the legal and specifically contract related 
obstacles within the internal market. This lends credence to the belief that SMEs suffer 
more acutely from the present state of European contract law.  
 
The next issue that must be addressed is the capacity of SMEs to overcome these legal 
obstacles in order to participate in cross-border trade. Here, it is clear that choice of law 
to overcome contractual obstacles is not as useful as for larger enterprises, owing to 
SMEs' inequality in bargaining power, which means that contractual freedom is deficient. 
In practice, the more powerful party will impose the law of their home state, as well as 
their standard terms and conditions, on SMEs, leaving them open to legal surprise due to 
lack of knowledge about the applicable law and their inability to obtain cost effective 
legal advice.
147 Similarly, even in contracts between SMEs, the parties will often fail to 
make a choice of law as this will usually be part of standard contract terms, and smaller 
businesses will not have these owing to the cost of legal advice.
148 SMEs will, therefore, 
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often subject their contractual relations to an unfamiliar default law, and commonly and 
unknowingly to the provisions of international sources of law, notably the CISG.
149 
Otherwise small companies may only concern themselves with the most desirable 
governing law after a dispute has arisen.
150 The Clifford Chance Survey confirms that, in 
terms of current cross- border trade practice, and the importance of being able to choose 
the governing law of the contract, businesses as a whole showed a much stronger 
preference for the use of choice of law than SMEs as a distinct group.
151 This result is 
clearly reflected in the prominent use by larger businesses, of equal bargaining power, of 
choice of law as a tool of international trade. However, while freedom of contract and use 
of choice of law remain the principal mechanisms in the internal market to overcome 
existing obstacles, it is clear that SMEs will continue to be in an unfavourable contractual 
position vis-à-vis larger businesses. In view of the foregoing, and to facilitate trade for 
SMEs, as by far the largest business constituent in the market, the future approach to 
European contract law would have to acknowledge the needs of this group in order to 
readdress this balance.
152  
 
2.3.6. Business (SME) to Consumer Transactions (B(SME)2C) 
 
Businesses wishing to sell or provide services to consumers in Member States other than 
their own will encounter obstacles arising from differences in national contractual rules in 
two ways.
153 In the first place, diversity in national regimes will arise from the fact that 
the EU's harmonised consumer protection rules are based on the principle of minimum 
harmonisation. In allowing Member States to maintain rules which are more favourable 
to consumers than those provided for in the EU measures, the level of consumer 
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protection and the content of the rules varies between States.
154 Secondly, businesses 
encounter difficulties because of the underlying differences in national regimes, which 
remain outside of the scope of the harmonisation measures. For example, the right to and 
measure of damages is governed entirely by national law in the context of consumer 
sales.
155 Businesses, therefore, have to acquire local legal advice and will incur additional 
transactions costs associated with this increase in legal risk. This is exacerbated because 
the mandatory nature of consumer protection rules prevents businesses from using 
contractual freedom to overcome these obstacles. An effective choice of law by the 
parties cannot deprive a consumer of the protection of the mandatory rules of their 
habitual residence, where the professional party directs their activities at this home 
state.
156 The result is that businesses are exposed to additional contractual risks and the 
multiple mandatory rules of up to 27 consumer protection regimes if they wish to target 
consumers in all Member States.  
 
This situation is unaltered by the EU’s harmonised consumer protection measures. To 
take as an example the Doorstep Selling Directive:
157 contributions from the retail trade 
isolated this measure, and its uneven transposition into national law, as a distinct obstacle 
to direct selling in the internal market.
158  Thus the Federation of European Direct Selling 
Association
159 reported that the Directive had led to insufficient harmonisation in this 
context owing to the use of minimum harmonisation. This had allowed, for example, 
national legislation to exceed the period of cancellation of a contract beyond the 
minimum period of 7 days,
160 and to further lower the minimum threshold provided for 
by the Directive for the consumer contract to fall within its scope.
161 The use of this 
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technique has, therefore, led to additional uncertainty and created further unnecessary 
barriers to cross-border trade. This conclusion can also be implied from the results of the 
Clifford Chance Survey, where 71% of respondents from the consumer and retail 
industries said that they experienced obstacles to cross-border trade, which is markedly 
higher than the average percentage in other industries, which stands at 58%.
162 Despite 
this, when asked how EU legislation had affected cross-border transactions, 65% of the 
consumer and retail industry maintained that the EU intervention had in fact reduced 
obstacles to trade, which is above the average of the industries, at 59%.
163 
 
It is clear, however, that businesses will be discouraged from engaging in cross-border 
transactions with consumers owing to the legal risks involved. Their inability or 
unwillingness to contract with consumers in Member States other than their own is to the 
detriment of consumers, who will be discriminated against based on whether the business 
is willing to contract under the law of their country of habitual residence.
164 The deterrent 
effect of obstacles is considered, for reasons already outlined, to be felt in particular by 
SMEs.
165 The present situation demands a great deal in terms of the trading capabilities of 
businesses to provide cross-border sales and services to consumers. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, businesses most likely to be involved in cross-border distance retailing are 
medium and medium-large retail enterprises, with a limited number of outlets in other 
Member States and with existing language capabilities.
166 
 
Consumers are, therefore, also detrimentally affected by the present state of European 
consumer law. This is in part due to businesses' unwillingness to sell to consumers in 
different Member States, thereby reducing the range of goods and availability of offers to 
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consumers from alternative suppliers in other Member States. The present situation, 
however, also detrimentally affects consumers in their own right. The response of 
consumer associations to the 2001 Communciation
167 confirmed that disparities in 
national contract law create real uncertainties for consumers because they do not have 
enough information on the applicable law
168 and, further, the choice of law regime does 
not always provide assistance from this perspective. Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation 
does not apply in the case of an active consumer who wants to take advantage of 
opportunities offered by the market.
169 In cases where the law of their habitual residence 
is not the applicable law to the contract, they may be subject to the standard terms and 
conditions of the trader and thus subject to their chosen law, or the applicable law may be 
determined objectively under the private international law regime.
170 In either case, the 
need for the consumer to acquire legal advice prior to the conclusion of the contract may 
be more important, and will lead to increased transaction costs and may even deter them 
from engaging in cross-border transactions.
171  
 
In practical terms, but with clear regulatory underpinnings, it is after-sales issues which 
are seen to influence consumers’ willingness to acquire goods and services from 
businesses in other Member States. Provisions on delivery, complaints and refunds and 
difficulties in taking legal action are seen as significant obstacles to cross-border trade 
from their perspective.
172 It was noted by one respondent that consumers are being 
encouraged to participate in the Single Market without there necessarily being any 
adequate safeguards or means to exercise rights of redress when things go wrong and 
that, as such, differing contract law was only one factor and, in their view, not the one 
                                                 
167 Summary of responses to the 2001 Communication, 7.  
168 Consumer confidence in the internal market is undermined by a lack of information, with only a fifth of 
European consumers knowing where to obtain information and advice about cross-border shopping, E-
Commerce report (2009), 12. The lack of information is mirrored by businesses in this context, with two-
thirds of EU retailers unsure of where they would obtain information about consumer regulations in the 
different Member States, Flash Eurobarometer 224 (2008), 38.    
169 2003 Communication, para 31.  
170 Articles 3 and 4 Rome I Regulation.  
171 2003 Communciation, para 31.  
172 Summary of responses to the 2001 Communication, 7 and, Vogenauer & Weatherill (2006), 115.    49
requiring the most urgent attention.
173 From the consumer’s perspective, and at a basic 
level, it is also the fact that such transactions are occurring across borders which is 
considered to complicate and render more difficult such purchases. In particular, 
language and cultural barriers act to deter consumers from purchasing goods and services 
from other Member States.
174 The result is that consumer confidence in cross-border 
contracting is low. This combined with businesses' unwillingness to offer goods and 
services to consumers in other Member States, means that neither group is fully 
benefiting from the potential of the internal market.
175 It is clear, however, that as distinct 
market actors, businesses and consumers are being deterred from contracting with each 
other for very different reasons. Both reflect the fact that European consumer contract 
law in its present state is not an adequate means of ensuring the proper functioning of the 
internal market for their benefit.  
 
2.4. Evaluation 
 
This section first evaluates the extent to which the questions posed in 2.2.3 have been 
addressed and answered. It then assesses how successfully the consultations have 
satisfied the need for empirical evidence in three key aspects: first, the EU’s competence 
to pursue further action in European Contract Law; secondly, the understanding of the 
contractual obstacles to the completion of the internal market; and, finally, whether the 
way forward for European Contract Law has been ascertained. 
 
Regarding whether the co-existence of different national contract laws acted directly or 
indirectly to obstruct the proper functioning of the internal market, both initiatives 
confirmed the existence of impediments to cross-border trade. However, these were not 
shown to be prohibitive of trade and could, on the whole, be overcome through local legal 
advice. The residual obstacle to cross-border contracting is, therefore, financial and trade 
depends upon market actors' financial capacity to overcome legal difficulties. 
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The Commission’s 2001 consultation confirmed that greater obstacles to trade arise 
where contractual freedom is limited. It was shown that, on the whole, (larger) businesses 
are well placed to deal with dispositive rules through legal advice, choice of law and the 
ability to vary and exclude such rules, often resulting in the formulation of standard terms 
and conditions. It is the domestic mandatory rules of the chosen law which act as 
obstacles to cross-border trade. In the B2C context the problem is more acute, as 
contractual freedom is substantially limited when a business directs its activities at the 
consumer’s home state, in which case it will have to comply with the mandatory 
consumer protection provisions of the consumer’s habitual residence.  
 
This fundamental distinction between the impact of dispositive and mandatory rules on 
cross-border trade is very important to the reflection on the nature of future action. It was, 
however, not specifically addressed by either consultation. Although the 2001 
Communication highlighted that conflicts between different mandatory rules may have a 
negative impact upon cross-border transactions, it failed to ask respondents specifically to 
distinguish between the effect of mandatory, as opposed to dispositive, rules. The 
disparate impact was, however, confirmed by the responses. Similarly, the Clifford 
Chance Survey failed to distinguish between the effects of such rules. Its failure to 
address this fundamental distinction is part of a wider criticism: that the initiatives lacked 
the focus necessary to determine, with clarity, the specific problems facing the internal 
market due to differences in contract law at national level.
176 If it had been made clear to 
respondents that the consultations were concerned only, for example, with dispositive 
rules and their effect on trade, then the results may have been quite different. In all 
likelihood, those who did confirm the existence of obstacles were concerned with the 
impact of conflicting mandatory rules on their contractual freedom. Such information 
would have aided the understanding of whether, if a harmonised instrument is supported, 
it should contain mandatory and/or dispositive rules. The usefulness of the results was 
further undermined in this respect by the fact that the questions posed by the Clifford 
Chance Survey failed to distinguish between the nature of the transaction in which the 
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respondents were participating, be it B2B or B2C. Such analysis would have aided the 
understanding of the specific nature of the obstacles at this level.
177  
 
In sum, both initiatives confirmed the existence of obstacles to trade arising from the 
existing state of European contract laws. They further highlighted inadequacies at the 
national level in facilitating cross-border transactions. Choice of law was shown to be an 
inadequate solution and, in particular, of little assistance where the contracting parties are 
not of equal bargaining power. It is also evident that businesses are turning to market-
based solutions,
178 and away from national regulation of their contracts. It is, however, in 
the EU’s existing legislative approach to the acquis communautaire, and in the B2C 
context, that distinct inadequacies are apparent. 
 
The second question addressed whether the EU’s legislation in the area, characterised by 
its sectoral and minimum approach to harmonisation, was an adequate and suitable 
response to such obstacles. Both consultations confirmed the existence of problems for 
the uniform application of EU law. These included internal inconsistencies in the acquis, 
as well as problems at national level concerning its implementation, interpretation and 
application. The EU’s focused activities in this area have failed to achieve a sufficient 
level of harmonisation and have, in fact, led to additional uncertainty.  
 
Despite these findings, when considering the solution to the identified problems, the 
Commission concluded in the 2003 Communication that it was possible to continue with 
the existing sector-specific and fragmentary approach to harmonisation. However, in light 
of the findings, it was necessary to take action to increase the coherence and consistency 
of the existing and future acquis in the area. This proposal was certainly warranted and it 
has formed the focus of European action and resources in the area. Significantly, it is 
those academics at the forefront of the original harmonisation debate who are undertaking 
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work on the creation of a Common Frame of Reference, the Commission’s key action, 
and the accompanying review of the acquis communautaire. 
 
In a similar vein, an increase in the uniform implementation and interpretation of EU 
Directives was the preferred method of bringing about further harmonisation by the 
respondents of the Clifford Chance Survey.
179 However, despite the survey seeking to 
ascertain what the users of contract law think about the Commission’s proposals, it failed 
to seek respondents' views on the CFR as the key proposal in this area. This was, 
however, fully discussed in the information note preceding the survey. This reflects the 
imbalance of the consultation in this respect, which focused on the desirability of a 
harmonised European contract law as the solution and – whether or not it was the 
intention in commissioning the survey – the concept did find support from 
respondents.
180 In favouring more uniform implementation and interpretation of the 
acquis communautaire, however, the respondents took one opportunity to express support 
for the Commission’s proposals in the area beyond harmonisation.  
 
A further limitation of the approach taken by the Clifford Chance Survey is its failure to 
distinguish between B2B and B2C transactions in presenting the results. One is left to 
presume, given the consumer focus of the acquis communautaire in the area, that it is 
businesses contracting with consumers in other Member States which experience those 
problems associated with the existing state of the European harmonisation measures. It is, 
therefore, those respondents who would favour the improvement of the acquis 
communautaire, and thus by implication, those involved in B2B transactions, that are in 
favour of a harmonised European contract law. This conclusion, however, cannot be 
reached with certainty, as it may be that those commercial actors involved in B2B 
transactions that favoured the acquis option as a means of preventing further 
harmonisation or limitation of contractual freedom via the creation of a (compulsory) 
harmonised European contract law. As such, again, it is the lack of specific focus of the 
survey, in the formulation of questions and presentation of results, which hampers the 
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search for effective and distinct solutions necessary for facilitating trade in the internal 
market.  
 
Regarding the Commission's other proposals, in addition to the continuation of the sector-
specific approach traditionally utilised, they also undertook to continue to reflect upon the 
opportuneness of non sector-specific measures: notably, an optional instrument of 
European contract law. This proposal, which was specifically addressed by the Clifford 
Chance Survey, gained the unwitting support of respondents, who indicated that they 
would be likely to use such an instrument.
181 The Commission’s final proposal, which 
was not addressed by the survey, was to promote the elaboration of EU-wide standard 
terms and conditions, as a response to those obstacles identified by the Communications 
that hampered the use of standard contracts across borders. The Commission 
subsequently decided, however, not to pursue this proposal.
182 They questioned the utility 
of such terms, and in the result were unconvinced that economic actors would in fact 
benefit from the exercise.
183 
 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the findings of the consultations, in identifying 
obstacles to trade and to the proper functioning of the internal market, confirmed the need 
for further EU action in the area of European contract; providing competence to take the 
proposed actions.
184 Further, the Commission’s proposals, and thus the ‘way forward’ 
outlined in the 2004 Communication, had found support and approval.
185 However, the 
extent to which the consultations strengthened the original harmonisation debate and, 
more specifically, advanced the understanding of the contractual obstacles in the internal 
market is open to question.  
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Both initiatives can be criticised for lacking the sufficient focus necessary for 
determining with absolute confidence the specific nature of the problem facing the 
market, and thus advancing our understanding of what an effective solution would be. 
The Clifford Chance Survey in particular fails to make fundamental distinctions, which 
are central to this debate, concerning the nature of the transactions at issue, be it B2B or 
B2C and in distinguishing between the nature of the rules which are in fact creating 
obstacles to trade. It is conceded, not only by the academic advisors to the Clifford 
Chance Survey, but also the Commission, that the responses received respectively, cannot 
be presumed to give a complete picture of all the problems which may exist for the 
functioning of the market arising from the present state of contract law.
186 Both initiatives 
can therefore be criticised for failing to optimise the extent of interest and resources 
which fell behind the debate at this time, in order to substantiate it.  
 
A further ground for these criticisms is the small sample sizes of both initiatives. The 
findings of the 2001 Communication were based upon the responses of only 180 
respondents, which were intended to cover all interested stakeholders in the debate. The 
largest proportion of these came from the academic and business communities. Of the 
latter, contributions were dominated by business associations. This raises the question of 
how successful the Commission's Communications had been in informing interested 
parties about the debate and their involvement in it. Only 61% of the Clifford Chance 
Survey business respondents knew about the Commission’s initiative in this area before 
being approached by the survey. The individual business focus of the Clifford Chance 
Survey therefore made a welcome contribution to the continuance of the debate. 
However, this consultation also involved a modest sample of respondents, with 175 
companies in 8 Member States participating and as few as 12 responses from some 
Member States.
187 Further diminishing the value of the Clifford Chance Survey was its 
failure accurately to represent the distribution of enterprise by size in Europe in its chosen 
sample. In particular SMEs, which represent 97% of enterprises within the internal 
market, were significantly under-represented in the Survey, which is unfortunate given 
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the significance attached to the needs of this group in the harmonisation debate. While it 
is presumed that SMEs suffer more acutely from the identified contractual obstacles, the 
results of the survey cast doubt on this presumption in terms of comparability vis-à-vis 
large businesses. The impact of such obstacles was not seen to have a significant 
differential impact on SMEs. It is, however, submitted that the sample size of SMEs 
considered in the survey
188 was insufficient to substantiate these beliefs in one way or 
another and should thus be treated as inconclusive.
189 Indeed, the Commission remains 
convinced of the weak trading position of SMEs vis-à-vis large businesses, and thus of 
the need to specifically assist this group in the internal market; to create a more 
predictable regulatory environment for them in order to decrease their compliance costs 
and more generally to allow them to trade more easily across the EU.
190 
 
The significance of the consultations should not, however, be undervalued to the extent 
that they met their objectives in substantiating and thus reinforcing the ongoing debate. 
They provide it with a greater, although not complete, understanding of the existing 
problems for the internal market arising from the present state of European contract law. 
The consultation initiated by the Commission signified the EU’s willingness to engage in 
a more fundamental discussion about the future needs of European contract law, and the 
debate thereafter has been enhanced by the commitment of resources and political will. 
Beyond this, the Clifford Chance Survey was an important complement in terms of its 
commercial focus. The fact that it was conducted without the involvement of the EU 
lends credibility to the results and, importantly from the Commission’s perspective, 
support for their future actions. The consultations thus also succeeded in a secondary 
objective, by making a case for further EU action in the way that the Commission’s 
Communications has envisaged. Thus, they go some way towards meeting the objections 
and scepticism of those who remained unconvinced of the need for further harmonisation 
in the area.  
 
                                                 
188 19%. 
189 Particularly as the 2003 Communciation confirms that they do suffer more acutely.  
190 Commission Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis COM (2006) 744 final, 4. The need to 
assist SMEs specifically in cross-border transactions is discussed in Chapter 6.    56 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The empirical evidence validates the internal market hypothesis: the existence of 
obstacles and disincentives to cross-border trade arising, directly or indirectly, from 
divergent national rules of contract law. These are exacerbated by the limitations to date 
of the EU’s legislative approach to harmonisation, which has attempted to overcome 
those obstacles. The case for further EU action in the area of European contract law is 
thus a sound one. It must, however, be acknowledged that the present state of contract 
law in deterring cross-border trade is only one of a host of other factors. Among these, 
are language, differences in cultural traditions and the perception that transactions are 
made more difficult simply because that they are occurring across borders. The general 
inadequacies in the existing approach to facilitating cross-border trade within the internal 
market, and in particular choice of law, have also been demonstrated. These issues and 
their net effect must also be overcome in the way forward.   
 
The debate now advances, in so far as the need for a comprehensive harmonised 
instrument is concerned, on the basis of an optional instrument of European contract law. 
Such an instrument could act as a tool to facilitate cross-border trade for both B2C and 
B2B contracts. In particular, given the weak position of SMEs in the market, it is 
apparent that this group could benefit greatly from the creation of a harmonised body of 
contractual rules. This proposal must necessarily, however, be joined by the review of the 
consumer acquis and elaboration of a CFR, to improve the coherence and consistency of 
the acquis communautaire, which in its present fragmentary state creates a distinct 
obstacle to B2C trade. The proposals, therefore, while addressing the distinct obstacles 
arising in the internal market, present two levels of response. In the latter case, the 
proposals are directed at obstacles arising from the existing harmonisation approach at 
the European level. An optional instrument, on the other hand, would address obstacles 
arising at national level, from the divergence in national contract rules. Whether these 
proposals provide suitable and sufficient solutions to address the current obstacles, and 
thus whether they present the best way forward, remains to be considered.    57
Chapter 3 
 
The Wider Debate 
  
The Commission’s proposals must be considered against the background not only of the 
internal market hypothesis, and the objective of facilitating cross-border trade within the 
internal market, but also against the wider issues and objectives which have impacted on 
the harmonisation debate in general and, now, on these proposals in particular. This 
chapter will, therefore, consider the wider economic,
1 social, cultural,
2 and political 
considerations
3 that bear on the future approach to be taken. This will assist in 
determining how far the proposals provide solutions which are not only suitable, in the 
sense of facilitating trade,
4 but also desirable, from the wider perspectives. It will further 
consider the extent to which such issues are being accommodated within the ongoing 
process conducted by the Commission.  
 
In the first place, however, the proposals and the following discussion must be viewed in 
light of the traditional solution that has been advocated in response to the internal market 
hypothesis. This has been the creation of a harmonised European contract law, or wider, a 
European civil code, to replace the law of the Member States. There has, however, been a 
lack of support for such a move for reasons relating to the wider issues to be discussed. 
As a result, calls for alternative action have arisen, such as those articulated by the 
Commission in the 2001 Communication. Thus, although the Commission proposed at 
that stage the adoption of comprehensive legislation at EU level,
5 this was presented with 
a number of options as to its form and binding nature. These included mandatory 
harmonisation of the existing laws of Member States: a European contractual code, and 
an optional instrument of European contract law. In the latter case, parties could either 
choose to opt-in to the contractual system as the applicable law of the contract in place of 
                                                 
1 Section 3.1.  
2 Section 3.2.  
3 Section 3.3.  
4 Chapter 2.  
5 Comprising provisions on general contract law as well as specific contracts. Option IV, 2001 
Communication, 16.    58 
a national system, or to opt-out, leaving them free to choose, if they so wished, to apply 
the law of another contractual system, i.e. a national system.
6 In either case, the optional 
system would co-exist with national law. In light of the responses
7 however, the 
Commission distanced itself from the creation of a mandatory contractual system and, 
along with the proposals aimed at improving the coherence and consistency of the 
existing and future acquis in the area, narrowed its proposal to the creation of an optional 
instrument of European contract law. Further (optional) harmonisation of European 
contract law, as the necessary and appropriate response, therefore remains central to the 
Commission’s proposals to facilitate trade in the internal market.   
 
3.1. Economic and Competition Issues 
 
From an economic perspective, the principal argument in favour of harmonisation has 
concerned the internal market hypothesis. Both the Commission and sectors of the 
academic community have looked to justify further harmonisation, or ultimately the 
creation of a European contractual code, in order to facilitate cross-border trade, with 
reference to this economic argument.
8 Because of the empirical evidence, however, it no 
longer maintains this hypothetical nature. Nevertheless, there remain a number of 
powerful and practical counter-arguments against the internal market hypothesis 
specifically and further harmonisation in general.  
 
While many recognise that harmonisation may in fact be advantageous for the internal 
market, by enhancing legal certainty through the creation of a neutral body of law which 
will assist businesses in operating more efficiently and cost effectively within the 
European market, they also highlight that it may impose costs which are disproportionate 
to the gain.
9 Such arguments surround the potentially negative adaptation costs and 
                                                 
6 These options are discussed in detail in chapter 6.  
7 Responses to the 2001 Communciation differed on the necessity and justifiability of this proposal. Few 
contributions outwardly supported the creation of a mandatory European contract code, with a number of 
Member States speaking out against such an instrument replacing their national laws and there were doubts 
as to whether the EU would have the competence to create an instrument of this nature and scope, see 
generally, summary of responses to the 2001 Communication, 17.  
8 Discussed in Chapter 2, 2.1.  
9 See for example, the Information note to the Clifford Chance Survey, 142.    59
unpredictability that would confront both businesses and legal practitioners, arising from 
the introduction of a new system of contractual rules.
10 In response to the 2001 
Communication’s proposal, it was highlighted by one respondent that any plans to create 
a mandatory European contractual system or, on a grander scale, a European civil code, 
could only be a long-term aim. It would need to be developed in stages, including the 
voluntary approximation of laws, so that businesses would not be suddenly confronted 
with massive adjustment costs.
11 Those who hold this view
12 may, therefore, see merit in 
an optional instrument as an interim measure, to the extent that its application would be 
voluntary. However, such concerns can also be levelled at this proposal, as the 
unpredictability and potential costs of a new legal instrument may render parties reluctant 
to take the lead in the harmonisation process, preferring to learn, initially at least, from 
the negative costs of others. Following on from this, it is also clear that an institutional 
structure would be needed to support such harmonisation. Uniform laws alone cannot 
ensure a uniform interpretation of the instrument across the Member States, and this 
suggests a pronounced role for the European courts in this project, if legal certainty is not 
to be undermined.
13 
 
Ultimately, a strong body of opinion exists that harmonisation is simply not necessary 
and is thus a disproportionate response to the difficulties currently faced.
14 For those 
holding this view there are more significant barriers to trade, such as language, 
differences in cultural traditions, currency and distance, which will influence the 
behaviour of market participants. This finding is confirmed by the results of the Clifford 
Chance Survey where non-policy induced factors, i.e. cultural differences and language, 
                                                 
10 See, Lando, Optional or Mandatory Europeanisation of Contract Law (2000) 1 European Review of 
Private Law 59, 60, and Smits, Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal Market, Maastricht 
Working Papers (2005), 
http://www.unimaas.nl/default.asp?template=werkveld.htm&id=F60BL5P00MJO466V63M6&taal=nl, 27. 
Smits maintains that the costs of transition from one legal system to another, or put differently, the 
transaction costs of eliminating national legal systems, should not be overlooked as they too can be 
considerable. The costs also include those of political decision making and the costs of the effective 
realisation of the reform.  
11 Summary of responses to the 2001 Communication, 18.  
12 Also see Wagner, The Economics of Harmonisation: The Case of Contract Law (2002) 38 Common 
Market Law Review 995, 1018-19.  
13 See for example, Collins, An Academic Green Paper (2002), 276, and see discussion in Chapter 6, 6.4.1.  
14 For an account of these arguments see, McKendrick (2006), III Why object to the creation of a European 
contract law, 19.    60 
were ranked only marginally lower on the impact scale to the policy induced factors, 
including the existence of variations between legal systems.
15 It is also clear that 
psychological barriers exist for both businesses and consumers. It is the fact that 
transactions are occurring across borders which acts to undermine their confidence, and 
thus at one level the problems that exist for cross-border trade are one of perception. For 
example, it is those businesses without direct experience of cross-border trade - most 
likely SMEs
16 - that are more concerned about the possible obstacles, than those already 
trading.
17 This should not, however, discredit the internal market hypothesis and the 
empirical evidence. It is in fact a distinct problem which, along with those issues 
discussed here, must be overcome in the future approach to European contract law. The 
solution will need to encourage such businesses to engage in cross-border trade.
18  
 
Those against the harmonisation of European contract law also maintain that the 
problems encountered from the law of contract cannot be viewed in isolation. This is 
because of the lack of uniformity in the areas with which contract interacts, such as 
property, tort and unjust enrichment. This means that the harmonisation of contract law, 
as an attempt to remove the trade barriers, would also require the review of the 
interaction between these areas, in articulating the future approach.
19  
 
A final group of arguments points to the fact that the internal market, among others, 
already functions as single market despite the existence of different national laws. In 
response to the 2001 Communication, the UK government highlighted that the UK itself 
is an example of a ‘perfectly functioning single market,’ despite the fact that differences 
exist between the Scottish and English legal systems.
20 They also noted that the states of 
the USA also have different laws of contract without these inhibiting the single American 
market. However, it must be advanced that the UK overlooked the significance of the US 
Uniform Commercial Code in advancing this view, and in particular the extent to which 
                                                 
15 Chapter 2, 2.3.  
16 Chapter 2, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.  
17 Flash Eurobarometer 224 (2008), 22 and 23.  
18 Discussed in Chapter 6, 6.4.  
19 See Chapter 2, 2.3.1 and McKendrick (2006), 23.  
20 Response of the UK Government, 
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this uniform body of commercial rules has facilitated intra-state trade. It is further 
contended that there is no need to harmonise at the European level as there are already 
international harmonised instruments, notably the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods. This body of rules can be adopted by parties to contracts 
made within the EU and, potentially, by the EU itself.
21  For those expounding this view, 
the relevant issue at debate is to determine the appropriate level for harmonising contract 
law and regulating cross-border trade. At the European level, internationally or not at all, 
leaving it to domestic regulation and thus variation? From an economic perspective this 
question is concerned with the issue of the centralisation or decentralisation of legal rules, 
and thus with the question of the optimal vertical allocation of competences.
22 It is 
necessary, therefore, to look at the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. 
 
The economic arguments in favour of harmonisation, or centralised regulation of contract 
law, draw on the gains that will arise for market participants from the creation of a level 
playing field. At present, the existing differences in national contract laws isolate 
domestic markets from competition from businesses in other Member States. Businesses 
are reluctant to enter new markets due to the inherent legal uncertainties and, where they 
do enter, they are placed at a competitive disadvantage in the form of transaction costs 
vis-à-vis domestic businesses which are familiar with the home state regulations.
23 The 
enhancement of legal certainty through harmonisation is thus to be welcomed under this 
view to the extent that it would reduce information and transaction costs arising from the 
existing divergence, which mean that it is more costly to contract under a decentralised 
system,
24 and thus overcome barriers to cross-border trade and result in greater 
competition. There are, however, those who consider the creation of a level playing field 
undesirable, fearing that the effect may be anti-competitive, as benefits to trade in fact 
arise where parties can exploit differences.
25 Further, the harmonisation of contract law 
may not, after all, result in a level playing field for businesses across Europe, as it would 
                                                 
21 McKendrick (2006), 23 and 29.  
22 Kerber and Grundmann, An Optional European Contract Law Code: Advantages and Disadvantages, 
(2006) 21 European Journal of Law and Economics 215, 216; Van den Bergh, Forced Harmonisation of 
Contract Law in Europe: Not to be continued, An Academic Green Paper, (2002), 250 
23 See, Wagner (2002), 1005.  
24 Kerber and Grundmann (2006), 221.  
25 Van den Bergh (2002), sees this as a prerequisite for trade, 253.    62 
leave ‘competitive distortions’ intact in other fields of regulation, i.e. those areas adjacent 
to contract. Such differences would then become more apparent.
26 Van den Bergh 
maintains that it is not in fact possible to create a level playing field, since businesses will 
retain competitive advantages in some states owing to variations in the level of regulation 
in areas such as wages and labour productivity.
27 This underlines that differences in 
contract law is only one factor which raises transaction costs for cross-border trade. 
Higher transport costs and additional bank expenses, for example, will continue to make 
such transactions undesirable or untenable.
28 The creation of a level playing field and the 
presumed benefits of this through the harmonisation of contract law alone is simply not 
feasible.  
 
The effect of centralised regulation
29 is to reduce competition between legal systems, 
which is disadvantageous given that a monopoly on regulation can result in inefficiencies 
as the regulator is left with no incentive to reduce legal costs.
30 Decentralisation, on the 
other hand, encourages innovation and adaptability to new problems and thus increases 
efficiency.
31 With centralisation, therefore, there is the perceived risk of a resultant 
decline in the quality of the legal systems. Proponents of this view advocate the continued 
promotion of regulatory competition within the internal market and thus the process by 
which, “legal rules are selected and de-selected through competition between 
decentralised, rule making entities, which could be nation states or other political units”.
32  
 
                                                 
26  Ibid.  
27 Van den Bergh (2002), 253.  
28 Collins (2002), 276.  
29 Discussed for example by Weatherill, Why Harmonise? (in) European Law for the Twenty First Century: 
Rethinking the Legal Order (Tridimas, Nebbia eds.), (2004), Chapter 2, 15.  
30 Van den Bergh (2002), 256.  
31 I.e. Competition between governments creates incentive to develop new efficient rules. For further 
discussion on the nature and effects of decentralisation, see, Wagner (2002), 1001- 1003; Kerber and 
Grundmann (2006), 222, and Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of 
Economic Analysis to Comparative Law (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 405, part 
B.  
32 Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe? (2006) 12 (4) European 
Law Journal 440, 441.     63
Regulatory competition can be seen to pursue three objectives which are highly relevant 
to the debate concerning the future approach to be taken to European contract law.
33 In 
the first place, the theory provides that differences in legal rules allow for the greatest 
satisfaction of wants or preferences of the consumers of law to be met, while also 
maintaining diversity. Such diversity not only leads to the former object, but can also be 
seen as a good itself from a number of perspectives, including the socio-cultural.
34 
Ultimately, regulatory competition can aid and promote information flow between 
systems, thus allowing for learning processes towards better law and, potentially, 
resulting in greater convergence between legal systems.
35 Existing legal diversity in the 
internal market is thus seen as an advantage which should be preserved.
36 This conclusion 
is confirmed by current trade practices and the prevalence of use of choice of law.
37 As 
Goode maintained in response to the 2001 Communication, there is value in retaining the 
diversity of legal systems in the area of dispositive law, allowing contracting parties to 
select from a wide choice of law which best suits their needs.
38 Thus the maintenance of 
diversity would maximise the satisfaction of wants of market participants
39 within the 
internal market, while also ensuring the other beneficial effects discussed above.  
 
On this view, it is thus advanced that the regulation of contract law should be 
decentralised unless there is compelling reason for this power to be vested at a higher 
level.
40 Indeed, as Van den Bergh maintains, competition between legal systems should 
only be rejected if it would result in a ‘race to the bottom,’ whereby the quality of the 
legal systems would be too low. This possibility is then rebutted by the fact that 
international trade and regulatory competition will, in fact, result in a race to the top as 
                                                 
33 Discussion is based in part on Deakin’s, discussion of Tiebout’s theory on regulatory competition, Ibid. 
442. 
34 See discussion, Section 3. 2.  
35 See, Ogus (1999), 409, and Van den Bergh (2002), 254.  
36 See generally, McKendrick (2006), 27.  
37 At least in the B2B context, see discussion of Clifford Chance Survey results in this regard, Chapter 2, 
2.3.5.  
38 Goode, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.6.pdf. 
Para 11, while also recognising the value of harmonising mandatory law.  
39 Deakin (2006), 442.  
40 Wagner (2002), 1002.    64 
states will compete to retain and attract economic resources.
41 A caveat must however be 
made, as the theory of regulatory competition is based on a number of assumptions which 
cannot be considered as realistic,
42 particularly in the case of the internal market. 
Significantly, it rests on the assumption that consumers and businesses are informed on 
existing differences between legal systems, and that they know of the costs and benefits 
associated with that.
43 On this basis it is presumed that they can make a rational choice 
between the systems as part of their choice of law, in order to choose a law which 
satisfies their preferences, and which results in competition between those systems.
44 The 
empirical evidence has, however, demonstrated that parties in making or becoming 
subject to a choice of law will often know very little about the applicable law, or of its 
costs or benefits.
45 If parties are to gain such information then the resulting obstacle to 
contracting is financial. The existence and strength of competitive pressure between the 
systems, to bring about those benefits of decentralisation outlined above, will therefore 
depend on the cost of making an informed choice of law.
46 If the cost of that information 
outweighs the costs of the transaction it is unlikely that the choice of law will be an 
informed one which will reflect the parties’ preferences. As such the benefits of 
regulatory competition cannot be realised, as competition between the contractual 
systems is undermined by the existing transaction costs.
47 The need to address such costs, 
which result from existing decentralisation, thus remain and clearly demand 
harmonisation of European contract law.
48  
 
It is clear, therefore, that both centralised and decentralised levels of regulation present 
both advantages and apparent disadvantages for the internal market and its participants. 
At a basic level, questions arise as to the feasibility of harmonisation in any case and thus 
the possible creation of a level playing field of regulation within the internal market. It is 
                                                 
41 Van den Bergh (2002), 253 and 260.  
42 See, Wagner (2002), 1006. The assumptions are made by Tiebout’s theory of regulatory competition.  
43 Ibid, 107.  
44 Wagner (2002), 1010, and Ogus (1999), 408.  
45 This is particularly for SMEs, see Chapter 2, 2.3.5.  
46 Ogus (1999), 408.  
47 Wagner (2002), advances that the transaction costs of a deliberate choice of law in all but the most 
exceptional cases by far exceed the gains to be obtained from such a decision, and thus prove prohibitive, 
1011.  
48 Ibid. 1011-12.    65
also clear, however, that on balance neither approach rules the other out. It could, 
therefore, be advanced that the way forward for European contract law would be to 
combine the advantages of centralised and decentralised regulation, while minimising the 
perceived disadvantages or limitations through the creation of an optional instrument of 
harmonised contractual rules.
49 Indeed, it is highlighted that the basic assumption of the 
optional instrument is that neither a fully centralised or decentralised system of contract 
laws is the optimal solution, but some combination of both.
50 As such contracting parties 
should have the choice between national and European rules,
51 and thus the addition of a 
28
th contractual system of contract rules would prove a useful addition to market 
participants. 
 
 
3.2. Social and Cultural Issues 
 
This section considers further the apparent need to balance the desire to facilitate trade 
within the internal market trade through harmonisation, with the need to respect the value 
of legal diversity, inherent in the EU in articulating the future approach to be taken to 
European contract law. Specifically, it will address a group of what can be termed as 
“value” arguments.
52 These are characterised by the belief that, although European 
integration may require further legal measures for facilitating trade within the internal 
market, these measures cannot be regarded solely as a technical problem. Ultimately, 
certain value choices will have to be made, and therefore criticism exists of the market-
orientated agenda with which the EU has pursued this debate.
53 The Commission can be 
criticised for failing to address many significant issues in this respect.  
 
                                                 
49 This approach gains support from Kerber and Grundmann (2006), 228, and Wagner (2002), 1023.  
50 Kerber and Grundmann (2006), 219.  
51 Ibid.  
52 See for example, Wilhelmsson, The Legal, the Cultural and the Political – Conclusions from Different 
Perspectives on Harmonisation of European Contract Law (2002) European Business Law Review 541, 
544.  
53 See specifically, the Special Edition of the European Law Journal on the Future of European Private 
Law, published in response to the Commission’s 2003 Action Plan (2004) 10 (6) European Law Journal, 
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Such criticism comes despite calls, from the beginning of the EU’s involvement in the 
debate, for them to consider the social functions of contract: that it facilitates social as 
well as economic relations and is an articulation of a society’s values and principles of 
justice.
54 The Commission has, however, continued to advance and defend the needs of 
the internal market as the principal purpose for further action in the area of European 
contract law. The Communications have been viewed as presenting a series of technical 
measures to deal with technical problems, namely barriers to trade.
55 As Miller notes,
56 
by presenting the elaboration of the CFR as simply a technical, value-free exercise, the 
Commission obscures the real difficulties that harmonisation poses. Partly, this criticism 
recognises the connection between a state's contract law and its particular economic, 
political, philosophical and social choices and traditions, which applies equally to the 
articulation of a European contract law. It is clear, therefore, that if the harmonisation of 
European contract law is to mean more than simply the creation of "surface" rules, what 
is needed, and what many see as absent from the Communications, is recognition of the 
real issues at stake.
57 The Commission needs to engage more fully in discussion of what 
type of law a European contract should be: the philosophies on which it should be based, 
its functions and the values that inform it.
58 Their failure to do so and to continue to base 
their claims for harmonisation solely on the needs of the internal market may ultimately 
lead to resentment by those advocating this view.
59  
 
The issue that arises is why the Commission has failed to engage fully with these issues, 
and the answer lies in the EU’s competence. The market-orientated focus can be viewed 
as a means of empowerment, as the existence of barriers to trade arising from divergences 
in national regulation has proved to be the most successful justification for extending EU 
action in this field
60 and, specifically, for claiming a Treaty basis
61 upon which to pursue 
                                                 
54 See for example, The Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in European 
Contract Law: a Manifesto, Ibid. 653, 654 and Hesselink, The European Commission’s Action Plan: 
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55 Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law (2004), 662.  
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57 Ibid. 384.  
58 Miller (2007), 384.  
59 Hesselink (2004), 417.  
60 Thus the need for on empirical evidence, Chapter 2, 2.2.    67
further regulation.
62 The Commission has thus, quite properly, limited its discussion of 
the future approach to European contract law to discussion of areas within its 
competence: to examination of technical problems, while suppressing the more 
fundamental social and political questions.
63  
 
The concern remains that, while acting within its competence, the Commission’s narrow 
focus excludes issues and concerns addressed by national law, such as fairness, solidarity, 
equality and other basic values that contribute to social cohesion.
64 Ultimately there is 
doubt that the needs of the internal market alone can support the proposals for a uniform 
law.
65 The Social Justice Group goes further, questioning whether the EU has a mandate 
to pursue such a scheme of fairness or distributive justice and thus, ultimately, the EU’s 
competence in any case to create a suitable body of rules.
66 It is thus advanced that 
liberation from an exclusively market focus is both a necessary and desirable 
development in the furtherance of this debate.
67  
 
The task of ensuring a balance between private autonomy and social solidarity has, 
however, been viewed as an arduous one in the harmonisation process owing to the 
contradictory nature of these values.
68 The result is that existing harmonisation 
instruments imply a strong emphasis on liberal values, and the PECL are a key example 
of harmonised contract rules which are absent of such welfarist values and rules
69 In light 
of this, and given the prevalence of the market-orientated values of the Commission in 
conducting the debate, the concern is that the same fate awaits any harmonised 
instrument of European contract law originating with the Commission.
70 
                                                                                                                                                   
61 Namely Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC). 
62 Hesselink (2004), 413.  
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69  See Chapter 5, 5.2 for discussion of the nature of existing harmonised instruments at the international 
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70 See for example, Memorandum by Professor Geraint Howells, to the House of Lords European Union 
Committee on the Future of European private law (2005) 
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The extent to which provisions of consumer protection and other welfare principles can 
impinge upon freedom of contract, and thus the level of consumer protection to be 
afforded will always be contentious. The harmonisation proposal advances on the basis of 
the adoption of an optional instrument of European contract law that would apply to 
contracts between businesses and consumers, between businesses of equal bargaining 
power, but also with SMEs.  The Commission thus needs to strike the correct balance 
between respective values and interests. On the one hand, businesses will want to 
maximise contractual freedom and thus keep the level of consumer protection low, while 
at the same time benefiting from the harmonisation process in terms of increased legal 
certainty and reduced transaction costs. When contracting with SMEs, it will be 
necessary to redress the imbalance that exists in such contracts.
71 One way would be to 
extend protective consumer provisions and the principles of solidarity and fairness to this 
group, as akin to consumers.
72 Consumers themselves will require a sufficient level of 
protection vis-à-vis businesses in order that they remain confident, if not potentially 
becoming more confident, in entering cross border transactions in the internal market.
73 
These considerations need to be taken into account by the Commission in articulating the 
ideological basis of a European contract law. 
 
The concern that a harmonised regime of European contract law would reflect the same 
liberal imbalance apparent in existing harmonised instruments is, however, initially 
confounded by the Commission’s Communications. The Commission asserted that 
contractual freedom should be one of the guiding principles of a harmonised contractual 
law instrument, and that as such restrictions on this freedom should only be envisaged 
where it can be justified by good reason.
74 As a caveat, the Commission did acknowledge 
that some mandatory provisions aimed at protecting consumers will have to limit the 
principle in any potential optional instrument.
75 However, this qualification has done little 
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to allay the concerns. The Social Justice Group, for example, criticise the Commission for 
taking freedom of contract as the starting point and thus foreclosing the question of 
whether that principle should hold such a privileged position in governing policy 
choices.
76 Indeed, they are critical of the heavy burden of proof that any limitations must 
surpass in order to trespass on freedom of contract.
77  
 
Such concerns must, however, be balanced against the consumer-driven agenda which 
has dominated the acquis in this area to date, and which has more recently impinged on  
the contract law project, leading to the prioritisation of the proposed review of the 
consumer acquis. The prioritisation impacted upon the elaboration of the CFR,
78 which 
became, at least from the Commission’s perspective, a consumer-driven instrument
79 
owing to its relationship with the ongoing revision of the acquis.
80 The issue that arises, 
therefore, in the ongoing process is the impact that this prioritisation will have on the 
content and nature of the final CFR. This is particularly relevant as, following the 
prioritisation of the acquis and completion of the CFR workshops on those topics directly 
relevant to consumer contract law, the CFR workshops stopped.
81 This raised concerns 
even among the academic researchers that the Commission had no interest in including 
general principles of contract law within the harmonised instrument.
82  
 
The result could in fact be an instrument that is balanced too far in favour of social 
solidarity and fairness, and against contractual freedom. This is particularly alarming as 
the CFR is also to serve as a basis for an optional instrument of European contract law, 
which must balance the respective interests of market participants. The prioritisation of 
the consumer acquis within the CFR process exacerbated existing scepticism as to the 
origin of the European contract project, with the consumer Directorate of the 
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Commission, DG SANCO. In the UK, for example, business interests fear that the CFR 
will be heavily influenced by the origin of the instrument and that the balance achieved 
between the respective interests would fail adequately to reflect the Common law 
tradition and all that that encompasses, namely party autonomy, freedom of contract and 
legal certainty.
83 Concerns for the balance of interests achieved in the CFR also arise 
from confusion in regard to the relationship between an optional instrument and the CFR. 
The fear for some is that the final political CFR would look like a potential optional 
instrument
84 and, as such, one not fairly balanced in the interest of businesses.
85 
 
The immediate issue, however, concerns the balance which is achieved in the academic 
draft of the CFR.
86 In the first place, the DCFR
87 contains rules of general contract law as 
well as consumer rules. The idea that the draft could only deal with consumer contracts 
was rejected, as consumer law cannot be considered as a ‘self-standing’ area of private 
law. Rather it is drawn from deviations of general principles of private law, which must 
also be included within any harmonised instrument of European contract law.
88 The rules 
then take freedom of contract as their starting point. Natural and legal persons should 
therefore be free to decide whether or not to contract and with whom to contract. They 
should also be free to agree on the terms of their contract.
89 Such freedom will however 
be subject to any applicable mandatory rules, and thus must be balanced against the needs 
of justice.
90 Freedom of contract is, therefore, unaffected where the parties are of equal 
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bargaining power and are fully informed.
91 Where this is not the case, the rules of the 
DCFR will be tempered by the needs of justice and social solidarity and will seek to 
protect the weaker party. In this way, the contractual principles of freedom and justice are 
ensured and reflected within the model rules.
92  
 
They are joined, as the underlying principles of the DCFR, by the principles of security 
and efficiency. These are discussed in a self-contained section, which draws on the work 
on governing principles and the CFR project by the Association Henri Capitant and the 
Société de Législation comparée as part of the ‘CoPECL Network of Excellence’ who 
also prepared the Principes directeurs du droit Européen du contrat.
93 It is here that the 
principles are developed and illustrations of their operation provided in order to 
demonstrate their role within the DCFR. It was envisaged that this would assist the reader 
in understanding the instrument more fully as well as providing general guidance to those 
using the CFR, for example, in the preparation of legislation. Ultimately, as part of the 
draft text, it may be hoped that they provide considerations which might be taken into 
account in the transformation of the draft into a political instrument.
94 
 
Alongside the underlying principles, the introduction to the DCFR elaborates on a 
number of “overriding principles”. Although some of these are reflected in parts of the 
DCFR, they are considered by the Network of Excellence to be primarily relevant to an 
outside assessment of the DCFR as a whole.
95 They are considered to be highly political 
in nature and consist of the protection of human rights, the promotion of solidarity and 
social responsibility, the preservation of cultural and linguistic diversity, the protection 
and promotion of welfare and the promotion of the internal market.
96 In this way, the 
overriding principles reflect the wider aims and issues at stake in the European 
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harmonisation debate. Thus, the Network points to the impetus for the DCFR in its 
present form and for its present purposes.
97 On the one hand, it seeks to recognise cultural 
and linguistic diversity. The Network makes clear the principal purpose of the CFR is as 
a legislator’s toolbox. It is not an attempt to create a single European law, to replace that 
of the Member States. Rather, it seeks to enable people from diverse legal backgrounds to 
understand European legislation, and to reflect, as far as possible, all legal systems in the 
EU.
98 On the other hand, it arises from concerns about the harmful effects of the internal 
market arising from the excessive diversity of contract laws. The promotion of the 
internal market aim, an overriding principle, is considered as a subheading of the 
promotion of welfare, as the welfare of European citizens and businesses can be 
promoted by the DCFR through the promotion of the smooth functioning of the internal 
market. The Network highlights that the issue of whether this can be achieved simply 
through the DCFR’ toolbox function in improving the quality, and therefore accessibility 
and usability, of the acquis, or whether this may require the development of optional 
instruments, is ultimately a political decision.
99  
 
What is clear is that the academic researchers' approach to the DCFR goes some way 
towards addressing the concerns articulated in the beginning of this section, namely that 
the elaboration of the CFR is being treated as simply a technical, value-free exercise by 
the Commission and one which is not fairly balanced in the interests of all interested 
parties. The DCFR recognises and gives due attention to many of the real issues and 
interests at stake in the harmonisation process. The extent to which the Commission will 
engage with these issues and, although clearly desirable, the extent to which they will 
adopt the DCFR as the politically authorised text
100 is, however, still unclear 
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3.3. Political Issues  
 
The existing harmonisation debate can be understood as being concerned with the need to 
represent, reconcile and fairly balance the economic and socio-cultural aims and interests 
inherent within the EU and the national contractual systems. The issues and choices that 
arise therefore in creating a harmonised body of rules, and in the first place a CFR, as the 
basis for the revision of the acquis, and for future acquis and ultimately for the adoption 
of an optional instrument are of a political nature. As is already apparent in the academic 
text, the creation of a harmonised European contract law requires recognition and 
accommodation of the often conflicting interests discussed in preceding sections, which 
bear on the content of a body of harmonised rules. The harmonisation process is not 
merely a matter of technical input, but also political. This section will therefore outline 
the political issues and concerns that arise, many of which are related to the nature, 
demands and magnitude of the harmonisation project. It considers the extent to which 
they have so far been accommodated in the ongoing harmonisation work. 
 
The political nature of the harmonisation project can be considered from two 
perspectives. The first is the nature of the harmonisation process and its participants, i.e. 
EU institutions, stakeholders and academics, as well as the need to involve the public at 
large. It is clear that the involvement of the Commission in what was otherwise a private 
academic debate and effort to create a set of common European contractual rules 
converted this process into an EU program. It therefore became a political process and the 
Commission remains the dominant influence on the harmonisation agenda.
101 The 
project, however, remains an interplay between European institutions, including the 
European Parliament and Council, and European legal science,
102 with the continuance of 
the harmonisation work of the Commission on European Contract Law and Study Group 
on a European Civil Code within the research structure of the Co-PECL Network of 
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Excellence. Indeed, it is conceded by Von Bar that, if it were not for political 
developments, notably the European Council’s request at the Tampere Submit
103 for an 
overall study on the need to approximate Member States' legislation on civil matters, 
joined by calls from the European Parliament for work to begin on the unification of 
private law as being essential for the completion of the internal market
104, then the 
existing developments and, particularly, the possible political authorisation of a largely 
academic text
105 would not have occurred. The 2001 Communication on European 
contract law responded to these calls,
106 and the Commission equally acknowledged, at 
an early stage, that it would be essential in the elaboration of the CFR that existing 
research activities were to be continued and exploited to the full. It was, therefore, their 
goal in this respect to combine and coordinate the ongoing research with any new 
research activity, to avoid any repetition.
107 Thus, despite initial concerns advanced by 
the Study Group on Social Justice, the involvement of others, beyond the Commission, 
there is the prospect that those involved may appreciate the wider issues involved in the 
current harmonisation debate. However, while the Commission continues to influence the 
current agenda, the concern remains that the political process will be driven by a narrow 
market-orientated approach, unless this agenda is properly challenged.
108 
 
The second perspective is how the wider issues and debate must be addressed and 
accommodated within the political process of creating a harmonised European contract 
law. It is the nature of the decisions that are of a political nature, to the extent that 
contract law can be understood as an articulation of a society’s political values. As such, 
it is clear that a harmonised European contract law cannot be devoid of political 
judgments, nor treated as a technical exercise. As Beale highlights, once we move beyond 
a toolbox and legislative tool to a set of optional rules which can be chosen by parties to 
govern their contracts, there are political choices to be made by the legislator. It is 
important that these choices are pursued on some democratic basis, rather than solely on 
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technical input.
109 It is, therefore, when the perceived end objective of the harmonisation 
project changes, that is to say beyond a non-binding tool for legislators, that the task 
becomes a political one and much more difficult. As has been highlighted, much 
opposition to harmonisation, which continues with the Commission’s current project, 
centres in the belief that what is actually being proposed is a mandatory harmonised 
instrument to replace the contractual systems of the Member States. For those holding 
this belief, the aim of harmonisation must necessarily be towards the political goal of 
creating a shared European identity, based upon a union of shared fundamental values. 
Clearly, such a statement requires both democratic endorsement and regulatory 
legitimacy.
110 The issue is how this is to be ensured in the current harmonisation process, 
the issue applying equally if the final result is an optional harmonised instrument.  
 
The 2004 Manifesto of the Study Group on Social Justice was fundamentally a call for 
the introduction of a more representative and accountable process in order to reveal the 
issues that are really at stake.
111 If this is not achieved, such issues will never be openly 
addressed and the risk is that powerful interest groups will be able to exploit the ongoing 
process to advance their own interests at the expense of all European citizens. In the same 
vein, Hesselink calls for the empowerment of the citizen and for a more open debate at 
EU level. This is necessary if the future proposals are to be properly considered in light of 
what best corresponds with the socio-economic, cultural and political interests and 
expectations of all stakeholders, namely all European citizens.
112 Failure to launch such 
an all inclusive process would ultimately risk the legitimacy and credibility of any 
resulting instrument. It would undermine not only the harmonisation work of the 
Network of Excellence and the CFR, but also the success of any future optional 
instrument, which depends upon the willingness of parties to participate by applying the 
instrument as the governing law of their contract.   
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The legitimacy of the ongoing project will thus be secured through democratic 
participation and dialogue, and, for this to be achieved, fair and open representation of all 
stakeholders must be ensured. Additional benefits will also arise from the nature of such 
input, as academic research can be met with the practical and technical experience of 
experts and practitioners in the respective fields. The demands of democratic 
participation will further ensure the necessary accountability of those leading the project; 
in the first place the Commission, but also the academic researchers. With regard to the 
Commission, it is also clear that, because of the existing scepticism about their true 
intentions as to the end product, they must be transparent in their intentions and 
proposals. Only in this way will the harmonised rules gain legitimacy and will confidence 
and trust be created in the end product.  
 
It is, therefore, necessary to consider the extent to which the current project has ensured a 
representative and accountable harmonisation process and thus addressed the apparent 
political issues and concerns involved.  
 
With regard to the nature and extent of representation achieved, the Commission has been 
credited with ensuring a valuable and probably the most extensive exercise of this kind: 
one which it is maintained must be recognised as such even by its detractors.
113 Although 
the success of the consultation initiated by the Commission in 2001 in these terms can be 
questioned, as Chapter 2 does,
114 it must be conceded that the Commission identified the 
need to consult widely on their proposals from the beginning. The consultative nature of 
the project has been maintained, which has in part been a response to calls from EU 
institutions. The European Parliament and Council, which welcomed the Commission’s 
Communications, also underline the need to involve all interested parties in the project, in 
particular in the elaboration of the CFR.
115 In response to the 2003 Communication, the 
Council called upon the Commission to establish appropriate mechanisms at both   
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political and expert level, in order to allow all interested parties and, significantly, also 
the Member States and  EU institutions, to participate actively in the CFR process.
116 
This was to be achieved through mechanisms such as discussion forums, annual progress 
reports on the ongoing process and the creation of the CFR-net. The Commission was to 
ensure that the elaboration of the CFR would take into account the practical needs of all 
stakeholders, particularly Member States’ legal cultures and traditions, in the 
development of the project.
117 
 
The process continues to be characterised by the relationship between the Commission 
and the academic researchers, who together form the Network of Excellence. This 
follows from the work of the Commission on European Contract Law and, later, the 
Study Group on European Civil Law. Under their contract, the researchers were expected 
to submit a first draft of the CFR by the end of 2007, with a complete version expected by 
2009. The academic researchers were joined by a network of stakeholder experts, known 
as the CFR-net, consisting of business, professional and consumer interests,
118 who were 
intended to provide the necessary complement to the academic research with practical 
feedback based on their experiences in the preparation of the CFR. In addition, there was 
also the network of Member State experts, consisting of contract law experts representing 
the Member States and ensuring their direct involvement in the preparation of the CFR.  
 
As indicated, the Council and European Parliament have also expressed interest in the 
project and have maintained their involvement. The European Parliament has 
acknowledged the project as the most important initiative under way in the civil law 
field
119 and has sought to ensure the participation of the democratic arm of the EU 
directly in the process. This was considered particularly necessary in view of those who 
were seen as leading the project, the soft law nature of the process and the possible long-
term outcomes. Thus Wallis (MEP) highlighted that that the European Parliament was 
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nervous of the nature of the CFR because of its proposed soft law nature, which can be 
perceived as threatening democracy and thus the Parliament's legislative place to the 
extent that this  would be assumed by researchers and stakeholders.
120 To ensure that the 
European Parliament remained fully engaged in the process, a Parliamentary working 
group was established to provide a forum for discussion of subjects dealt with by the 
researchers and stakeholder experts, for which the European Parliament considered it 
important to provide political guidance.
121  
 
The potential long term outcomes of the project were also believed by the European 
Parliament to dictate its involvement. While recognising that the Commission maintains 
that it is not its objective to propose the creation of a binding code – an idea to which the 
European Parliament has long been predisposed to in order to aid the completion of the 
internal market – it also considered that, in the future, the political will may exist to adopt 
such a code.
122 With this in mind, and given that the very decision to adopt a code is 
political and that its content will pursue social and political objectives, it considers it 
essential that the present process be done well and with appropriate political input.
123 In 
any case the European Parliament views it as essential, even if the project is limited to the 
present proposals, namely the revision of the acquis and the elaboration of a CFR, that the 
political authorities have proper input into the process.
124  
 
The Commission can thus be seen to have conducted a seemingly representative debate 
on the future approach to be taken to contract law.
125 It can be criticised, however, for the 
manner in which it chose to conduct other aspects, with potential implications arising for 
the legitimacy of the ongoing harmonisation process and of the confidence therein. In 
particular, the Commission has been accused of being deliberately ambiguous and 
tentative in the manner in which it has chosen to put forward and define its proposals. 
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This concerns particularly the CFR and a possible optional instrument,
126 and the 
approach has led to uncertainty even for those involved in the process.
127 Although the 
CFR presented as a legislative ‘toolbox’ sounds rather innocuous, there has been concern 
that this may potentially be a “Trojan horse” for the development of a mandatory 
contractual or civil code.
128 Similarly, scepticism has surrounded the way in which the 
Commission proposed to reflect on the opportuneness of a “non-sector specific measure” 
such an optional instrument.
129 Collins, in response to the Commission’s 2003 
Communication, questioned the meaning of the term and what was potentially 
camouflaged behind this new jargon.
130 For Collins, this is simply a European 
contractual, or greater, civil code and this for him, like others, explains the Commission’s 
“need for reflection and camouflage, whilst reflecting on whether they can get away with 
it  (opportuneness), and how to explain that it is even constitutional (legal basis)”.
131 
 
Much uncertainty and distrust underlies the current initiative due to the lack of 
transparency surrounding the Commission’s approach and the relationship between the 
CFR and an optional instrument. This has ultimately impeded the ongoing process. For 
example, it is considered
132 to have frustrated CFR workshops where little progress was 
made owing to ‘lengthy and repetitious’ debates on whether the CFR was intended to 
form a ‘toolbox’ or an optional instrument: an outcome which, it is felt, the Commission 
brought upon itself.
133 The lack of transparency and resultant uncertainty has also 
frustrated the efforts of the academic researchers involved. Schulte-Nölke
134 noted that 
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the possibility of advancing the CFR to an optional instrument in the future has overlaid 
and perhaps even impeded awareness of the currently more pressing need for the CFR as 
a toolbox for European contract law. He therefore hoped that everyone familiar with the 
CFR work would distinguish between this urgent need and what he described as the still 
rather vague but interesting idea that the CFR may in future serve as the basis for the 
discussion about a possible optional instrument. Any opposition to the latter idea should 
not spoil discussion of how the actual state of EU law could currently be improved.
135  
 
Criticism further surrounds the Commission's organisation of participation and 
interaction between academic researchers and stakeholder experts. As discussed the role 
of the academic researchers in a political process has not been uncontentious. For some, 
given the nature of the task that they were assigned, the Network of Excellence holds an 
unjustifiably prominent position in the harmonisation process. The elaboration of the 
CFR can be viewed as law-making under the auspices of research
136 as the process 
requires academics to make political decisions: for example, deciding on how the 
respective interests must be balanced. This raises a contentious point of legitimacy 
regarding private law-making in accord with the demands of democratic principles, and 
in light of concerns raised by the European Parliament as to their legislative place being 
usurped. Those within the Network of Excellence are, however, aware of such views and 
have made clear that it is not their intention to seize the political initiative. On the 
contrary, it is considered as vital that the democratic institutions realise that there are 
policy choices being made at researchers’ level and that the political process should be 
left to them and not to technocrats.
137 
 
Legitimacy is thus felt to have been added to the project, and the overall quality of the 
future instrument improved, where the academic researchers have been joined by 
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stakeholder experts in the field.
138 The CFR-net provided for practical input on the 
researchers’ drafts through participation in CFR workshops and via the dedicated website 
created to facilitate communication between members.
139 The extent to which the 
addition of stakeholders has ensured an all-inclusive, open and representative process is, 
however, open to question and shortcomings in the way that the Commission ensured 
their involvement were apparent from an early stage. Stakeholders were critical from the 
beginning of the workshops' organisation, some noting that it is not possible to expect a 
meaningful contribution from groups when dates and extensive, often complicated and 
unfamiliar academic topic drafts, were communicated to them only a few weeks in 
advance.
140 Such criticism resulted in a number of procedural improvements, outlined in 
the first annual progress report, including the extension of time within which the 
stakeholders could examine the researchers’ drafts from 1 to 2 months.
141 Not all, 
however, were wholly convinced of these limitations. It was noted that difficulties, 
including the volume of the research material and the breadth and size of some 
workshops' subject matter, were problems that could not and should not have been 
overcome. It was essential that stakeholders considered not only the text but also the 
accompanying comments and notes.
142  
 
While practical and necessary limitations in the process clearly existed, those noted were 
just some of a number of fundamental issues
143 which stakeholders felt undermined their 
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http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference092005/brandao2005
.pdf, 2. 
For full discussion of the organisation of the workshops, see The First Annual Progress Report (2005), 4.  
141 Ibid.5.  
142 Beale, Issues arising from the First CFR Workshops, paper presented to the First discussion forum 
(2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference092005/beale2005.p
df. 2. 
143 Others concerned the way in which stakeholder participation and representation was ensured, and the 
order in which sessions and topics were organised. See for example the Evidence of Clark to the House of 
Lords European Union Committee on the Future of European Private Law (2005), Q. 163.   82 
input, and the degree to which their interests were represented in workshops.
144 It resulted 
in concern among some that they were involved in no more than an empty exercise 
designed to claim wider endorsement for the project.
145 There were calls for the 
Commission to take stakeholder input effectively into account and not, as was felt, 
merely to test their reaction to work already completed by academic researchers at what 
was, by then, a relatively late stage.
146  
 
The latter criticism concerns the nature of the drafts presented by the academic 
researchers to stakeholder experts which were somewhat inevitably, owing to the fact that 
draft material was based upon the existing Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), 
drafted in the form of a code. The drafting style, together with the opacity of the 
Commission’s objectives in the creation of a CFR, led to greater confusion and 
uncertainty about what was actually being proposed: whether it was a legislative toolbox 
or, as the existing form may lead one to believe, a mandatory European contractual 
code.
147 Stakeholder experts felt that the CFR-net process was operating so as to approve 
work already carried out by researchers many years in advance.
148 Such criticism can be 
overcome to the extent that the researchers had the benefit of basing their Draft CFR on 
the wealth of harmonisation work and rules contained in PECL. Nevertheless, the 
academic researchers and thus the drafts were receptive to stakeholders' input, with a 
number of significant changes made to the existing PECL rules in light of the stakeholder 
workshops, and included within the Outline Edition of the DCFR.
149  
 
A further issue in the relationship between the academic researchers and stakeholders 
concerned the coverage of the material presented by the Network of Excellence. There 
was an apparent divergence in this respect between the academic DCFR as presented to 
the CFR-net, and what was envisaged by the latter stakeholder experts. For some 
                                                 
144 Ibid.  
145 See the supplementary memorandum by the CBI to the House of Lords European Union Committee on 
the Future of European private law (2005), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldeucom/95/5020206.htm 
146 Brandäo (CCBE) (2005), 1.  
147 Keane (2005), 2.  
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stakeholders, a discrepancy existed between the limited objectives of the instrument as a 
legislative toolbox, and the seemingly unlimited coverage of the proposed CFR 
instrument.
150 Stakeholder concern was that what was being created was an instrument 
which was “too wide, too extensive, too elaborate for purpose”.
151 It thus becomes 
apparent that the stakeholder experts had different objectives in terms of the coverage and 
thus end product of the CFR exercise than those of the academic researchers’. 
Stakeholders characteristically took a pragmatic viewpoint on the creation of a CFR, 
ultimately seeking a workable end product to improve the existing state of European 
contract law or else their resources in terms of time, money and expertise – a real issue 
dictating their involvement in this process – had been wasted.
152  
 
In contrast, the researchers’ objective was the continuation of their far reaching research 
activities in the area and, for the first time, they received EU funding. Indeed, their 
submission for funding under the Sixth Framework Programme for research was based 
solely on furthering the European legal science community and, in line with this, under 
their research contract they were obliged to include initially, in terms of coverage of the 
draft CFR, material from seven existing academic publications.
153 These comprised two 
volumes of the Principles of European Contract Law and four books in the series on 
Principles of European Law (PEL),
154  produced by the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code, covering distribution contracts, service contracts, personal security contracts and 
benevolent intervention in another’s affairs. Finally, the first volume published by the 
Acquis Group on pre-contractual obligations, conclusion of contract and unfair terms 
                                                 
150 Patchett- Joyce (General Council of Bars of England and Wales), Contribution to the First Discussion 
Forum (2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference092005/patchett-
joyce2005.pdf, 3.  
151 Ibid. This also raises issues concerning the credibility of the instrument, discussed below.  
152 On the influence of resources on stakeholder participation in this process see, Murray (Director of the 
European Consumer Organisation), Speech to the First Discussion Forum (2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/conference092005/murray2005.
pdf, 1.  
153 For a full account of the initial scope of the research contract see, Von Bar, Coverage and Structure of 
the Academic Common Frame of Reference, paper delivered to the SECOLA Conference (Amsterdam, 1 
June 2007), 4.  
154 N.b. The Study Group confines the scope of its private law research to patrimonial law, defined as; the 
law of obligations:  i. the general law of contracts, ii. the special law of particular contracts  
iii. non-contractual obligations, as well as the law of moveable property. 
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would also be included within the scope of the harmonised instrument. It follows that the 
Academic CFR, which also includes rules on unjust enrichment and non-contractual 
liability, does have a somewhat expansive coverage for the perceived remit and purpose 
of the CFR as presented in the Commission’s Communications and, indeed, PECL – on 
which it is principally based. Such disparity can, however, be explained by the source of 
the funding, which came from DG Research, and the researchers’ fear  that they would 
not receive funding if their proposal were limited to areas already covered by PECL, as 
that work already exists, subject to amendments through the CFR process.
155 The 
academic value of the research contract undertaken has been recognised by others 
involved in the process. For example, Wallis (MEP) acknowledged the work as a huge 
scientific undertaking and as such worthy for its own sake.
156 From this it follows that the 
scope and coverage of the research may not be “tailor made, for the CFR, nor for the 
European legislator” and Wallis concedes that it is, therefore, inevitable that there will be 
some tensions, but that this should not be allowed to detract from the need for the 
research or its results.
157 
 
Not all, however, are of the same opinion, and as the goal posts have been moved for the 
researchers in terms of their research contract and the Commission’s changing agenda, 
the aforementioned tension has grown. As Von Bar notes, despite the research contract 
being concluded with DG research, the academics realised early on that they were in fact 
working to an imposed time frame and that their research proposal was being influenced 
by the DG for consumer affairs and their agenda.
158 A notable unforeseen development 
was the dramatic change in the Commission’s priorities with the decision to prioritise the 
review of the consumer acquis in 2005. This meant a switch of focus for the researchers 
and a revised programme of workshops to this end, in what is perceived as an attempt to 
finish the revision of the acquis within a shorter timescale.
159 The Commission made 
clear at that time, in contrast to other views, that this project was not to be an academic 
exercise but rather one which produced practical results to be used in both the existing 
                                                 
155 Von Bar (2007), 5.  
156 Wallis, Second discussion forum (2006), 1.  
157 Ibid.  
158 Von Bar (2005), Paper delivered at Tartu, from 9 minutes.  
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acquis and new legislation.
160 This sentiment was shared by others, who feared 
impractical results would follow if the researchers' more ambitious targets were to be 
pursued in the time frame. The prioritisation of the acquis and the need to review the 
overall structure of the proposed CFR was, therefore, viewed by many as a welcome 
development.
161  
 
This, however, was not the case for all and, while the consumer acquis workshops were 
considered a success, the change of agenda did have a negative impact on those 
stakeholders who were not concerned with consumer matters: in particular, those who 
were still interested in participating in the CFR process in the B2B context and in the idea 
of the CFR serving as the basis for a possible optional instrument. Once-active 
participants therefore no longer attended meetings.
162 It also raised concerns for the 
academic researchers as, following the completion of the consumer acquis workshops, 
they were no longer continued and it outwardly appeared at that time that the 
Commission’s agenda was no longer concerned with a CFR containing even principles of 
general contract law.
163 Ultimately, however, this period of “crisis” for the academic 
researchers
164 did not prevent the completion of the DCFR in their terms and with their 
intended coverage and scope.
165 
 
To what extent, therefore, has the current project ensured a representative and 
accountable harmonisation process and thus addressed the apparent political issues and 
concerns involved? It is clear that the Commission sought to ensure an inclusive process, 
by involving the stakeholder experts and EU institutions, in addition to the academic 
researchers, in the elaboration of the draft CFR. In this way, and also through publicly 
                                                 
160 Commissioner Kyprianou, First Discussion Forum (2005),  
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available update reports,
166 it has sought to maintain the consultative nature of the project 
and, in this way, maintained some accountability. The mechanisms were in place for a 
representative debate and it has been demonstrated that the range of actors involved 
clearly understood the wider issues involved in the process and, thus, the political nature 
of the task. Notwithstanding this, the process has come in for criticism, and clear 
limitations have been shown to exist. Some of these, such as the demands placed on 
stakeholder expert involvement, were unavoidable, and the input of this important group 
has been ensured in the end product, as a complement to the academic basis of the text. 
The process has, however, been further undermined by a lack of transparency on the part 
of the Commission, which undermined interaction between the respective actors. As a 
result, the project has been afflicted with uncertainty, and distrust exists as to the end that 
is sought. This further undermines the identification and accommodation of the political 
issues and concerns involved. The Commission, in going forward, therefore must be clear 
on what the end proposal is, whether it ultimately is a legislative toolbox, or more 
ambitiously an optional instrument of European contract law. Without such clarity the 
continued risk is that the real issues at stake will be obscured.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The economic arguments highlighted the need to be aware of the types and scale of 
potential positive and negative impacts associated with proposals and bore specifically on 
their suitability.
167 On balance, it is possible to question the suitability of the creation of a 
body of harmonised rules of European contract law as the solution. Fundamentally, it is 
open to question as to whether such a course of action would achieve the desired goal of 
creating a level playing field for European trade. To the extent that the centralised 
regulation of European contract law would address existing divergences which are 
identified as creating problems for the functioning of the market, this option cannot be 
discounted. However, the benefits of any such course of action must outweigh the costs.  
                                                 
166 The Commission’s Europa website has also been an important source of information and updates for the 
European public.  
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For example, it was shown that the choice as to the binding nature of such a harmonised 
instrument may in fact result in greater costs for market participants, particularly if the 
decision is to create a European contract code to replace that of Member States. Indeed, 
the perceived disadvantages of such action points to the need to adopt alternative 
responses to current problems. Thus there is acknowledged potential in adopting a hybrid 
measure, such as an optional instrument of European contract law which would benefit 
from centralised regulation and, thus, enhanced certainty and reduced transaction costs. 
At the same time, the instrument would benefit from the advantages of decentralised 
regulation, thus limiting the negative impacts, in particular the anti–competitive effects of 
harmonisation. Regulatory competition would in fact be promoted through the adoption 
of an optional instrument.  Indeed, as a course of action in it own right, regulatory 
competition, with its aim of allowing for the greatest satisfaction of wants and needs of 
market participants, creates distinct benefits for the internal market, while also potentially 
leading to greater convergence between the legal systems.
168 Also, the fact that regulatory 
competition views diversity as a good would have socio-cultural benefits for the internal 
market which must also be weighed in the balance in assessing the most suitable way 
forward.  
 
The social and cultural perspective focused on the desirability of potential proposals and, 
more specifically, highlighted wider issues and needs which must be accommodated 
within the Commission’s response. The continuance of the Commission’s technocratic 
approach, aimed at removing divergence between national contractual systems with the 
object of facilitating trade, is therefore neither a sufficient nor desirable response alone to 
the problems encountered in the internal market. In terms of the objective of future 
action, although principally to facilitate cross-border trade, there are wider objectives 
which must be accommodated within the proposal, to represent, reconcile and fairly 
balance the apparent socio-economic and cultural aims and interests inherent in the 
internal market and thus in the national contract systems. To this end, the final proposal 
will have to make value choices and ensure a balanced approach between private 
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autonomy and social solidarity if it is to address the needs of the respective market actors 
and, further, to reflect a European society’s common values and principles of justice.  
 
The nature of the decisions that have to be made, and of the proposals themselves, will 
impact upon the manner in which the EU continues to conduct this debate and the nature 
of the process by which the proposals are to be realised. Taking the CFR as an example, it 
is clear that if the purpose of the instrument is to move beyond a non-binding legislative 
toolbox and to form the basis of optional but binding contractual rules, once it is chosen 
by the parties as the governing law of their contract, then a political process will be 
necessary. It has been shown that the Commission must continue to ensure an all-
inclusive process and thus one which ensures fair, open and meaningful representation 
and input of all interested parties. Maintaining this nature of the debate will also increase 
transparency, which has been seen to be lacking at some points in the process and this 
will ensure support and legitimacy for the Commission’s proposals. Beyond this, the 
Commission must also continue to engage with wider issues involved in the debate as to 
the future approach to be taken to European contract law,
169 and a good starting point 
would be for the Commission to draw to a large extent on the restatement work in the 
DCFR in the elaboration of the political CFR, to support its future uses. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Review of the Consumer Acquis and the Common Frame of Reference 
 
In light of the empirical evidence, the wider issues identified and the parameters set for 
the assessment of future courses of action, it is necessary to consider in greater detail the 
Commission’s proposals. The focus of this chapter is the review of the consumer acquis 
communautaire and the creation of a Common Frame of Reference (CFR). Each can be 
considered as a response to the evident inadequacies in the EU’s ongoing legislative 
approach to harmonisation in the internal market, which had already been directed 
towards the removal of obstacles arising from divergent national contract rules for B2C 
contracts. The creation of a CFR, establishing common principles and terminology for 
European contract law, is presented as an important step towards achieving better quality 
EU legislation in the area, being characterised by a high degree of consistency not only in 
its drafting, but also in its implementation and application.
1 The interrelated proposal, and 
need to review the existing acquis, must be considered in light of the EU’s better 
regulation aims and objectives and the overall strategy of simplifying the regulatory 
environment and quality of EU legislation.
2 It was recognised that the problems identified 
internally within the acquis demanded its review in order to remove existing 
inconsistencies, fill gaps and simplify the legislation. From an early stage, it was 
envisaged that the outcome may result in the need to consolidate, codify and recast the 
existing instruments
3 and a clear link was made with the function and role of the CFR to 
this end.
4 The following discussion will consider these proposals and their objectives, 
critically assessing the progress that has been made to date. It will consider the 
relationship that exists between the proposals and the direction in which we can expect 
these measures to go in the future, as part of the overall strategy to meet the objectives of 
the European contract law project. It will be asked whether these proposals and the 
current actions of the Commission provide a suitable, sufficient and, in light of earlier 
                                                 
1 2003 Communication, para 59.  
2 Ibid. paragraphs 69 – 71. 
3  2003 Communication, paragraphs 76 – 77. 
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discussion, a desirable solution to address the problems currently experienced at the 
European level.  
 
4.1. The Acquis Review 
 
4.1.1. The Proposal and Objectives 
 
In light of the apparent inadequacies and limitations of the EU’s legislative approach to 
harmonisation, this proposal promised to fundamentally question the existing policy 
approach in the area. The review process
5 began with a diagnostic review of eight 
consumer Directives
6 which would be reviewed as a whole as well as individually in 
order to identify regulatory gaps and shortcomings in the existing approach. The 
overarching aim of this phase was to assess the extent to which the current legislation had 
met the Commission’s principal objectives in the area. These had been to enhance 
consumer and business confidence, through a high common level of consumer protection, 
and the elimination of internal market barriers. More specific to this proposal was the aim 
of regulatory simplification to create a more predictable regulatory environment for 
businesses and thus encourage cross-trade.
7 The assessment required not only a review of 
the Directives, but also analysis of their transposition and application in the Member 
States.
8  
 
The diagnostic phase culminated in the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer 
Acquis. Here, the Commission presented their initial findings and identified a number of 
                                                 
5 The process was first outlined in the 2004 Communication, 3 and was further elaborated upon in the 
Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, (2006) 744 final, 3.  
6 Directive 85/577/EEC to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business 
premises. Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours. Directive 
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7 2004 Communication, 3 and the Green Paper (2006), 3.  
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key issues that the future review and any future action would have to address.
9 In the first 
place the findings confirmed the fragmentation of the consumer rules, owing to the 
minimum and sectoral approach to harmonisation.
10 The consumer acquis is thus 
characterised by diverging levels of consumer protection and many issues are regulated 
inconsistently between directives,
11 resulting in regulatory fragmentation. The differences 
result in additional transaction costs, and thus deter businesses from conducting cross-
border trade.
12 The findings also confirmed, and identified as a key issue, a lack of 
consumer confidence in purchasing goods and services from businesses established in 
other Member States.
13 In part, this can once again be seen to result from fragmentation 
caused by minimum harmonisation, which means that consumers cannot be sure that the 
level of protection that they experience at home will be replicated in transactions in other 
Member States. It can also however, be attributed to practical issues and, at least, the 
perception that it is harder to resolve problems such as after-sales issues, where a cross-
border element exists.
14 
 
The EU’s existing regulatory approach clearly undermined the functioning of the internal 
market. The problems confirmed by the diagnostic phase struck at the heart of the 
Commission’s objectives in the area, and served to undermine both consumer and 
business confidence in cross-border trade. The findings pointed to the need to review the 
acquis and to make fundamental changes to regulatory policy in the area. The 
Commission envisaged that at the end of the review it would be possible to say to 
consumers, “wherever you are in the EU or wherever you buy from it makes no 
difference: your essential rights are the same”.
15 This goal could not be achieved under 
the current regulatory approach. The Commission, therefore, set out a number of possible 
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10 Green Paper (2006), 6.  
11 Example provided in the Green paper (2006), 6. Also see, Chapter 2, 2.3.2. 
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13 Green Paper (2006), 7.  
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options for the future revision of the acquis, on which the Green Paper sought to collect 
views from all interested parties.  
 
4.1.2. The Commission’s Green Paper: Public Consultation 
 
The Commission’s Green Paper and proposals for the review of the acquis will be 
examined from two perspectives. In the first place, the proposals for reform will be 
considered to ascertain the extent to which they offer an appropriate response to the 
identified problems. More particularly, it will be asked whether they address the 
Commission’s better regulation aims in conducting the review, and thus simplify the 
existing regulatory framework in order to enhance both consumer and business 
confidence. The consultation will then be examined from the perspective of the manner in 
which the Commission has conducted the debate. The consultation must, therefore, be 
viewed in light of earlier criticism directed at the Commission in relation to the European 
contract law communications, particularly with regard to transparency and the wider 
issues set down in Chapter 3. It is significant in these terms that the Commission itself 
placed the consultation and analysis of the outcome in the context of its general principles 
and standards for consulting interested parties.
16 One of the principal aims of establishing 
such principles and standards was to encourage wider involvement through a more open 
and transparent consultation process. This was intended to enhance the Commission’s 
accountability
17 and to improve confidence and credibility in both the complex 
institutions and their policy making.
18 The consultative nature of the debate, through the 
publication of the Green Paper, is to be welcomed, as it is on the basis of the outcome of 
this consultation that the Commission would decide on the need for a legislative 
initiative.  
                                                 
16 Referred to in Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the Outcome of the Public Consultation on 
the Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/acquis_working_doc.pdf, 2, and taken from the 
Commission’s Communication, ‘Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission’ COM (2002) 
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Revising the Consumer Acquis: (Half) Opening the Doors of the Trojan Horse, (2008) 2 ERPL, 427, 429.  
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A first indication of the options for future action to improve the acquis was provided in 
the First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law in 2005. It held that, should 
evidence arise from the diagnostic phase of the review that the acquis needs to be revised, 
the Commission could “theoretically” choose between 2 options.
19 On the first count, and 
in a continuation of the existing vertical approach, it would be possible to maintain the 
current approach, subject to the individual revision of existing directives or the regulation 
of specific sectors.
20 In the alternative, a more horizontal approach could be envisaged, 
entailing the adoption of one or more framework instruments. These instruments would 
regulate common features of the acquis and would allow for common definitions across 
the acquis and for the horizontal regulation of the main consumer rights and remedies. 
The Commission did, however, maintain that it was too early to predict what would 
ultimately be proposed in the Green Paper and expressed no clear preference.
21 
 
In the end, little more was brought to the table in 2007 with the publication of the Green 
Paper, where the Commission presented 3 possible options. The first proposed a vertical 
approach, under which the existing directives would be amended separately in order to 
address the identified problems. This would result in the removal of inconsistencies 
between the directives, while also respecting the specificity of the needs and restraints of 
each sector.
22 However, the disadvantages of this are clear. The volume of legislation 
would remain and the consumer acquis would continue to be regulated in various 
directives.
23 It would still be possible for Member States to transpose the same issue, 
although common to several directives, inconsistently into national law.
24 Ultimately, a 
vertical, sector-specific approach cannot achieve the simplification of the regulatory 
environment that is necessary.  
 
                                                 
19 First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Review of the Acquis  (2005), 9.  
20 The example of a directive on tourism, including provisions of the Package Travel and Timeshare 
Directives, was given in the latter case.  
21 See the inaugural speech of Commissioner Kyprianou at the First European Discussion Forum (2005), 3.  
22 Green Paper (2006), 8.  
23 Both the advantages and disadvantages of this approach were articulated by the respondents to the Green 
Paper, see Detailed Analysis of the Responses to the Green Paper, Analytical Report on the Green Paper on 
the Review of the Consumer Acquis submitted by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/detailed_analysis_en.pdf, 42.  
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The adoption of a horizontal approach was the key policy innovation advanced for 
consultation. The Commission’s second proposal was a mixed approach which would 
allow for the adoption of horizontal instrument(s), combined, where necessary, with 
vertical action.
25 This could lead to the improvement of the acquis and introduce a more 
coherent approach, while also recognising that specific regulation of certain areas may 
still be necessary. In advancing the feasibility of the option, the Commission pointed to 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,
26 which follows this more ‘integrated’ 
approach, and indicated the potential to extract issues which are common to the existing 
directives and to regulate them more systematically in a horizontal instrument.
27 It was 
envisaged that common issues, such as the definitions of consumer and professional, the 
length of cooling-off periods and the modalities for the exercise of the right of 
withdrawal, together with the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive,
28 also 
being horizontal in nature, could form the general part of the horizontal instrument. The 
second part of the instrument would regulate the contract of sale, as the most common 
and broad consumer contract, and the Consumer Sales Directive
29 would be included 
within the scope of the instrument to this end. It is clear, therefore, that the Commission 
envisaged a fundamental shift in regulatory policy, from vertical to horizontal regulation, 
in order to simplify and rationalise the consumer acquis in accordance with the objectives 
of the review.
30 It also had the creation of a very specific instrument in mind, the content 
of which was already apparent.  
 
With regard to the possible territorial scope of this instrument, the Commission discussed 
3 options.
31 In the first instance, it could be applicable to both domestic and cross-border 
transactions; in the alternative, exclusively to cross-border transactions; or finally, it 
could be limited to distance shopping, whether cross-border or domestic, and would 
replace the Distance Selling Directive. The latter two options can be discounted, as the 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal 
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27 Green Paper (2006), 8.  
28 Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (UCTD).  
29 Directive 99/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees.   
30 Green Paper (2006), 8.  
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Commission acknowledged,
32 as they fail to satisfy the objectives of action. Legal 
fragmentation would continue, or indeed be increased, if different sets of rules would 
apply depending on whether the transaction is cross-border or domestic, distance or face-
to-face, respectively.
33 This would undermine the consumer and business confidence in 
trade that the review seeks to instil and would fail to provide the necessary simplification 
of the regulatory environment. Such a distinction would ultimately undermine the 
achievements of changing to a horizontal approach in this respect. A clear and justifiable 
preference for the first option can be inferred from the Commission’s discussion, which 
would allow for the creation of one instrument for all consumer sale contracts within the 
internal market. Such a broad coverage is clearly preferable to the extent that it would 
allow for the benefits derived through the adoption of a horizontal instrument to be 
maximised.  
 
The Commission’s final proposal was to maintain the status quo and take no legislative 
action at all. This would leave the existing regulatory fragmentation in place, with the 
potential that it could in fact increase with the continued use of minimum harmonisation 
clauses.
34  
 
The proposals, and the questions and issues surrounding them, were formally put forward 
for consultation in Annex I of the Green Paper. It was felt that the first option, and thus 
the continuation of the vertical approach, did not require an extended list of questions as 
these had already been dealt with in the context of the consultations on European contract 
law and in the activities which accounted for the diagnostic phase of the review 
proposal.
35  Attention was thus focused on a potential change of regulatory policy and the 
adoption of a horizontal/mixed approach to regulation, in particular a horizontal 
framework instrument.
36 The focus on horizontal issues can be considered as necessary 
and therefore warranted, to the extent that the adoption of this proposal would provide a 
suitable means to address the problems identified in relation to the existing acquis and 
                                                 
32Green Paper (2006), 9.   
33 Ibid. 9.  
34 Green Paper (2006). 9.  
35 Outlined in Section 2.1 of the Green Paper.  
36 Green Paper (2006), 11.    96 
regulatory approach. Consideration must, however, also be given to the manner in which 
the Commission conducted the consultation in order to determine the extent to which the 
Commission met its own wider consultation aims. 
 
The consultation began by asking for opinions on the best approach to be taken to the 
review, based upon the 3 proposals that had been discussed at length earlier in the Green 
Paper.
37 The phrasing of this question can be criticised as leading,
38 as although it 
presents three options it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the status quo could 
not continue, and this achieved almost unanimous agreement from respondents, with 98% 
in favour of some form of EU action.
39 It thus appears that certain options, which were in 
fact not real options, were included for the sake of appearances.
40 This raises early 
concerns for the transparency of the Commission’s approach and their true intentions in 
regard to the outcome. Similar criticism can be levelled at question 2, which concerned 
the preferred scope of a possible horizontal instrument, as the earlier discussion clearly 
favoured the creation of a horizontal instrument which would apply to both domestic and 
cross-border transactions.  
 
The third question concerned the level of harmonisation of the revised directives or new 
instrument. Here, the Commission can be criticised to the extent that they present this as 
an issue independent of the legislative option chosen to revise the acquis,
41 as the two 
issues are inextricably linked. It is clear from the fragmentary state of the acquis that the 
continuation of a vertical approach, on a minimum harmonisation basis, is not 
maintainable. Despite this, minimum harmonisation was placed alongside full 
harmonisation as a possible basis of harmonisation for the revised legislation. It was 
proposed that if minimum harmonisation were preferred it could be combined in the first 
place with a mutual recognition clause or in the alternative with the country of origin 
principle. In the first case Member States would retain the ability to introduce stricter 
                                                 
37 Question A1. Note that all options were indicative and non-exhaustive.  
38 Rutgers and Sefton Green (2008), 431.  
39 Table 3.2. Detailed Analysis of the Responses to the Green Paper, Analytical Report on the Green Paper 
on the Review of the Consumer Acquis submitted by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/detailed_analysis_en.pdf.  
40 Rutgers and Sefton Green (2008), 431.  
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rules of consumer protection in their national laws; however, they could not impose those 
requirements on businesses established in other Member States in such a way as to create 
an unjustified restriction on the free movement of goods or services.
42 Such an approach 
would thus ensure a high level of consumer protection at the national level with the 
safeguard of common European standards when contracting with a business in another 
Member State. It would prevent the creation of new obstacles to trade caused by 
divergent regulation at the national level. In the alternative, where minimum 
harmonisation could be combined with the country of origin approach, Member States 
could introduce stricter rules nationally; however, to simplify matters, businesses 
established in other Member States would only have to comply with the rules applicable 
in their home country. However, it is clear, and is acknowledged by the Commission, that 
neither option would aid the simplification of the regulatory environment and 
fragmentation would continue.
43Although businesses would benefit from increased legal 
certainty, this would be to the detriment of the consumer, whose confidence would be 
undermined. Neither option, therefore, provides a tenable approach for the review of the 
acquis. The same arguments would apply to the Commission’s proposal to combine the 
adoption of a full harmonisation approach with a mutual recognition clause for the issues 
which, although covered by the legislation, are not fully harmonised. This is intended to 
avoid the re-creation of barriers, where full harmonisation is not possible.
44 Even under a 
full harmonisation approach, therefore, fragmentation would continue to exist in certain 
areas, but it could be anticipated that the impact would be reduced with a transition to full 
harmonisation where possible.  
 
In response to the issue of the degree of harmonisation, there is a clear business/consumer 
divide in favour of full and minimum harmonisation respectively.
45 A preference as to 
whether it should be joined by the principles of mutual recognition or country of origin, 
however, is more difficult to discern, as the Commission’s options were greeted with 
little enthusiasm by respondents. Thus, with regard to those who favoured minimum 
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43Ibid.  
44 Green Paper (2006), 11.  
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harmonisation,
46 the majority opted for minimum harmonisation with no variant attached 
to it.
47 This was closely followed by support for “other option”.
48 This trend was also 
apparent in regard to the variant to be combined with full harmonisation, as while the 
majority
49 was in favour of targeted full harmonisation with mutual recognition as the 
variant, 21% favoured full harmonisation with another variant. In regard to other 
potential variants, a high proportion of respondents were in favour of the country of 
destination principle rather than the country of origin principle, in accordance with Rome 
I. Indeed, this option is a clear omission in the Commission’s proposals,
50 which 
overlooks the relationship between the end proposal and its link with European choice of 
law rules, which applies the law of the consumer’s habitual residence in regard to 
consumer protection rules.
51 The inclusion within the proposal of a variant other than the 
country of destination would be in direct conflict with Article 6(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation which provides that the law chosen by the parties cannot deprive the 
consumer of the protection granted by the law of his country of residence. Such a change 
would, as recognised by the Commission, require legislative amendment to Rome I 
shortly after its adoption, and would involve a major change in EU consumer policy.
52 
The result, in this respect, is that the status quo must be maintained, and it is 
questionable, therefore, why the possibility of including such a variant was the subject of 
discussion.  
 
In evaluating the manner in which the Commission conducted the consultation, concerns 
do exist. These arise in regard to the transparency of the approach and of the 
Commission’s true intentions, to the extent that, although perhaps justified on the basis of 
                                                 
46 24% of total respondents, Detailed analysis of response, 48.  
47 35%. 
48 30%. Minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition or country of origin principle was favoured by 
13%, minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition by 12% and minimum harmonisation and country of 
origin principle by 10%, Detailed analysis of response, 48.  
49 52%, for the reasons discussed below, the majority was most probably dominated by businesses, which 
comprised the largest groups of respondents (150), compared to consumers, who were the second largest 
group with 53 responses, Detailed analysis of response (2007), 5.  
50 One which is highlighted by consumer groups, Detailed analysis of response (2007), 50.  
51 Article 6 (1) Rome I Regulation.  
52 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the resulting proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive does not provide for 
such a variant and its provisions are without prejudice to Rome I.  Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, COM (2008) 614 final, 5 and recital 10.    99
the identified problems and issues, the Commission had its end object in view. Further, it 
is felt by some that the Green Paper fails to address and highlight, particularly in light of 
the relationship between the issues, many important questions. These include the wider 
issues identified as being central to the debate and the way forward.
53 In particular, when 
it is apparent that the Commission’s preferred option is the creation of a fully 
harmonised, horizontal instrument of consumer contract law, it is a significant omission 
that the consultation failed to ask whether this was considered to be a suitable or desirable 
outcome of the review. It is, therefore, unsurprising that following the Green Paper, as 
well as other references made to the review by the Commission in the wider European 
contract law project,
54 what was expected in terms of the resulting proposal was an EU 
consumer code.
55 
 
4.1.3. The Outcome of the Public Consultation: A Directive on Consumer Rights 
 
The outcome of the review was a proposal to create a Consumer Rights Directive (CRD). 
The Commission concluded that the majority of respondents to the Green Paper had 
called for the adoption of a horizontal legislative instrument applicable to domestic and 
cross border transactions, based on full targeted harmonisation, and thus of those issues 
which raised substantial barriers to trade for business and/or deterred consumers from 
buying cross-border. The horizontal instrument would be combined with the vertical 
revision of the existing sector-specific directives.
56 The final proposal seeks to decrease 
existing fragmentation by regulating the common aspects of the contract of sale for 
consumer goods
57  in a systematic fashion and consolidates four vertical directives
58 in a 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 432 and see Micklitz and Reich, European Consumer Law – quo vadis? 
Comments on the Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis (2007)), 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses/micklitz_reich.pdf, 15.  
54 See for example earlier discussion of Commissioner Kyprianou’s speech and that of Commissioner 
Kuneva who said that one of the objectives of her consumer strategy was ‘to establish a single, simple set 
of rights and obligations Europe – wide”, ‘European Consumer Policy in the 21
st Century’, speech given at 
the Challenges and Opportunities for the Transatlantic Agenda Conference (Cambridge, October 2007), 
cited by Rutgers and Sefton Green (2008), 430.  
55 See Rutgers and Sefton Green (2008), 430 and Turro, Federation of European Direct Selling Associations 
(FEDSA) speech to the First European Discussion Forum (2005), 3.  
56 Consumer Rights Proposal (2008), 5.  
57 Ibid. 2.    100 
single instrument and set of rules. It seeks to improve the functioning of the B2C internal 
market by enhancing consumer confidence through a high common level of consumer 
protection and adequate information about their rights and how to exercise them.
59 
Businesses would benefit from this new confidence, and the simplified contract regime, 
which would result in an increased willingness by them to engage in transactions which 
they would otherwise have been reluctant to enter in the past, owing to disparities in 
national consumer rules. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the proposal with a view to 
ascertaining the extent to which it meets these objectives, and thus ultimately the 
Commission’s objectives in conducting the review.  
 
To begin with the content of the proposal, it is limited to the key aspects of consumer 
contract law which are relevant for trade. That is to say, those relevant for traders when 
they draft their standard contract terms, design their information materials and for the 
operation of their businesses.
60 As such, it is not seen as interfering with more general 
contract law concepts such as the capacity to contract or the award of damages.
61 Indeed, 
in line with acquis review objectives, the proposal is presented as little more than a 
simplification exercise,
62 allaying the fears of some business stakeholders who have 
expressed a desire to limit the scope of the instrument. Some have advanced that the 
instrument should be limited to key notions of consumer protection, such as common 
definitions and pre-contractual information, and in that regard the revision should be 
limited to the harmonisation or alignment of such definitions and not seek to extend the 
scope of the consumer acquis.
63 Others, however, have opposed the introduction of a 
horizontal instrument because there is too little content to regulate. That is to say, it 
would not be enough to base a horizontal instrument on the limited number of vertical 
directives consolidated in the proposal. Under this view, the examples given by the 
Commission, such as a harmonised definition of consumer and professional or of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
58 Doorstep Selling Directive (1985/577/EEC), Unfair Contract Terms Directive (1993/13/EEC), Distance 
Selling Directive (1997/7/EEC), Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees Directive 
(1999/44/EEC).  
59 Consumer Rights Proposal (2008), 2.  
60 Ibid. 7.    
61 Ibid.  
62 Consumer Rights Proposal (2008), 10.  
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period of the right of withdrawal and how to exercise it, do not justify the creation of 
such an instrument. It is clear, therefore, that whether the horizontal proposal will gain 
support will depend to a large extent on its scope: while many favour limiting its scope 
others seek an ambitious instrument from the Commission.  
 
The proposed Directive sets out to consistently regulate certain common aspects of 
business to consumer contracts and begins in Chapter I
64 by defining the key terms within 
the directive, including harmonised definitions of ‘consumer’ and ‘trader’.
65 In regard to 
the scope of the directive, Article 3 makes clear that, subject to the conditions within the 
directive, it applies to sales and service contracts concluded between the trader and 
consumer, and that certain provisions will extend to apply to areas of otherwise vertical 
regulation, including package travel, timeshare and financial services.
66 The Chapter ends 
by establishing the principle of full harmonisation upon which the proposal is based.
67 
 
Chapter II
68 details core information duties which the trader must provide the consumer 
with prior to the conclusion of any sales or service contract and establishes the 
consequences of failure to provide such information. The proposal distinguishes between 
the information requirements which must be complied with in distance and off-premises 
contracts and those conducted on premise. The effect is that in addition to compliance 
with Chapter II, traders involved in distance and off-premise transactions must also 
comply with the additional information requirements provided for in Chapter III.
69 This is 
the effect of Article 9, and is without prejudice to the general requirement provided for in 
Article 5(1) (d), which requires that the arrangements for payment, delivery and 
performance are provided only where they depart from the requirements of professional 
diligence. In the case of distance and off-premise contracts, this information must always 
be provided.
70 The reason for the distinction is that such information should be more 
                                                 
64 Articles 1-4, Subject matter, definitions and scope.  
65 Article 2 Definitions.  
66 Article 3 (2) and (3), this extension of scope and relationship between the existing vertical acquis in these 
areas and the proposal will be discussed below.  
67 Article 4.  
68 Chapter II Consumer Information, Articles 5 – 7. 
69 Chapter III, Consumer information and withdrawal right for distance and off-premises contracts.  
70 Article 9 (a).   102 
readily apparent in the context of an on- premise transaction as compared to that 
conducted off-premise.
71 Chapter III provides for the right of withdrawal from such 
contracts and introduces a major improvement to the current system of consumer 
protection by providing for a withdrawal period of 14 calendar days in the case of 
distance and off-premise contracts.
72 This period presently stands as a seven day 
minimum harmonisation requirement. Many Member States have thus extended beyond 
the latter period, leading to the associated fragmentation of consumer protection. This has 
been exacerbated by the fact that the current directives do not specify whether working or 
calendar days be used in the calculation, which has meant that Member States have also 
implemented the minimum period divergently in this regard. The new provision will thus 
enhance certainty for both businesses and consumers and should lead to a reduction in 
compliance costs.
73 
 
Chapter IV concerns consumer rights specific to sales contracts, including rules on 
delivery, passing of risk, non-conformity and commercial guarantees.
 74 The chapter is 
limited to the sale of goods, and as such for the purpose of mixed contracts the chapter 
will only apply to the goods.
75 This limitation in scope is subject to criticism. It excludes 
services from it scope, and together with the definition of goods under the Directive, 
which is limited to any ‘tangible moveable item’
76  the chapter fails to provide remedies 
for faulty services and digital products, and thus to fully simplify remedies for consumer 
sales and services contracts.
77  
 
This is part of a wider criticism, concerning the extent to which the proposal regulates 
contracts for digital services, i.e. downloadable software and data. While the information 
requirements of chapter II and the rules on unfair contract terms in chapter V apply, 
                                                 
71 Recital 17.  
72 Article 12 and for reference as to calendar days, recital, 24.  
73 For support for this move, see the UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(BERR), in their consultation on the Commission’s proposal, http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file48791.pdf 
para 70- 74 and also recital 22, Consumer Rights Proposal (2008).  
74 Articles 21 – 29.  
75 Article 21 (1), without prejudice to Article 24 (5).  
76 Article 2 (4). 
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digital products are excluded from the scope of chapter IV.
 78 This limitation is surprising 
given that an express objective of action was to review the acquis in order to keep apace 
with new market developments, particularly in the face of the growing importance of 
digital technology and digital services. These, as the Commission recognised in the Green 
Paper, raise controversial issues relating to user rights, as compared to the sale of 
physical goods.
79 However, the question of whether the scope of consumer sales rules 
should be extended to cover contracts where digital content services are provided to 
consumers raised significant debate in response to the Green Paper.
80 The majority of 
stakeholder groups were of the opinion that these types of contracts should be covered by 
the consumer sales rules.
81 The business sector, however, which was comprised by a 
significant number of digital service providers, stood out in strong opposition to the 
inclusion of such services within the scope of the proposal. They highlighted the 
specificity of software in comparison with tangible goods and thus the distinct nature of 
their service.
82 Indeed, some were of the opinion that the regulation of digital content 
could not be undertaken as an extension of the consumer sales provisions, and that it may 
require the updating of existing instruments or indeed the creation of new specific 
instruments.
83 The debate on the way forward in this respect continues and the 
Commission has more recently made a call for tenders for a study on consumer problems 
related to digital content. The study will collect more information on issues such as non-
conformity, which would otherwise be governed by Chapter IV of the proposal for 
tangible, moveable goods.
84 The approach of the proposed Directive further highlights the 
need for and the importance of maintaining vertical harmonisation and thus regulation of 
certain sectors, in conjunction with horizontal instruments where possible and necessary. 
                                                 
78 A distinction is created as the purchase of a CD from a website does come within the scope of the 
Directive, but downloaded music does not, resulting in potential confusion for consumers. For criticism of 
this distinction and the limitation in scope of the proposal, see House of Lords 
European Union Committee - Eighteenth Report,  EU Consumer Rights Directive: getting it right (2009) 
,http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/126/12602.htm, Chapter 4.  
79 Green Paper (2007), 7.  
80 Question H1, Green Paper (2007).   
81 Detailed analysis of response (2007), 91.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid. 92.  
84 Such issues have more recently been discussed at a conference organised by the Competitiveness 
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In defence of the proposal, in regard to the review objective of updating the acquis in line 
with technological developments, the proposal does go some way to adapting the acquis 
to new sales methods, and is intended to cover all forms of consumers transactions, 
irrespective of the medium used.
85 As such it addresses some technological developments 
by introducing regulation for new channels for B2C transactions, which are not currently 
covered by consumer acquis, such as on-line ‘e-bay’ auctions.
86 
 
Returning to the scheme of the proposal, Chapter V of the proposed Directive governs 
consumer’s rights concerning contract terms. The Chapter broadly reflects the provisions 
of the current Unfair Contract Terms Directive, applying to those terms which have not 
been individually negotiated, i.e. standard contract terms. In a marked improvement to 
the approach of the existing Directive, however, the proposal provides for two lists of 
unfair terms. Those contained in Annex II, are terms which are to be considered in all 
case as unfair, while those terms listed in Annex III should be deemed unfair unless the 
trader can prove otherwise.
87 This development will improve upon the current position 
which provides merely an indicative and non-exhaustive list of unfair terms, and thus 
results in uncertainty.
88 It is important to note in this respect that the scope of application, 
and thus impact of this chapter, will be more far reaching than the others. Its provisions 
and the full harmonisation approach will be extended to apply to the Timeshare and 
Package Travel Directives as well as to financial services as regards certain off-premises 
contracts, as part of the extended scope of the Directive.
89 The expansion reflects that it 
will remain necessary as part of the review, that the creation of the horizontal instrument 
be combined with the vertical revision of the existing sector-specific directives (mixed 
approach).
90 To this end, with the repeal of the existing Unfair Contract Terms Directive, 
which would otherwise apply to these areas, the scope of the proposal must necessarily be 
extended.  
                                                 
85 Singleton, Proposed New EU Laws – Consumer Rights Directive (2008) 16 10 (1) IT Law Today, and 
Taylor and Whitehouse, EC’s proposed Consumer Rights Directive – a welcome move for trading (2009), 
17 1 (8) IT Law Today.  
86 Green Paper (2007), 7, for the definition of ‘auctions’ within the proposal, see Article 2 (15).  
87 In accordance with Article 32.  
88 Recital 50.  
89 Article 3 (2) and (3) of the proposal.   
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To take the review of the Timeshare Directive as an example, although this was part of 
the original eight directives which were subject to review as a constituent part of the 
consumer acquis, it has been excluded from the scope of the horizontal instrument. It has 
instead been subject to vertical review,
91 owing to the limited number of horizontal issues 
affected by the revision of the Directive.
92 The characteristics of timeshare and other 
similar products clearly justify vertical regulation as it raises distinct issues for consumer 
protection,
93 which arise foremost from the nature and complexity of such contracts. In 
the first place, timeshare products are a combination of a repeated property lease and a 
service, which gives rise to legal complexity since it is not easy to understand the nature 
of the rights purchased by consumers, be they rights in rem, personal rights, etc. This is 
particularly as these rights will be defined differently in the legislation of Member 
States.
94 This is exacerbated by the often substantial financial commitment which arises 
from the contract and the fact that these commitments are often undertaken for a long 
period of time. Timeshare is also a product which is characterised by the manner in which 
it is marketed, i.e. away from business premises, such as door to door or at a holiday 
resort itself, and thus away from the consumers home. This factor alone is felt by some as 
justifying targeted legislation in this area.
95 Responses to the Review Green Paper 
maintained, in light of the foregoing, that an even longer cooling-off period, i.e. than that 
would be applicable to other distance contracts within the scope of the horizontal 
instrument,
96 would be required for such contracts in order to be commensurate with the 
risk to the consumer.
97 This view is now reflected in the revised Timeshare Directive,
98 
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92 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the proposal for a directive on consumer rights 
Impact Report (2008), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/impact_assessment_report_en.pdf, 20. 
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consultation paper on the review of the Timeshare Directive, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/timeshare/consultation_paper010606_en.doc, 11.  
94 Ibid.  
95 Downes, More about Timeshare: A Revised Directive or a Regulation? Incidence of Other Instruments of 
Consumer Protection (2008) 4 European Review of Private Law 607, 616.  
96 Thus in favour of vertical revision and it should be noted that the proposed harmonised 14 day period in 
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97 Detailed analysis of response (2007), 77. 
98 Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of consumers in 
respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, Article 6 
(1) and in line with the CRD proposal.    106 
where the period provided for the consumer to withdraw from the contract has been 
extended from 10 to 14 days to reflect the above considerations, under a full 
harmonisation approach.  
 
In the widest extension of the proposals’ provisions, the consumer information duties and 
withdrawal rights for off-premise contracts, contained in Chapter III, and those 
information requirements in Articles 5 and 7,
99 extend to financial services as regards off-
premises contracts.
100 Despite the general formulation of this extension, however, in the 
result the provisions will only apply to specific financial contracts concluded off-premise. 
Specifically, Chapter III will not apply to off-premise contracts concerning;
101 insurance, 
financial services where the price depends on fluctuations in the financial market outside 
the trader's control, which may occur during the withdrawal period, as defined in the 
Directive on the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services,
102 and to consumer 
credit which falls within the scope of the Consumer Credit Directive.
103  In practice this 
means that mortgage credit contracts and consumer credit contracts for less than EUR 
200 or more than EUR 75000, i.e. consumer credit contracts falling outside the scope of 
the Consumer Credit Directive, will be regulated by the CRD.
104  
 
The limited extension of the proposals provisions is intended to fill existing regulatory 
gaps in this sector, e.g. for contracts falling outside the threshold of the Consumer Credit 
Directive. The failure of the proposal, however, to positively define those financial 
service contracts to which it extends, but rather to do so negatively, by reference to the 
sector-specific acquis with which the CRD will continue to co-exist is unfortunate. In 
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100 Article 3(2).  
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102 Article 6(2)(a) of Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and Council concerning the distance 
marketing of consumer finance services,. It is questionable whether reference to definitions in the sector-
specific acquis aids the simplification aims of the proposals.  
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defining its scope, reference is made to the Directive on Distance Marketing of Consumer 
Financial Services, and the Consumer Credit Directive.
105 The CRD proposal, therefore, 
becomes part of a more complex regulatory structure of sector-specific acquis governing 
financial services, and in its current form, uncertainty will likely surround the extended 
scope of the proposal in this respect. A large number of Member States have, therefore, 
considered that financial services, due to the complexity of the area and the relationship 
that exists with specific legislation, should not be covered by the proposed Directive.
106 
To this end, the  Presidency compromise text on the proposed CRD has proposed 
removing financial services altogether from the scope of Chapter III.
107 This change 
would be desirable given the uncertainty that will be created by the extended scope of the 
proposal in this respect, which cannot be justified by the narrow scope of that extension 
to a limited number of financial services. The effect, however, will be that the scope and 
thus impact of the proposal, and the move to full and horizontal harmonisation becomes 
narrower.   
 
While the move to horizontal regulation was, therefore, intended to address one source of 
fragmentation and regulate consumer contract law in a more systematic and coherent 
fashion, it is evident that this has been achieved with varying degrees of success. On the 
one hand four directives have been consolidated into one. By replacing the Distance 
Selling and Doorstep Selling Directives, for example, the applicable information 
requirements and rules on the right of withdrawal for contracts of sale and services are 
contained within one instrument. These rules, however, exist as the lex generalis and co-
exist with the sector-specific rules of the acquis which have precedence in the case of 
conflict.
108 Together with continued vertical regulation and review of sector-specific 
legislation, rules governing the same issue continue to be spread across the acquis, and 
thus the objective of simplifying the regulatory environment is not wholly realised in this 
respect. This limitation is, however, justified by the limited number of horizontal issues 
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that exists between directives, the need for continued sector-specific regulation in certain 
areas, and thus the need for the mixed approach that is being pursued. It is also clear that 
greater convergence is being achieved between the areas under vertical review, and with 
the Commission’s horizontal proposal.
109 The proposed 14 days withdrawal period in the 
CRD for example, already finds expression under a full harmonisation approach, and for 
sector-specific reasons, in the revised Timeshare Directive, and the Distance Marketing 
of Consumer Financial Services Directive. It is also now replicated in the revised 
Consumer Credit Directive,
110 in an attempt to approximate the procedures for the right 
of withdrawal in similar areas.
111 While greater coherence is thus being achieved under 
this mixed approach, the issue is whether this is sufficient to create the simplified and 
predictable regulatory environment necessary for businesses and consumers to engage in 
cross-border trade.
112  
 
Further concerns arise from the transition to full harmonisation in the proposal as a 
response to the other cause of fragmentation: minimum harmonisation. In particular, this 
change has clear repercussions for consumer protection within the internal market, and 
the level at which this will be set within the acquis.
113 The level will be an important 
determining factor as regards the extent to which the reviews objectives will be achieved, 
and should not compromise the accomplishments made to date in this politically sensitive 
area, which has been achieved through a combination of EU and national law.
114 As 
Member States will no longer be able to maintain or adopt provisions which diverge from 
the CRD, however, the concern is that the proposal will deprive some consumers of their 
existing rights. If this is the case then the confidence which the proposal seeks to create 
for consumers, through the creation of one common set of rules, would be undermined. 
From the consumer’s perspective, therefore, nothing but a high level of protection can be 
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110 Article 14. 
111 Namely with the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services Directive, Recital 34.   
112 This issue is addressed further in Chapters 5, 5.3 and 6, 6.4.2.  
113 The level of protection within the CRD Proposal is discussed further in Chapter 6, 6.4.2.  
114 For this reason, the Acquis Group advances that full harmonisation is not appropriate for consumer sales 
because of the negative effects which this can have on the current protection of the consumer through 
provisions made by the Member States, Acquis Group Position Paper on the Proposal for a Directive on 
Consumer Rights (2009) Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 3 at ouclf.iuscomp.org, 4.   109
accepted,
115 and unsurprisingly, in response to the Commission’s Green Paper on the 
review of the acquis, the largest group within the consumer sector preferred the 
continuance of minimum harmonisation.
116  
 
The protection afforded to consumers by the proposal also impacts upon businesses 
ability and desire to engage in cross-border trade. Too high a level would undermine the 
economic benefit that they seek to derive from the move to full harmonisation. It is 
anticipated that businesses will benefit from much lower administrative costs as a result 
of the move, and that compliance costs will be cut by up to 97%,
117 where they comply 
with the fully harmonised information requirements set out in the proposal, as an integral 
part of the sales or service contract.
118 This reduction in costs will not only be significant 
for those businesses engaging in cross-border trade,
119 but also those who are currently 
only trading domestically, but that are considering expansion.
120 A move to full 
harmonisation thus offers a significant opportunity for such businesses. It is seen 
however, to impact negatively on those businesses only trading domestically, as they will 
be subject to what is viewed as the small ‘one-off’ costs of adaptation to the new 
regulatory regime.
121 These costs must however be considered in light of the net effects 
of the proposal in other respects.
122 If the level of protection is established too high, 
however, higher costs for businesses will result once again, reducing the benefits which 
are anticipated from the full harmonisation approach. Costs arising from this would 
invariably be passed on to the consumer which will undermine the stimulating effect on 
trade that the Commission believed that the proposal would have.
123  The move to full 
                                                 
115 The EU is bound to achieve a high level of consumer protection in the proposal, Article 169 TFEU.  
116 31%, Detailed analysis of responses (2007), 48.  
117 Press Release of 8 October 2008 (Brussels), Consumers: Commission proposes EU-wide rights for 
shoppers, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1474&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN. 
118 CRD Proposal (2008), 8 and Article 5 (3).  
119 Commonly with one or two other M.S. See, Eurobarometer 224 (2008), 28.  
120 Particularly as retailers who are already trading cross-border are less concerned by the regulatory 
differences compared to those who have no experience of such activity, Eurobarometer 224 (2008), 27.  
121 CRD Proposal (2008), 8.  
122 On the winners and losers of the proposal, see generally, the Impact Assessment Report Accompanying 
the Proposal (2008), 40.  
123 Detailed analysis of responses (2007), 35.    110 
harmonisation may, therefore, detrimentally impact upon the interests of businesses and 
consumers alike.  
 
In the result, however, and as expected, greater concern and opposition has arisen in 
regard to a loss of protection in the CRD. This arises not only in terms of the current 
(national) level of protection, but also in regard to the nature and content of those rights. 
The UK government has, for example, expressed concern in regard to the loss of the 
immediate right to reject under the proposal, and has sought amendment to allow for the 
national right to reject faulty goods for a short and reasonable period to be retained in the 
UK.
124 In order to address such concerns, and to clarify how the proposal will affect the 
existing consumer protection levels in the Member States, the Commission has produced 
a comparative table identifying where there would be a change in the level and/or nature 
of protection.
125 The table provides examples of where the level of consumer protection 
will increase in some Member States, but this is joined by the fact that the provisions will 
often maintain the status-quo, or result in a loss of protection. For example, while the 
proposed EU-wide 14 days cooling off period for distance and off-premises contracts 
reflects the current level of protection in 9 Member States, it leads to an increase in 
protection in 15, but a loss of protection in 2 Member States.
126 This outcome is 
unavoidable with the adoption of a full harmonisation approach and demonstrates the 
difficulty in reaching agreement on an acceptable level of protection, even where there is 
a consensus among some Member States. While some consumers will gain from certain 
provisions, others will invariably loose out as a result,
127 and this may well serve to 
undermine consumer confidence in the new regime.  
                                                 
124 Law Society EU Update on Consumer Protection (September 2009), 13. Discussed further below. 
Similar concerns arise in regard to the guarantee for hidden faults under the French domestic system. See, 
the Commission’s note on the CRD proposal (2009), 5.  
125 Available at; http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/comparative_table_en.pdf (October, 2009). N.b. 
The comparative table does not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of the effects of the proposal on 
national laws, which would require a thorough screening of the national laws and is intended as a living 
document, 1.  
126 Comparative table (2009), 7. 
127 Article 12 CRD, providing for the starting point of the withdrawal period for off-premises contracts is an 
example of where there is a loss in protection, maintenance of the status quo in certain Member States, but 
no increase, comparative table (2009), 7.    111
Remedies for non-conformity are an area where consumer protection would in fact be 
reduced under the proposed full harmonisation approach.
128 In the first place we have 
encountered the UK concern in regard to the loss of the immediate right to reject. Under 
Article 26 of the CRD, the trader must, in the first instance, remedy the lack of 
conformity either by way of repair or replacement.
129 This is unless the trader can 
demonstrate that this remedy would be unlawful, impossible or would cause them a 
disproportionate effort. Then, or subject to the additional circumstances further outlined 
in Article 26,
130  the consumer may choose to have the price reduced or the contract 
rescinded.
131 This two-stage hierarchy of remedies under the proposal maintains the 
position under the existing acquis, in the Consumer Sales Directive.
132 The detrimental 
and complained off effect in terms of consumer protection therefore arises from the move 
to full harmonisation, as this suggests that the Member States cannot retain their sales 
remedies within the scope of the Directive. As such Member States, such as the UK, 
would no longer be able to provide that the consumer can immediately demand their 
money back in the case of non-conformity, and this would have a negative effect on the 
legal situation for consumers in such Member States.
133  
 
This provision is further critcised from the perspective of consumer protection, as it 
places the right to decide between repair and replacement with the trader. This reverses 
the current acquis
134 where the choice lies with the consumer, in the interest of the latter 
party.
135 The reversal clearly shifts the balance in favour of the trader,
136 and gives rise to 
the view that what is being created in the CRD is a business driven instrument. It has 
                                                 
128 See, Twigg-Flesner, Fit for Purpose? The Proposal on Sales in: Modernising and Harmonising 
Consumer Contract Law, Howells and Schulze, Munich: Sellier, 2009, 159.  
129 Article 26 (2).  
130 Article 26 (4), See Twigg-Flesner (2009), 159.  
131 Article 26 (3).  
132 Article 3 (3).  
133 Discussed by Howells and Schulze, Overview of the Proposed Consumer Rights Directive, in: 
Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, Howells and Schulze, Munich: Sellier, 2009, 19. 
This result finds little support. See for example, Beale, The Draft Directive on Consumer Rights and UK 
Consumer Law – Where Now, in: Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law (above), 291 and 
293.  Beale argues there that the consumer should be given a right to reject non-conforming goods 
immediately, rather than having to first go through the hierarchy provided under the proposal.  
134 Article 3 (3) of the Consumer Sales Directive.  
135 See, Howells and Schulze (2009), 20.  
136 Twigg-Flesner (2009), 159.    112 
been highlighted, however, that the result is indicative of the problems associated with 
pursing consumer rights within the context of the internal market, and with Article 114 
TFEU as the legal basis, as the interests of the consumer will always have to be balanced 
against those of the trader.
137  
 
This balance is, however, at the cost of the consumer confidence which the proposal 
sought to enhance.
138  A particular concern that arises in regard to the proposal is a loss of 
consumer protection where the previously minimum levels of protection under the acquis, 
are made the ‘maximum’ under the proposal.
139 An example
140 is Article 28 of the CRD 
proposal, which provides that the consumer must inform the trader of the lack of 
conformity within two months from the date on which they detected the lack of 
conformity if they are to be entitled to the remedies detailed in Article 26. The Consumer 
Sales Directive, however, only provides that Member States may provide that, in order to 
benefit from their right, the consumer must inform the seller within this period. The 
transition of this provision to a maximum harmonisation basis will thus lead to a 
reduction in protection in those Member States who did not enact this provision, and thus 
provided for a longer period.
141 It is noted that this will not only have a negative effect on 
the position of consumers, but that the two month notification period also has practical 
implications which may also have a negative impact on cross-border trade. It is 
considered that it will act to discourage consumers from acquiring goods when they are 
abroad, as if they cannot return defective goods within that period, they will be denied a 
remedy under the proposal.
142  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the CRD proposal does not always realise its objectives. While a 
move to full harmonisation is clearly in the interest of businesses,
143 to the extent that it 
                                                 
137 Ibid.  
138 While also reducing business reluctance to trade cross-border. Discussed in 4.1.3 and Consumer Rights 
Proposal (2008), 2.  
139 Howells and Schulze (2009), question fundamentally how a maximal harmonisation approach can 
enhance consumer confidence, when it seeks to set the existing minimum as a maximum, 8.  
140 Discussed, Ibid.  
141 For example, the consumer in Belgium or Poland has the period of one year within which to notify the 
trader. See further the comparative table (2009), 15.  
142 Howells and Schulze (2009), 8.  
143 Provided that the level of protection is not too high.    113
creates a more simplified regulatory environment and will address their reluctance to 
engage in cross border transactions, the resulting removal or reduction of important 
consumer protection rights will not increase consumer confidence.
144 Beale concludes 
that the “draft is less about creating confident consumers who will be prepared to shop 
across borders and thus contribute to the development of the internal market than it is 
about making it easier for businesses to supply consumers”.
145   
  
In terms of the concern expressed by the UK, the Commission has clarified
146 that it is 
not the intention in fully harmonising the specific consumer remedies to preclude 
Member States from retaining their traditional contract law remedies. The impact of full 
harmonisation on this topic should, therefore, be rather limited.
147 As such, in most 
Member States, as the consumer rights remedies co-exist with the traditional contract law 
remedies, the consumer in the UK would retain the choice between the use of the 
harmonised consumer sales remedies or the right to reject. The result, however, in a 
concession
148 made to the national contract systems, is that full harmonisation of 
consumer sales remedies is not realised, and a dual regime, reliant on both European and 
national contract law, is created.
149 The result, more generally, will be uncertainty as to 
what falls within the scope of the Directive, and thus subject to full harmonisation, and 
what rules Member States are free to maintain, i.e. higher levels of protection.
150 The 
dividing line is certainly not clear, and the CRD creates a pretence as to the full and 
horizontal nature of the regime created therein. This will be detrimental also for 
                                                 
144 The Law Commission expressed concern that the potential loss of the "right to reject" under UK law 
would reduce consumer confidence, House of Lords, European Committee, Eighteenth Report, EU 
Consumer Rights Directive: getting it right, (2009), para 162. 
145 Beale (2009), 289. While conceding that despite some aspects of the draft giving cause for serious 
concern, consumers would remain fairly well protected. And even if it will do little to increase consumer 
confidence, it might increase consumer welfare if it encourages businesses to enter cross-border consumer 
contracts, in terms of greater choice and competition.  
146 Commission’s note on the CRD (2009), 5.  
147 Ibid 5-6.  
148 This being just one example of a concession or compromise being made by the CRD proposal in this 
respect, see discussion in Chapter 5, 5.3.  
149 The Commission’s note on the CRD (2009) highlights that a number of Member States have expressed 
doubts about the practicality of the dual regime that it is created, with some seeking the exhaustive 
harmonisation of consumer remedies for faulty goods, including a right to reject, although this is not 
presently the case, 5.  
150 Beale (2009), highlights these concerns further in regard to the regulation of unfair terms, and the effect 
of full harmonisation on the “blacklisted terms”, 294.    114 
businesses, and will undermine the benefits that they are intended to derive from the 
proposal.
151 
 
The extent to which the proposal can achieve the simplified regulatory environment 
necessary for businesses and consumers contracting in the internal market is thus once 
again open to question. While the CRD proposal results in some substantive 
improvements,
152 it is clear that the proposal does not fully realise the Commission’s 
objectives in conducting the review of the consumer acquis. This can be principally 
attributed to the narrow scope and targeted nature of the proposed instrument. While 
confined to key aspects of consumer contract law relevant for trade, the impact of the 
regulatory move to horizontal and full harmonisation is limited to four directives. 
Although the proposal’s provisions are extended to the area of financial services, the 
regulatory impact of this extension would again will be limited, and uncertainty would 
likely result from the proposals failure to define positively those financial services to 
which it extends. In the area of financial services, as with the existing sector-specific 
acquis in general, the proposal’s provisions will form part of the wider, fragmented EU 
regulatory framework, which will continue to be regulated and reviewed on a vertical 
basis. While greater coherence is being achieved by the mixed approach to 
harmonisation, it is questionable whether this is sufficient. Further criticism has been 
directed at the proposal’s failure to fully simplify an important area of consumer contract 
law, namely remedies. Chapter IV excludes both services, and digital products
153 from 
the scope of its provisions, and the consumer remedies contained therein will co-exist 
with national contract law remedies. A wholly simplified and predictable regulatory 
framework does not, therefore, result from the proposal. Despite the move to full and 
horizontal harmonisation, fragmentation of the regulatory environment will continue.
154 It 
is doubtful that in its present state, the CRD provides a sufficient regulatory response to 
obstacles for trade at this level, and that, therefore, it poses the most appropriate way 
forward for European contract law. 
                                                 
151 The relationship between the CRD and national law, and the extent to which this undermines full 
harmonisation is considered further in Chapter 6, 6.4.2.  
152 For example the full harmonisation of the withdrawal period.  
153 Failing, in part, to satisfy the objective of updating the acquis in light of new market developments.  
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4.2. The Common Frame of Reference 
 
4.2.1. The Proposal and Objectives  
 
While the review of the acquis and the horizontal approach of the CRD are intended to 
address the cause of internal inconsistency within the acquis, and thus one source of 
fragmentation at this level, this was only part of the response. The Commission also 
proposed the creation of a CFR to address the problem, which arises from the use of 
sectoral harmonisation, with the result that the existing piecemeal legislation lacks 
coherence and consistency. Similar situations are regulated inconsistently between 
directives and the acquis is characterised by the use of abstract terms which are often 
undefined and considered too broad.
155  This not only undermines the coherence of the 
acquis as a whole, but also creates problems at the national level, for the implementation 
and application of such measures. Inconsistency also exists, therefore, at the national 
level. There is a clear need for aligned and consistent EU rules, including fully 
harmonised definitions, to improve the consistency of the acquis and to facilitate the 
move to a more coherent horizontal approach.  The creation of a CFR, establishing 
common principles, model rules and terminology for European contract law is thus seen 
by the Commission as an important instrumental step towards the improvement of the 
contract law acquis.  
 
The principal objective and purpose of the CFR is to act as a legislative ‘toolbox’ for the 
Commission, as a means to review the existing acquis, and to assist in the creation of 
future measures.
156 The CFR should thus remedy and avoid in future the existing internal 
inconsistency, and will simplify the acquis by providing clear definitions of legal terms 
and fundamental principles.
157 In this way, it will avoid the presently conflicting results, 
and terms will be defined in a consistent manner. This will also aid consistent application 
of the acquis at the national level.
158 There is, therefore, a clear relationship between a 
                                                 
155 For detailed criticism of the sectoral approach, see Chapter 2, 2.3.2.  
156 2003 Communication, para 62.  
157 Ibid. para 57 and 64.  
158 2003 Communication, para 57.    116 
CFR and the review of the acquis, to meet the respective objectives of action. The ‘useful 
synergies’ between the two initiatives have been highlighted.
159  
 
Beyond the principal legislative function, it is also envisaged that the CFR could be used 
to achieve a higher degree of convergence between the contract laws of the Member 
States.
160 Thus, as a legislative toolbox it could be used by national legislators as a point 
of reference and assistance when transposing directives, and could be drawn on when 
they enact legislation in the area of contract law which is not currently regulated at EU 
level.
161 In the same way, it may assist and inspire national courts when interpreting and 
applying EU rules. Any resulting convergence in national contract systems can then be 
viewed as a by-product of the CFR’s legislative function.
 162 It is, however, envisaged by 
the Network of Excellence that the CFR, at least in its draft form, may act independently 
as a text from which inspiration may be gained for the development of private law issues. 
This would be in the same way that PECL influenced many higher courts in Member 
States, as well as bodies responsible for the reform and modernisation of national contract 
laws.
163  Therefore, even if limited to an academic text, the Draft CFR (DCFR) may 
contribute to an ‘informal’ Europeanisation of private law.
164 
 
The third envisaged function of the CFR is to act as a basis for reflection on whether non-
sector specific measures, such as an optional instrument, may also be required to solve 
the problems in European contract law.
165 The CFR is thus viewed as an attempt to 
formulate relevant rules and principles which would form the content of such an 
                                                 
159 See for example, the inaugural speech of Commissioner Kyprianou, at the First European Discussion 
Forum (2005), 4. The relationship between the two initiatives is considered further in 4.3.  
160 As well as leading to convergence with the contract laws of appropriate third countries, 2003 
Communication, paragraph 62.  
161 Ibid. paragraph 60 and 2004 Communication, 5.  
162 On this possibility and the potential impact of the CFR on national systems of contract law which may 
not only lead to convergence but also to tension between the European and national levels of regulation, see 
Hesselink, The idea of codification and the dynamics of Europeanisation – the Dutch Experience, (2006) 12 
(3) European Law Journal  279, and Loos, The influence of European Consumer Law on General Contract 
Law and the Need for Spontaneous Harmonisation, (2007) European Review of  Private Law 515. 
163 DCFR Outline Edition (2009), para 8, 7.  
164 Ibid. 10. The Network, however, highlights that this could only occur if the content of the draft text can 
convince those involved in the development of contract law at the national level, to draw upon it. 
165 2003 Communication, paragraph 62.    117
instrument.
166 The issue that arises, however, is whether one instrument can 
accommodate all these purposes, as the risk is that by attempting to fulfil several diverse 
roles the final instrument may fall short of expectations.
167 The Network of Excellence 
has approached the DCFR as the development of an academic text, a legislative toolbox 
for the review of the acquis and as an optional instrument.
168 It is maintained that it has 
been continuously borne in mind that the text will undergo a political process before it 
can assume the latter roles and the drafting process has sought to facilitate progress to this 
end. The extent to which this has been achieved however, remains to be considered. The 
purpose of the next section is, therefore, to consider the suitability of the final draft from 
the perspective of its ability to undergo development into a political text, and then to 
serve as the basis of the Commission’s proposals. A wider evaluation of the DCFR is not 
intended. 
169 
 
4.2.2. The Draft Common Frame of Reference: The Outline Edition 
 
The DCFR outline edition
170 takes PECL as its starting point and foundation.
171 It builds 
upon it to incorporate the acquis communautaire with the addition of new contractual 
model rules in this regard. In a similar vein to PECL, which incorporates rules applying 
to private law rights and obligations in general,
172 the DCFR extends such coverage 
beyond the law on contracts.
173 Specifically, the DCFR extends to cover non–contractual 
obligations arising from unjust enrichment, tortious liability and benevolent intervention 
                                                 
166 Ibid. paragraphs 64 and 95.  
167 For this concern, see Lim (2008), 4.  
168 DCFR Outline Edition (2009), from 36. On the CFR as the basis of an optional instrument, see, 46, para 
80.  
169 I.e. the discussion is concerned with the choices that have been made in the creation of the harmonised 
instrument as regard to, for example, the structure, style, scope, and terminology, and is not intended as an 
evaluation of the content of the provisions therein.  
170 Published in January 2009, it appears without comments and notes in order to promote the wider 
dissemination and discussion of the text, which could be undermined by the volume of the complete 
edition. The Commission received the final text including the explanatory and illustrative commentary on 
each model rule in December 2008. DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 5, para 3.  
171 PECL consisting of rules on formation, authority of agents, validity, interpretation, on the contents of 
contracts,  performance, non-performance and remedies, both for non-performance specifically and those 
that apply in general, DCFR outline edition (2009), 23.  
172 Ibid. Including rules on plurality of parties, on the assignment of rights to performance, on set- off and 
on prescription.  
173 DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 23.   118 
in another's affairs. It also includes matters of movable property, such as transfer 
ownership, proprietary security and trust law.
174 The result, as the Network concedes, is 
an instrument that is considerably broader than that envisaged by the Commission’s 
Communications. However, they justify their approach in terms of its future uses, which 
they maintain have a direct bearing on its coverage.
175 
 
Regarding the CFR’s function as a legislative toolbox, it was clear that the draft must 
cover the fields of application of the existing directives under review. It also had to 
extend to the acquis likely to be reviewed in the future, including those areas where 
further harmonisation may be considered, even where there is no immediate proposal for 
new legislation.
176 It was felt that all the general part of contract should also be covered in 
the CFR, in its role of providing definitions of the terms and concepts referred to in the 
acquis.
177 There are so few topics which are not at some point referred to in the 
directives, or at least presupposed by them, that it was considered simpler to include the 
whole of the general law of contract rather than to omit any areas.
178 In a similar vein, it 
is maintained that non–contractual, as well as contractual, rules are referred to or 
presupposed in the acquis. The consumer acquis often presupposes rules on unjust 
enrichment and the rules on pre-contractual information refer to or presuppose rules 
which in many Member States systems’ are classified as tort.
179 Such areas should, 
therefore, be included, not because they are likely to be the subject matter of EU 
regulation in the near future, but because the existing legislation presumes that national 
systems provide the appropriate rules, without knowing whether they do so in a way 
which is compatible with EU legislation.
180 The inclusion of such rules will thus have 
instructional value, both for the EU legislator in devising legislation and for Member 
States, in its implementation. A clear link between the extended scope of coverage to 
                                                 
174 Book I includes a list of areas which are excluded from its intended scope of application, I. - 1:101: 
Intended field of application.  
175 DCFR Outline Edition (2009) 40, para 66. 
176 Ibid, paragraph 68.  
177 DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 42, para 69.  
178 Ibid.  
179 DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 42, para 69.  
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include non-contractual obligations and the CFR’s future use as a legislative toolbox is 
thus made.  
 
Guiding the Network’s approach has been the desire to avoid the creation of a fragmented 
text, replicating a major fault in the existing acquis. In cases of doubt, therefore, areas 
have been included rather than excluded.
181  Although this approach is to be welcomed in 
these terms, such coverage clearly has implications for how the draft text can be utilised 
by the Commission to create the political CFR. The current scope does not accord with 
that of the much narrower focus of the Commission, as is readily apparent from the 
review of the acquis, which was limited to eight directives. The draft text, however, 
extends to areas which some feel have no direct relationship with contract law, notably 
benevolent intervention in another's affairs. It is therefore questioned how the draft can be 
revised in order to limit its impact to general contract and consumer law without a 
considerable and careful process of unpicking the relevant parts.
182 The ability of the 
political institutions to utilise the draft text as the basis for the CFR is a critical issue in 
the analysis of the draft text, and one which is also clearly influenced by the structure and 
style of the draft instrument.  
 
In terms of structure, the subject matter of the draft text has been divided into ten Books, 
each broken down into chapters, sections, sub-sections and articles.
183 Book I provides 
the general provisions and is intended to act as guide for the reader on how to use the 
text.
184 It outlines the intended scope of application of the draft, and how its rules should 
be interpreted and developed. It further provides that the definitions found in Annex I 
apply for all purposes unless where the context otherwise requires.
185 Book II, entitled 
                                                 
181 DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 42, para 70.  
182 Whittaker, The ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’, An Assessment Commissioned by the Ministry of 
Justice, United Kingdom, (2008). 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/Draft_Common_Frame_of_Reference__an_assessment.pdf 4.  
183 For a general overview of the structure, see the DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 25.  
184 Ibid. para 43.  
185 Note that we find some key definitions in Book I including “consumer” and “business” (1:105) and “in 
writing”, “signature” and similar expressions (1:106 and 107), which are replicated in the definitions found 
in Annex I. Note also that we find definitions of ‘good faith and fair dealing’ and ‘reasonableness’ (1:103 
and 104) also in this section, the relevance of their specific reference here will be discussed below,   120 
Contract and other juridical acts, begins with general provisions
186 and the articulation of 
a right of non-discrimination.
187 It goes on in its seven remaining chapters to address 
marketing and pre-contractual duties, formation, rights of withdrawal, issues of 
representation, grounds of invalidity, the interpretation of contracts and, finally, their 
content and effects, including the regulation of unfair contract terms.  
 
A significant feature of Book II is that it introduces the concept of juridical acts, which 
runs throughout the book and which is defined distinctly from a contract. A contract is 
defined as an agreement which is intended to give rise to a binding legal relationship or to 
have some other legal effect. It can be a bilateral or multilateral juridical act.
188 A 
juridical act, on the other hand, is taken to be any statement or agreement, whether 
express or implied from conduct, which is intended to have legal effect as such and may 
be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.
189  In the form of unilateral acts these will be one 
sided promises, and legal acts which are intended to have legal effects.
190 For the most 
part and in a bilateral or multilateral form, however, they will be contractual 
agreements.
191 In light of the future uses of the CFR it is, therefore, questionable why the 
concept of juridical acts is used, as once contracts are removed from the concept it is left 
with little value. In terms of the legislative toolbox, it is clear that the concept bears no 
relevance to the present acquis nor is it likely to do so in the future, and nor will it be 
necessary for an optional instrument, which would be the chosen law of the parties to a 
contract.
192 
 
                                                 
186 The general provisions provide definitions and principles which apply for the purpose of this chapter.  
187 Book II.-2:101. The right of a person not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sex or ethnic or 
racial origin in relation to a contract or other juridical act the object of which is to provide access to, or 
supply, goods or services which are available to the public.  
188 Defined in II.-1:101 (1). 
189 II.-1:101 (2).  
190 See, Collin's book review of the DCFR Outline Interim Edition, (2008) 71 (5) Modern Law Review, 
840. In English law an example would be a promise contained in a deed, see Whittaker (2008), 78.  
191 As is conceded by the draft text itself which in terms of defining a ‘contract’, categorises it as ‘a bilateral 
or multilateral juridical act’, II. - 1:101 (1).  
192 See, Whittaker (2008), 6 and 79, who notes that there is no explicit example of a ‘unilateral juridical act’ 
in the acquis, and considers that the use of the concept is indicative of a codifying approach rather than one 
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Book III, entitled Obligations and corresponding rights, extends the coverage of the draft 
text to cover contractual and non-contractual obligations and corresponding rights. 
Together with Book II, it covers the existing material within the PECL, subject to the 
scope of those rules being extended to cover non-contractual obligations. It is thus within 
these seven chapters that we find the rules on performance, remedies in the case of non-
performance, plurality of debtors and creditors, the assignment of rights, set-off and 
merger and prescription. The content of Books II and III, and the division of the PECL 
material between them, amounts to a structural feature in the draft text. It seeks to create 
a distinction between, on the one hand, contract as a type of agreement and thus a 
juridical act in Book II and then, as a legal relationship, giving rise to reciprocal 
obligations and rights, both contractual and non-contractual, in Book III.
193 The division 
of the material in this way has, however, been criticised, as while it is conceded that the 
later chapters, dealing with set-off and prescription, are common to all obligations, 
contractual or otherwise,
194 the rules on performance and non-performance apply mainly 
to contracts.
195 This is implicit in the Network's explanation of the structural division, 
which is discussed primarily in terms of ‘contract’ and not non-contractual obligations.
196 
It is thus argued that, in accordance with PECL, the chapters on performance and non-
performance should have been contained in Book II. Instead, the draft text buries these 
contractual rules within the treatment of obligations generally and obscures the 
relationship of these provisions with those in Book II.
197 This will not assist the 
Commission in its future development of the political text.  
 
This criticism, although directed at the structure of the text, is clearly derived from the 
extended scope of the draft to deal also with non-contractual obligations and the decision 
to deal with both in one Book.
198 Treating contractual and non-contractual obligations 
                                                 
193 A structural division which the Network maintain is implicit in PECL itself, Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (2009), 27, para 45.  
194 See for example, Lando, The Structure and Legal Values of the Common Frame of Reference, paper 
delivered to the SECOLA conference, (2007), 4. On file with author. 
195 Ibid. 5, although accepting that they do in some cases apply to non-contractual obligations.  
196 Draft Common Frame of Reference (2009), 27, para 45.  
197 Whittaker (2008), 98.  
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separately was rejected structurally as it made the text cumbersome.
199 It was maintained 
by the Network
200 that, since questions concerning the modalities of performance and 
remedies for non-performance for non-contractual obligations arose frequently, it was 
advantageous not to have to repeat default rules in every provision for a non-contractual 
obligation,
201 nor to include detailed cross-references to earlier Articles. The rules in 
Book III are thus framed in general terms so as to apply to both, unless an Article applies 
only to contractual obligations, in which case this exception would be clearly stated.
202 
The Network have advanced that this will be the exception and not the rule
203 and clearly 
the treatment of contractual and non-contractual obligations together, and thus the 
structural division, can only be justified if this is the case.
204 In terms of the chapters 
concerning performance and remedies for non-performance, however, many rules apply 
exclusively to contracts and explicitly state this. An example of rules that can only apply 
to contracts is the section outlining the creditors' right to termination of the contract in the 
event of non-performance, which amounts to 4 subsections and 14 Articles, 
encompassing the grounds for termination, the scope and exercises of the right, its effects 
and the restitution of benefits received by performance.
205 A further example is the right 
to reduce the price, in section 6, where the restriction in scope to contract follows from 
the word “price”.
206  
 
In other Articles, the limited application to contractual obligations and relationships is 
implicit. For example, Section 4 of Chapter 3 concerning the right to withhold 
performance of reciprocal obligations. Although the Article does not talk of contractual 
obligations explicitly, given that it is the contractual relationship that gives rise to 
                                                 
199 Ibid. 
200 Subject to those comments of Lando (2007), 4 discussed above.  
201 Ibid. Among those non-contractual obligations where such questions are expected to arise, and to which 
Book III applies are, obligations arising out of unilateral promises, pre-contractual obligations and those 
arising by operation of law to pay damages for loss caused to another, or out of benevolent intervention in 
another’s affairs, or to reverse an unjust enrichment.  
202 DCFR Outline Edition, (2009), 28, para 46.   
203 DCFR Interim Outline Edition (2008), 23, para 48.  
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205 III. - 3:501–514. 
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reciprocal rights and obligations,
207 it is difficult to envisage when this provision will 
apply to anything other than a contractual relationship.
208 The conclusion to be drawn is 
that the Articles applying only to contractual obligations are not mere exceptions. The 
Commission, using the draft text to create a contractual legislative toolbox, is faced from 
the beginning with an “incomprehensible logic”.
 209 They must find provisions, which in 
the vast majority of cases only apply to contracts, in a book which treats them equally 
with other obligations. It can therefore be contended, on this basis, that the current draft 
text is not a suitable basis for a contractual toolbox.
210 Further, the extent to which the 
Network of Excellence has justified its decision to treat contractual and non-contractual 
obligations together, and the structural division that has been undertaken, are 
questionable in these terms.  
 
The content of the draft has also been heavily influenced by its sources. It is primarily 
based upon PECL and has undertaken a largely faithful replication of its provisions, 
subject to the influence of the scope and structure of the text already discussed. In 
particular this has meant that the rules in Book III taken from PECL have been extended 
to apply to obligations in general, despite being drafted originally for contracts and the 
earlier conclusion that, in practice, they will apply only to contractual obligations. Minor 
changes in the structure of the text are also evident. For example, although Chapter 4 of 
Book II on formation generally follows Chapter 2 of PECL in terms of both structure and 
content, there are a number of notable exceptions. Although PECL deals with terms that 
are not individually negotiated and the ability of parties to invoke these within its chapter 
on formation,
211 in the DCFR they will be found in a separate section of Chapter 9 in 
Book II,
212 governing the content and effects of contracts. This change in structure and 
dedication of a whole section to the regulation of such terms reflects the new significance 
attached to their regulation in B2C contracts, which was not reflected in the earlier PECL, 
                                                 
207 Which is seen as the defining features of a contract, DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 27, para 45.  
208 N.B. Parallel to provisions on withholding performance in PECL, Article 9:201.  
209 Lando (2007), 5.  
210 Although the Network maintain that if a CFR were to be confined to contract, it would be very easy to 
use the model rules in Book III for that purpose and that for  most this would require no alteration, DCFR 
Outline Edition (2009), 28, para 46.  
211 PECL, Chapter 2, Section 1 Article 2:104.  
212 Section 4.    124 
and indicates the incorporation of the acquis into the draft text. Including these provisions 
within the chapter governing the content and effects of contracts, rather than regulating 
them at the formation stage, can also be considered a structural improvement. Other 
improvements are evident in the placing of the rules governing negotiation and 
confidentiality duties and liability for breaches of such. Whereas these were previously 
considered within the formation chapter of PECL,
213 they are now found in Chapter 3, 
Section 3 of Book II, governing marketing and pre-contractual duties. This improvement 
is not merely structural, given that both duties apply at the pre-contractual and thus pre-
formation stage, but again reflects the incorporation and impact of the acquis 
communautaire. The introduction of positive pre-contractual information duties, which 
were not included within PECL, has been a key feature of the consumer acquis. 
 
A further clear deviation from PECL, which results from the scope of the draft, is the 
introduction throughout Book II of separate sections to deal with juridical acts other than 
contract. Chapter 4, for example, has a separate section on formation for other juridical 
acts: specifically, the requirements for a unilateral juridical act.
214 As the draft provides 
distinct and separate sections for juridical acts, this aspect cannot be overly criticised in 
terms of undermining the draft text's utility as the basis for a contractual toolbox, as the 
provisions for contract can be easily discerned. It may still, however, be open to the 
earlier criticism regarding why juridical acts were included within the scope of the draft 
in the first place.  
 
The most prominent difference in the PECL, both in terms of content and structure, has 
therefore been the need to accommodate the acquis communautaire within the text, which 
formerly did not contain consumer provisions. The effect has been to introduce new, 
consumer protection driven, rights and obligations derived from the acquis. Thus a right 
of withdrawal is introduced in consumer contracts negotiated away from business 
premises. This replicates the rights of withdrawal which have been recognised in the 
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acquis,
215 and which would now come within the scope of the general right detailed in 
Article 5:201 of Book II of the DCFR.
216 The latter provision therefore presents an 
opportunity to compare the provisions of the CRD with those of the DCFR in so far as 
the incorporation of the acquis in the DCFR is concerned.  
 
We find that the CRD proposal makes a distinction between off-premise contracts,
217 
distance contracts for the sale of goods, and distance contracts for the provision of 
services as regards to the start of the withdrawal period. The period starts from a different 
specified date in each of the 3 instances. This reflects the existing and sector-specific 
approach of the acquis
218 in the Distance
219 and Doorstep Selling
220 Directives which 
would be replicated, and consolidated in Article 12 (2) of the CRD. Article II.-5:103(2) 
DCFR, however, lists those 3 times found in the acquis but provides that unless otherwise 
provided, the period will begin at the latest of those possible times.  
 
The way in which the DCFR abandons the sector-specific approach fixed by the acquis as 
to the starting point should be welcomed. The CRD proposal has been criticised in this 
respect for maintaining the status-quo of the existing acquis, and for failing to address 
problems that arise from the unjustified distinction that it makes between contracts 
concerning goods and services in the case of distance contracts. While in the case of 
services the period of withdrawal runs from the date of the conclusion of the contract, in 
the case of the sale of goods, it will be from the later point when the consumer acquires 
material possession of the goods ordered. In contrast, in the case of off-premise contracts, 
the withdrawal period shall begin from the day when the consumer signs the order form. 
In practice this means that the starting point under the CRD will normally be the moment 
that the contract is concluded,
221 except for the distance sale of goods. While this 
                                                 
215 The Doorstep and Distance Selling Directives. 
216 A more specific right of withdrawal has been given in the case of timeshare contracts in Article 5:202. 
For justification for the separate treatment of timeshare contracts, see Section 4.1.3.  
217 I.e. Doorstep selling.  
218 The start of the withdrawal period within the existing acquis is discussed in detail by Loos, Rights of 
Withdrawal, in: Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, Howells and Schulze, Munich: 
Sellier, 2009.  
219 Directive 97/7/EC, Article 6. 
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distinction and later starting point may seem justified in allowing the consumer to 
ascertain the nature and functioning of the goods,
222 it may equally be justified in other 
cases.
223 The CRD also fails to address ambiguities that can arise from the goods/services 
distinction.
224 Loos provides the example of the distance selling of prepaid mobile 
phones, where the consumer buys both the good, i.e. the mobile phone, and the service to 
make use of the mobile phone for a certain period.
225 Under the existing acquis, and 
indeed the proposed CRD, it is not clear when the withdrawal period would start: when 
the phone is delivered under the goods rule, or when the contract is concluded, as per the 
service rule. The latter ambiguity is overcome by the approach of the DCFR as it will be 
at the latest of the starting points listed therein that the withdrawal period will begin.
226  
 
Despite the noted difference between the instruments in their approach to the starting 
point, there is in fact little substantive difference between the provisions in terms of those 
points which will be determinative of the withdrawal period,
227 and both clearly draw on 
the existing acquis in these terms. However, while the approach of the DCFR can be seen 
to improve the coherence of the existing acquis, the CRD focuses on the consolidation of 
the existing rules. This may be one area, therefore, where the CRD proposal could draw 
on the DCFR in order to ensure greater coherence of the acquis.
228  
 
More generally, the extent to which the DCFR abandons the limitation of scope of 
application fixed by the directives and generalises the rules of the consumer acquis,
229 
                                                 
222 Discussed Ibid. 254.   
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should have been anticipated as a development in line with the Commission’s regulatory 
move towards full harmonisation and a horizontal approach. The DCFR seeks to identify 
how the sectoral provisions may be applied so as to eliminate gaps and assist the 
‘horizontal approach’.
230 Concerns arise, however, where the rules are generalised and 
extended to apply also to commercial transactions. One example is the creation of a 
general duty of disclosure on businesses, to provide such information concerning goods 
and services as the other person can reasonably expect.
231 In the case of B2B contracts, 
and in assessing what information the other party can reasonably expect to be disclosed, 
the test to be applied is whether failure to provide information would deviate from good 
commercial practice.
232 In regard to B2C contracts, where the business has a duty not to 
give misleading information, that is to say not to misrepresent or omit material facts, the 
test of information to be given is that of what the average consumer
233 could expect to be 
given to make an informed decision on whether to conclude a contract.
234 In this way a 
lower threshold is put in place for the business in terms of the information which must be 
supplied to the consumer. However, while the draft attempts to make a distinction so as to 
encroach less on party autonomy in B2B contracts, the result is nevertheless, that 
disclosure is to be the general rule even in commercial transactions.  
 
The DCFR takes a similar approach to the regulation of unfair terms which have not been 
individually negotiated
235 although, again, a higher threshold for intervention is clearly 
put in place for the regulation of standard terms in commercial contracts.
236 A further 
limitation to contractual freedom does, however, potentially arise in the context of B2C 
contracts, as the DCFR leaves it open to regulate the fairness of all contract terms which 
are provided by businesses, even those individually negotiated by the parties.
237  The 
issue has been one of extensive debate,
238 as the Study Group would prefer 
                                                 
230 DCFR Outline Edition, (2009), 38 para 63.  
231 Book II.-3:101. Specific duties to provide information to consumers are provided in the following 
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233 To be distinguished from the consumer who is at a particular disadvantage, Article 3:103.  
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comprehensive scrutiny of all contract terms in such contracts. The Acquis Group, 
however, in line with the approach of the consumer acquis itself, considers that only 
standard terms should be regulated in these terms, and thus seeks to maintain some 
degree of party autonomy for B2C contracts. In practice, the Network of Excellence 
considers that the consequence of removing the words “which has not been individually 
negotiated” will probably have little impact, as most terms supplied by businesses will 
not be individually negotiated.
239 In any case, they consider the issue a delicate one which 
requires a political decision.
240  
 
The regulation of standard and individually negotiated terms demonstrates a more general 
difficulty that has faced the Network of Excellence collectively in giving effect to 
freedom of contract. This was to be the guiding principle of the CFR
241 and, indeed, is the 
starting point of the DCFR.
242  The issue is the extent to which this freedom can and 
should be restricted, particularly beyond the B2C context.
243 From one perspective
244 and 
given that the scope of the protective provisions in the acquis were limited to the 
consumer,
245 it could have been inferred from this original scope, that the terms of 
commercial contracts should continue to be largely unregulated. In most cases there is no 
incompatibility between contractual freedom and the needs of justice.
246 However, there 
are recognised cases where restrictions on contractual freedom are justified and thus 
contracts will not be enforced. This is primarily where one party is in a weaker position, 
owing to inequality in bargaining position or information,
247 but also in classic cases of 
procedural unfairness such as mistake, duress, fraud or those which involve unfair 
exploitation.
248 In such cases, the contracts will not be enforced – not only because one 
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party was not freely agreeing to contract, or was misinformed which means that they have 
not exercised their fundamental freedom of contract
249 - but also to ensure that the needs 
of justice are met in the given situation.
250 
 
A particular way in which justice is ensured is through the principle of good faith and fair 
dealing, 
251 which is readily apparent throughout the provisions of the DCFR. Specific 
and more general duties, which cannot be excluded or limited, fall upon the parties to act 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing from the negotiation stage,
252 through to 
performance.
253 In this way and in justifiable circumstances the party’s freedom of 
contract is clearly restricted. Discussion, however, has surrounded the manner in which to 
give effect to such restriction. The Network of Excellence maintains that any interference 
with freedom of contract should be kept to the minimum that will solve the problem, 
while providing the other party, the business, with sufficient guidance so as to be able to 
arrange their practices within these parameters.
254 While in some cases this may require, 
as we have seen, the introduction of information duties, this may not always be sufficient. 
In other cases, the problem may require the elaboration of precise rules or even 
mandatory rules. However, with a view to keeping interference with the parties’ freedom 
of contract to a minimum, it is sometimes seen that a flexible ‘fairness’ test to protect the 
weaker party may suffice.
255 To this end the DCFR uses objective standards and general 
principles, such as ‘fairness’ and ‘good faith and fair dealing’ throughout, as a means of 
regulating contractual agreements.  
 
Contrary to the Network's contention that this approach should interfere less with the 
parties' freedom of contract, the use of such provisions has been criticised for widely 
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curtailing the scope of contractual agreements and thus of doing the exact opposite.
256 
Much discussion surrounded the original provision in the interim outline edition of the 
text relating to party autonomy in Book II, as it provided that although parties would be 
free to make a contract and to determine its contents, this freedom would be subject to the 
rules on good faith and fair dealing.
257 Freedom of contract was from the outset subject to 
an obligation to act in good faith, leaving what is seen as a relatively low threshold for 
interference in the agreement that the parties have made.
258 In view of what is described 
as confusion surrounding the reference to good faith in the provision, although clearly it 
can be understood in terms of criticism of this initial and far-reaching incursion on 
contractual freedom, the reference to good faith has been removed from the provision.
259 
As has been demonstrated, however, the principle of ‘good faith and fair dealing’ still 
plays a pronounced role in the scheme of the DCFR. Thus in a further change following 
the review of the interim outline edition, we now find in Book I a new definition of ‘good 
faith and fair dealing’.
260 This is included by the Network, at this juncture of the draft, in 
order to reflect the importance of the principle within the text.  
 
In terms of style, reference to objective standards and general principles such as good 
faith can be seen to reflect the use of such general principles in the earlier harmonised 
provisions of PECL.
261 Indeed, the need to rely on broad and general principles is 
inherent in the goal of harmonising instruments, which attempt to establish common 
principles, model rules and a shared terminology.
262 While their inclusion to this end is 
therefore unavoidable, their use does give rises to concern
263 in terms of their often vague 
                                                 
256 Eidenmüller et al. The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy Choices and 
Codification Problems (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 659, 678.  
257 DCFR, Interim Outline Edition (2008), II. – 1:102 (1). 
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and ambiguous nature, which results in uncertainty. This may undermine the realisation 
of the objectives in creating the CFR, and in particular its ability to aid the consistent 
transposition and application of the acquis at national level and thus to achieve a high 
degree of convergence between the contract laws of the Member States. For example, 
Member States do not share a common understanding of, nor make provision for, all legal 
concepts. The objective standard of good faith is not a general requirement in all systems, 
notably the common law system. This means that it will not always, therefore, be read 
into provisions and it will be necessary for the European legislator in the future, where 
they want the principle to apply, to include express provisions on the issue.
264 Even 
where this is done, however, the interpretation of the requirement may vary between 
Member States, as the possibility will remain that national courts will interpret the CFR 
and the acquis provisions in line with national conceptions of principles. Thus, what may 
be regarded as being in accordance with good faith, or as good commercial practice, in 
one national system may not be the same as that in another.
265 The use of general 
standards and principles may, therefore, make it difficult to achieve the degree of 
uniformity in application for which the Commission strives through the CFR.
266  
 
The use of objective standards and general principles can also undermine legal certainty 
for contracting parties.
267 As the Network acknowledges, although justice requires – and 
one party’s contractual security will be enhanced by – the other's duty to act in 
accordance with good faith and fair dealing, this will come at the price of uncertainty and 
insecurity for the party upon which the duty falls, owing to the open-ended nature of the 
concept.
268 The protection of the weaker party through such concepts is clearly at the cost 
of predictability which is essential to contracting, where parties want clear and 
transparent rules.
269 The use of such concepts may, therefore, also impact upon the 
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suitability of the existing DCFR as the source of rules for an optional instrument. This is 
particularly where they apply in the commercial context, where the risk is that freedom of 
contract would be unduly marginalised.
270 At the same time the combined effect of the 
use of such opened-ended concepts and the generalisation of the acquis provisions to B2B 
contracting, may be seen as producing a more balanced result and one that is more 
attuned to the consideration and needs of social justice in contracting.
271 From this 
perspective, even in a B2B contract, the economically weaker party will be better 
protected.
272  There is thus justification for this extension in regulation of commercial 
contacts, while it has also been shown that the incursion on contractual freedom will be 
less intrusive in this context than for B2C contracts.  
 
It has been shown more generally that the choices of the Network of Excellence, in terms 
of the scope and structure of the draft, have resulted in serious misgivings with regard to 
the suitability of the draft text to satisfy its principal objective as a legislative toolbox to 
improve the acquis communautaire. In particular, the choices bear directly on how the 
Commission is to utilise the draft text to produce a political text to that end, i.e. to create 
common European definitions, model rules etc. The DCFR may, in fact, demand a great 
deal from those participating in the political process to produce the final CFR, and clearly 
the ability of that instrument to fulfil those initial objectives will depend on the views and 
more recent objectives of those involved in the selection process, which remain to be 
considered.  
 
4.2.3. The Development of the Political CFR 
 
The Commission received the final version of the DCFR in December 2008. The final 
instrument will be developed under a different Directorate-General, as DG Justice, 
Freedom and Security (JFS) has inherited the task from the Health and Consumer Affairs 
Directorate. The completion of the CFR project will thus be undertaken in the broader 
context of civil law. The first statement by DG JFS on how they plan to advance with the 
                                                 
270 With detrimental effects for larger businesses, see Chapter 2, 2.3.4, and Chapter 6, 6.4.1.   
271 Vogenauer (2009), Q. 43.  
272 As a means, in particular, to protect SMEs, see Chapter 6, 6.4.1.    133
CFR was made in the proposal for the Stockholm Programme and their five year plan for 
justice and home affairs. The proposal places the CFR project back within the wider 
objective of supporting economic activity in the internal market
273 and thus of assisting 
businesses that are prevented from engaging in trade owing to the differences in Member 
States’ contract laws. The project is no longer limited to the consumer-orientated focus 
that existed under DG SANCO, and while the CFR as a legislative toolbox remains the 
principal proposal, wider uses are once again being envisaged.
274 The European Council 
has maintained, in view of the Stockholm proposal, that the CFR should form a set of 
fundamental principles, definitions and model rules to be used by lawmakers at Union 
level to ensure greater coherence and quality in the lawmaking process. This reaffirms the 
Council's position on the future uses and development of the CFR,
275 and the 
Commission was invited to submit a proposal on a CFR to that end.
276 The Commission 
is thus involved in a selection process to determine those parts of the DCFR that will 
prove useful in its legislative toolbox function. The issue that arises, is what can be 
expected to result from this process.  
 
In terms of the content of this instrument, the Council considers that it should focus on 
the existing acquis and on matters which are likely to be the subject of future 
legislation.
277 While this is subject to the caveat that, as an evolving legislative tool, it 
will be necessary for the CFR to be revised regularly so as to adapt it, in particular, to the 
changing scope of the EU acquis, the scope of the latter is a clear parameter in this 
regard.
278 The final instrument can thus be expected to be considerably shorter, in both 
                                                 
273 The current financial and economic crisis in the EU appears to be leading their agenda under Stockholm 
in this respect and may thus have an effect on the outcome, see the Evidence of Jonathan Faull’s, Director-
General, JFS, to the House of Lords on the Draft Common Frame of Reference (2009), Q. 156.  
274 See, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, An area of 
freedom, security and justice serving the citizen (Proposal for the Stockholm Programme), COM (2009) 
262/4, Section 3.4.2 and page 31, discussed below.   
275 Consolidated version of the conclusions of the Council on guidelines on the setting up of a Common 
Frame of Reference for European Contract law (2009).  
276 Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen (17024/09), 2 
December 2009, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st17/st17024.en09.pdf, 33.  
277 Consolidated Council conclusions (2009), para 15.  
278 Ibid, para 16.    134 
length and coverage,
279 than the draft text, but a comprehensive contractual instrument 
can still result. In order to be an effective tool for better law making, the Council 
considers that it could cover both general and consumer contract law
280 and this would 
include all relevant aspects of contractual relations, from the pre-contractual phase to 
performance or default in performance.
281 It has also not been ruled out that other special 
contracts falling within the acquis, outside the area of consumer contracts, could be 
included within the CFR.
282 The fact that the process is also now being undertaken in the 
wider context of civil law suggests a broader outcome than the original consumer driven 
instrument.  
 
A comprehensive contractual instrument will be necessary from the perspective of the 
other envisaged uses of the CFR. This is readily apparent from the manner in which we 
now see DG JFS contemplating the use of the CFR, which is as a basis upon which to 
create tools to encourage cross-border trade.
283  In the first place, it could serve as the 
basis upon which standard contract terms and conditions
284 could be drawn up between 
individuals and, in particular, between small businesses.
285 Consideration is also being 
given to the development of cross-border trade through the adoption of an optional 
instrument of contract law.
286 Support continues for the use of the CFR as the basis for 
such on instrument, and thus for the development of the CFR to this end.
287 With this use 
in mind, there is support for the optional instrument to be based on the wider DCFR, 
suggesting a more comprehensive final CFR than that limited to the toolbox function.
288 
                                                 
279 The consolidated Council conclusions (2009) speaks only of contract and Faull’s made clear, that in 
comparison with the draft text, the final instrument will not go beyond the wider category of contract law, 
Q. 129. He did however reserve some judgment on the issue at that early stage (March 2009).  
280 Consolidated Council conclusions (2009), para 10.  
281 Ibid. para 10.  
282 Although at a later stage, Consolidated Council conclusions (2009), para 14.  
283 Proposal for the Stockholm Programme (2009), 31. 
284 The proposal to create standard contract terms had been abandoned while the project was under the 
control of DG SANCO, see discussion in Chapter 2, 2.4.  
285 Commission’s Proposal for the Stockholm Programme (2009), 3.4.2. Considered further in Chapter 5, 
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287 Discussed in Chapter 6, 6.1.2.  
288  European Parliament, Resolution of 3 September 2008 on the common frame of reference for European 
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The European Parliament has thus warned on this basis that the overall coherence of the 
optional instrument should not be jeopardised in the selection process.
289 While the 
envisaged functions of the CFR, therefore, impact upon the scope and content of the 
future instrument, the extent to which the wider proposals will ultimately bear on the 
content of the political CFR remains unclear. The potential for the final instrument to 
fulfil such functions, and thus support economic activity in the internal market should not 
however be overlooked in the selection process.
290 
 
In terms of the legal effect of the CFR, and returning to its legislative toolbox function, 
the institutions have favoured a non-binding set of guidelines to be used by the 
lawmakers on a voluntary basis, as a common source of inspiration or reference in the 
law making process.
291 To this end, it is envisaged that the instrument could be appended 
to any future legislative proposals or communications by the Commission in the area of 
contract law to ensure that it will be considered by the EU legislature.
292 The issue that 
arises, however, is whether the CFR, in a non-binding form, would be attributed 
sufficient force to satisfy the objectives of action: i.e. to improve the acquis by 
overcoming its existing inconsistencies and inherent fragmentation. This will largely 
depend upon the resulting instrument, and whether the EU institutions are prepared to 
make use of it in the legislative process. The Council made this point expressly in 
reference to their preference for non- binding guidelines, and highlighted the need to 
involve all EU institutions in the process, in order to ensure optimum conditions for the 
use of the CFR. Clearly, if the CFR were adopted by only one of the institutions, its 
significance would be reduced.
293   It has further been highlighted by both the Council 
and European Parliament that the instrument will have to be capable, as a legislative 
toolbox, of regular revision so as to ensure that it reflects both changes in the acquis and 
                                                 
289 Ibid.   
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developments in national contract law.
294 In particular, it should be adapted in line with 
the changing scope of the acquis. This may, in future, allow for the potentially narrow 
scope of the initial instrument, i.e. in the legislative toolbox function, as a necessary short 
term action, to be widened in line with changing and potentially broadening political and 
legislative objectives of the Union, and the wider contract law and internal market project 
as it develops.
295   
4.3. The Relationship Between the Acquis Review and the CFR  
The relationship between the review of the acquis and the CFR was clear. In order to 
increase the coherence of the acquis and thus simplify the regulatory environment, the 
Commission would revise the acquis in the area, and proposals arising from the review, 
i.e. the resulting CRD proposal, would take into account a CFR.
296 The 2004 
Communication envisaged that the agreed definitions and model rules in the elaboration 
of the CFR would be tested for practicability
297 in the field of consumer protection in the 
context of the review of the acquis. The acquis review, and the content thereof, would 
then feed into the development of the CFR.
298 In this way, the creation of a CFR was seen 
as an intermediate step towards improving the quality of the EU acquis in this area and 
thus to meeting the objectives of action.
299 It later became clear, however, that the parallel 
work on the CFR would not delay the consumer acquis review.
300 In 2005
301 the 
Commission prioritised in the CFR workshops, issues related to consumer contracts and 
thus the main substance of the CRD, including consumer sales, pre-contractual 
information, unfair terms and the right of withdrawal, in order to ensure the CFR’s timely 
input into the review.
302  The Acquis Group was also central to the Commission’s review 
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rd September 2008, 
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297 2004 Communication, pages 3 and 12.  
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299 2003 Communication, para 53.  
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of the initial eight consumer directives that resulted in the creation of the EC consumer 
law compendium, which acts as the knowledge base of the review.
303 The CFR 
researchers’ findings and draft text on these issues then served, in part, as input into the 
review Green Paper and the questions posed therein.
304  
 
Despite the relationship between the two initiatives and the directly relevant work of the 
Acquis Group, there was negligible reference to the CFR in the Green Paper, with a mere 
reference only to the CFR and its researchers.
305 We also find that no reference is made to 
the DCFR in the resulting CRD proposal, despite, in both cases, the DCFR being 
available to the Commission at the relevant time.
306 This is not to say however, that the 
ongoing work on the DCFR did not more informally feed into the CRD proposal;
307 the 
influence of the DCFR can be found within the instrument. Schulte-Nölke
308 notes, for 
example, similarities in content in regard to off-premise contracts,
309 passing of risk in 
sales contracts and in the transparency requirements for non-negotiated contract terms. 
The lack of formal acknowledgement of the involvement of the DCFR in the CRD has, 
however, lead to scepticism in regard to the relationship between the instruments and the 
said influence of the DCFR,
310 and for some to conclude that the result is a “relationship 
of non-relations.”
311 There is a feeling that that the Commission has “put the cart before 
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the horse”
312 in proposing the CRD at a time when the CFR was still being prepared
313 
and while it should have served, in its function as a legislative toolbox, as the formal and 
transparent basis for such a significant proposal following the acquis review.  
 
A review of the CRD proposal demonstrates
314 that while it makes a number of 
amendments and innovations which are to be welcomed,
315  ultimately the draft is not a 
completely new piece of legislation.
316 It can be seen to follow the structure and content 
of the existing directives,
317 in an attempt to consolidate the four directives under review 
into a horizontal instrument. This objective appears to have been sought in some cases 
over the simplification aims of the review, and the need for coherence in the acquis.
318 
The result is that provisions of the CRD also require greater coherence and clarity and 
can be seen to fall short of the DCFR in this respect which attempted, in line with its 
objectives, to create a more coherent contract law.
319 
 
It has been demonstrated in regard to the starting point of the withdrawal period, for 
example, that there is little substantive difference in the provisions of the CRD and 
DCFR, both of which draw in terms of content on the existing acquis.
320 The difference 
between the instruments lies in the perspectives that they take.
321 The CRD on the one 
hand distinguishes the applicable starting point according to the type of contract 
concerned, i.e. off-premise, a distance contract for the sale of goods or one for the 
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provision of services. The DCFR on the other hand, provides for a general right of 
withdrawal in contracts negotiated away from business premises and details the starting 
points irrespective of the type of contract. This allows the DCFR to rationalise the acquis 
rules to offer a more horizontal and coherent approach to withdrawal, while also 
overcoming difficulties which arise from the sector-specific approach of the existing 
acquis and the CRD, in regard to the distinction made between distance contracts for 
goods and those for services.
322 The issue of withdrawal is therefore one area where 
greater coherence could be achieved in the acquis by drawing on the CFR in its toolbox 
function.  
 
It is also within this area that we see the influence of the DCFR on the CRD but within 
the limits of the existing approach of the acquis. A noted point of similarity
323 has been 
the approach to off-premise contracts. The CRD is thought to considerably extend the 
scope of the term ‘off premise’ contracts in comparison to that of the current acquis, 
under the Doorstep Selling Directive,
324 and in this respect follows the DCFR which 
refers to contracts negotiated away from business premises.
325 It has been discussed, 
however, that unlike the CRD, the DCFR brings under the latter head, without 
distinction, both off-premise and distance contracts, in a horizontal approach. The CRD 
is, therefore, criticised for failing to consider this approach, and for choosing to maintain 
a distinction between distance and off-premise contracts. Maintaining this distinction, 
once again
326results in what is considered to be unnecessary ambiguity.
327 The CRD does 
not offer a solution to the problem of mixed off-premise and distance marketing strategies 
and as such it has been advanced that it would have been easier in this respect to have 
followed the generic approach of the DCFR, which applies to all contracts not concluded 
on business premises.
328  
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The concern moving forward is, therefore, that while the proposed CRD provides for a 
full harmonisation and horizontal approach, it represents a framework for the future 
development of the contract law acquis in this area. The shortcomings of the proposal 
however highlight that opportunity still exists for improvement of this framework and the 
CFR would provide a good basis for this. The existence of the CRD proposal now 
suggests, however, that it will inform the development of the CFR to ensure consistency 
with the acquis. Indeed, the Council’s Committee on Civil Law Matters has been 
instructed with the task of considering how the provisions of the proposed CRD should 
be reflected in the CFR, in order to ensure consistency between the two instruments.
329  
To this end, the Committee considers that it would be desirable during the setting up of 
the CFR to follow and to take into account the negotiation of the proposed Directive; the 
result may therefore be that the DCFR is changed in order to be consistent with the CRD. 
 
From the foregoing it is clear, however, that there would be little value in a CFR which 
simply incorporates the CRD, and thus reflects the acquis as it will stand.
330 In line with 
the original intention of the CFR in its toolbox function, the model rules of the CFR 
would have to recommend improvements to the acquis derived rules, which the EU 
legislator could draw upon in the future.
331 The foregoing examples from the DCFR on 
the issue of withdrawal demonstrate where the CFR could present model rules to advance 
a more horizontal approach to the acquis, and overcome existing limitations in the 
continued sector-specific approach.
332 If the recommendations were supported by 
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explanations and reasons for deviations from the existing acquis, the open discourse that 
was intended between the two projects could result.
333 
 
More generally, there is still a need for a CFR as a European contractual framework of 
model rules, principles and terminology. While the CRD seeks to create a basis for the 
future development of European consumer contract law, it cannot fully serve in this 
function owing to its narrow scope and ‘targeted’ nature, which means that it also 
maintains the sector-specific approach based on the existing acquis. This means that 
while it has been shown that greater convergence in the acquis is being achieved by the 
accompanying vertical review, the CRD does not provide a sound basis for the review as 
it stands, and the risk is continued fragmentation. In order to ensure future consistency 
and coherence in the acquis it would, therefore, be desirable to utilise the CFR as the 
basis of a legislator’s toolbox in the future, as envisaged above. The CRD also interacts 
with issues of national contract law, which remain outside the scope of the proposal, and 
which threatens the coherence of the regulatory framework created in the CRD.
334 For 
example, the CRD refers to national law for the provision of remedies in the case of 
failure to provide information.
335 In contrast, the DCFR provides for such remedies 
within its own system and could, therefore, in order to result in a more complete and 
coherent system of European contract law, provide the CRD with a background of 
general contract law rules which could be read with the CRD.
336  
 
It is clear that in terms of the way forward, and in particular for the coherence of the 
regulatory response to obstacles arising from the state of contract law at the European 
level, good reasons exist for utilising the CFR in its toolbox function. It may, therefore, 
be hoped that the two initiatives may once again inform each other as originally 
envisaged, and thus that the CFR could further inform the acquis review in the future.
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Chapter 5 
 
The International Analogy 
 
This chapter considers the European harmonisation debate in general, and the European 
Commission’s proposals in particular, from the perspective of existing harmonisation 
efforts at the international and corresponding regional levels. It considers the extent to 
which these levels of regulatory activity can be regarded as being based on the same 
premise as the internal market and, ultimately, how this has resulted in the creation of 
harmonised transnational commercial law governing cross-border trade. A point of 
discussion is to consider what the European debate can learn from the international 
regulation of trade in general and in particular in terms of the approach, nature, form and 
effect of regulation at these levels. Since the traditional focus of the European 
harmonisation debate is the creation of a harmonised contractual instrument, the chapter 
moves on to consider what the EU can draw from existing harmonised instruments in 
creating a European law of contract. Central to the chapter, therefore, is a case study on 
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods. In light of the 
findings, the chapter goes on to consider how the international analogy can assist the 
understanding of the regulatory approach that must be taken to European contract law and 
the regulation of trade in the internal market.  
 
5.1. International Context 
 
The international dimension to the European contract law harmonisation debate is clear. 
The rationale of harmonisation at the European level can be equally observed at the 
international level, where divergences and ongoing competition between legal systems 
exist on a pronounced ‘global’ scale. Resulting inconsistencies between contractual 
systems inevitably increase risk in international transactions, in much the same way as 
identified for the internal market. Indeed, some point to the response at the international 
level to overcoming the problems to cross-border arising from domestic regulation as   144 
evidence of obstacles to trade arising from contract law for the Internal Market. This then 
serves as a basis to justify further harmonisation activity at the European level.
1  
 
The response at the international level has been an influx of private and commercial 
unified instruments, which in turn interact with the private law rules at the European 
level, both national law and the acquis communautaire. As a result, the search for 
coherence at the European level is simultaneously further complicated by the potential 
application of a number of non-national legal sources derived from this level. This may 
be the CISG, the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC),or 
the application of trade usages and customs; lex mercatoria.
2 The effort of facilitating 
trade worldwide and in overcoming the limitations identified as arising from the 
diverging national systems of contract law can be seen to be undertaken at a variety of 
levels; nationally, regionally and internationally, by a variety of actors, and it is achieved 
through a variety of means of regulation; be it binding or facultative instruments, 
contractually incorporated rules and trade terms created by international organisation or 
by means of business made regulation, i.e. standard terms and conditions.
3  
 
Harmonisation activity at the international level is not, however, merely a response to the 
substantive differences between national legal systems which act to hinder trade. It is also 
considered to be necessary in light of more intrinsic inadequacies and perceived failures 
of national regulation. Thus, principally, it is advanced that a transnational commercial 
law has emerged due to the fact that an international transaction cannot be treated in the 
same way as a domestic one.
4 Although this has not been presented as a significant 
argument in favour of harmonisation in the European debate, the unsuitability of national 
law as a means of cross-border regulation is evident at this level, in particular in terms of 
content; namely that national rules which are intended for domestic transaction are not 
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necessarily well adapted to the regulation and needs of cross-border trade.
5 To this end, it 
is possible to criticise the technique of using harmonised private international law rules to 
overcome potential conflicts between national contractual provisions in international 
transactions.
6 Although it has been shown that, where parties are of equal bargaining 
power the choice of the appropriate applicable law can be an effective way of 
overcoming obstacles arising from divergences,
7 criticism at this level is directed at the 
effect of the choice. This will be to subject an otherwise international contract to a 
national contractual system which may well be unsuited to the international context of the 
transaction.
8 As Schmitthoff notes; “The apotheosis of private international law is a side-
effect of an exaggerated notion of the national state. It is an attempt at localising an 
international legal relationship in a national legal system. As such, it runs counter to the 
object and purpose of the international relationship”.
9 
 
Others question more generally the merits of national regulation, noting in particular, 
information failures, by which states have insufficient knowledge in order to identify the 
causes of problems requiring action and thus to design solutions that are appropriate. 
Regulation is then further undermined by those who are subject to it, who are 
insufficiently inclined to comply.
10 The international level has thus witnessed a 
substitution of individual state regulation, including through means of choice of law, for 
the creation of a uniform system of trade regulation. The international market and its 
participants are not, however, being governed solely through traditional means of 
intergovernmental cooperation, and thus the conventions and model laws created by 
organisations such as UNIDROIT and UNICITRAL, who are officially mandated to 
develop legislative instruments and to contribute to private and commercial law reform at 
international level.
11 They are increasingly joined by a range of actors in the 
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harmonisation of private law at this level: non-governmental organisations, international 
trade organisation,
12 trade specific and professional organisations,
13 technical committees 
etc. Market participants themselves also contribute to the regulation of the market, 
through the exercise of the high degree of contractual freedom that they enjoy in the 
commercial sphere.
14  
 
A corresponding development to the international regulation of markets is 
regionalisation, that is to say, the creation of harmonised laws to establish a framework 
for the development of regional markets, based on states linked by a geographical area.
15 
The US can be considered as one of the world’s most important single markets, and much 
of its success can be attributed to the facilitation of trade between states by the Uniform 
Commercial Code, consisting of uniform legal rules relating to the most important 
commercial transactions. In contrast, to take the EU and the creation of the single market 
as a further example of regionalisation, it has been shown that harmonisation in this 
context has been accompanied by legal fragmentation. There has been a failure at this 
level to manage the existence of multi-level governance in the market, which has 
undermined the EU’s integration objectives and search for coherence. Thus, not only is 
there supranational regulation of the market and its participants through the EU, but also 
national and international regulation, all of which interact and in many cases conflict. So, 
in the B2C context, despite harmonisation by the EU in the area of contract law, 
significant differences remain in national contract systems, with which the acquis 
interacts, but which remain outside of the scope of the directives. Thus the internal 
market has not yet reached the stage where a contract of sale between parties in different 
Member States can be treated as if they were contracting within a single state.
16 The 
creation of such a regulatory framework is, however, the end now sought by the 
European harmonisation debate,
17 through the proposed CRD and reflection on the 
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creation of a harmonised optional instrument of European contract law.
18 Any future 
action at the European level will, therefore, have to ensure coherence between the varying 
levels of regulation that exist in the internal market. The issue becomes one of how this is 
to be achieved in Europe, and more particularly what can be learnt in this respect from 
the current regulation of trade at the international level.  
 
5.2. Levels and Forms of Regulation 
 
This section considers the current approach to harmonisation at the international level, 
through analysis of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). It 
considers the nature of, and approach to harmonisation at this level as well as the form 
and effect of the harmonised instrument. This is, however, preceded by a general 
discussion highlighting the key characteristics of harmonisation and other regulatory 
activities at these levels 
 
5.2.1.1. Approach and Nature  
 
The aim of harmonisation at the international level, has been the facilitation of trade 
through the creation of a harmonised, although not at this stage unified, set of rules 
governing specific contracts, and specific components of transactions. Significantly, there 
has been no binding attempt at this level to harmonise the general part of contract, subject 
to the existence of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, which 
forms a non-binding restatement of general contract law designed for use at the 
international level. The nature of a cross-border contract, in particular the contract of sale, 
is characterised by a multiplicity of parties, a number of independent yet interrelated 
contracts and different jurisdictions. This means that international contracts are not 
always realised and so the focus of harmonisation attempts has been the creation of an 
international business transaction law.
19 As such, there has been a piecemeal and sector-
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specific approach to harmonisation in the areas of transport, banking, arbitration and e-
commerce, among others,
20 which are associated with the principal commercial contracts. 
  
In the nature of harmonisation attempts at this level we can thus discern a commercial, as 
opposed to contractual, focus. It is, thus, the law of commerce and professionals, to the 
exclusion of consumer law that has been the concern of harmonisation activity at the 
international level.
21 This is clearly evident in the scope of existing harmonisation 
activities and the resulting instruments. For example, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNICITRAL) is responsible for modernising and harmonising 
the rules of international business. Their work encompasses the international sales of 
goods; being the creators of the CISG, as well as other harmonised instruments and rules 
on international payments, the international transport of goods, insolvency, and 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation, among others. The archetypal 
commercial transaction is the sale and supply of goods, illustrated by the existence of the 
CISG, as a codified instrument dedicated solely to this commercial transaction. There are, 
however, many other types of contracts associated with the contract of sale: contracts for 
carriage of goods, financing of sale, insurance, equipment and leasing. The potential 
scope of commercial law is clearly reflected in the US UCC, which provides uniform 
rules relating to what are perceived as the most important commercial transactions. 
Harmonised law relating to the sale and leasing of goods, bank deposits, negotiable 
instruments, letters of credit and documents of title, secured transactions and investment 
securities are all found within the regional code.  
 
However, as highlighted, inter-governmental cooperation is only once source of 
harmonised commercial rules existing at these levels. Regard should also be given to 
regulation through international trade organisations, notably the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), which demonstrates a different approach to bringing about greater 
uniformity in international transactions. The standard contract, although adopted 
principally as a matter of practicality, as there will be little time for negotiation on precise 
                                                 
20 See Bonell, Do we need a Global Commercial Code? (2000) Uniform Law Review 469, 470.  
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terms of agreement beyond those related to the subject matter and price, has become an 
essential feature of commercial law internationally, and the ICC has been at the forefront 
of their development. Today, their standard terms are adopted so widely as to be 
considered as non-parliamentary statutes, the prime example being the international rules 
for the interpretation of frequently used trade terms known as the Incoterms. Rather than 
forming a complete model contract to govern typical international sales transactions, 
these rules have the more modest but significant aim of partial standardisation of terms 
relating to the delivery of goods and the allocation of costs. They are intended to create a 
common language and infrastructure for trade and a considerable amount of the ICC’s 
success has been attributed to the restriction of their aims in formulating rules like the 
Incoterms. These aims, to consolidate existing trade practices, rather than pursuing 
harmonisation for its own sake, are considered better in practical terms than theoretical 
improvements.
22 
 
Success in the formulation of uniform commercial rules at international and regional 
levels has thus been largely attributed to the pursuit of realistic, achievable aims,
23as is 
evident in the limitation of the scope of harmonisation to commercial law. This is the 
case for two reasons. Firstly, it is clear that commercial law has lent itself well to 
standardisation and harmonisation, as it is concerned with a large number of transactions 
in which participants can be considered as regular players, so that the transactions are 
typical and on the whole repetitive.
24 Secondly, they have been confined to commercial 
transactions, as those involving consumers are already highly regulated and, in particular, 
are dominated by mandatory rules.
25 The rules contained in successful harmonisation 
instruments thus consist almost entirely of dispositive rules, i.e. those which parties are 
free to vary or exclude. This is principally attributed to the difficulty in reaching 
agreement for inclusion of mandatory rules which can prevent instruments coming to 
fruition in the first place. Having regard to the internal market, however, and to the future 
                                                 
22 Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Environment, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981 
(2
nd ed), 19. 
23 Goode, Contract and Commercial Law: The Logic and Limits of Harmonisation (2003) Vol. 7.4. 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, I 3.  
24 See, Sealy and Hooley (1999), 5. 
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approach to European contract law at this level, it is clear that such a limitation in scope, 
so as to include within a harmonised instrument only dispositive and commercial rules, is 
not a tenable response to the identified obstacles. In consideration of the creation of a 
single regulatory framework to support trade in the internal market, however, the 
foregoing nature and approach of existing harmonisation presents clear parameters which 
must be reflected upon.
26  
 
5.2.1.2 Form and Effect 
 
The existing body of uniform international commercial law has been seen to be derived 
from a variety of sources.
27 At one level, legal instruments which are the product of 
intergovernmental cooperation can be seen to exist at the international and regional 
levels, and may have different binding effects. One possible combination is an 
international harmonised instrument which is intended to be legally binding on those 
Contracting States which are party to the Convention, such as the CISG
28. Another 
combination is a regional instrument, which is not intended to be binding and thus forms 
a model law which States can either adopt in full, not at all, or in a varied state. These are 
important means by to achieve harmonisation of commercial law across regions, and the 
most noteworthy example is the US UCC. This points to an intermediary category, and a 
further option which the EU has considered for the form and nature of a harmonised 
instrument.
29 Restatements, produced by scholars, result from comparative research 
seeking to develop common contract principles based on the most common solution 
found in national contractual systems. Their creation is often motivated by the desire to 
find the best rules from across the Member States, thus ensuring both harmonisation and 
improvement of the law.
30 Such instruments constitute soft law and are therefore not 
legally binding. They can, however, be used by parties at the drafting stages of  contracts, 
where they can incorporate those rules which they believe to constitute the best solution 
                                                 
26 Section 5.3.  
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28 Although contracting parties in Contracting States can contract out of the Convention, Article 6 CISG. 
29 2001 Communication, Option II: Promote the development of common contract law principles leading to 
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for their needs, and are also influential for national courts and legislatures in applying and 
developing the law. At the international level, an important example is the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts; the EU also has it own important 
source of common rules in the PECL and, notably, now in the DCFR.
31 It is clear that the 
PECL and, in its extended form, the DCFR, is an important resource upon which the EU 
and the creators of a European contract law should draw.
32 
At another level, international trade has benefited from the standardisation of trade terms. 
Such attempts can be classified into groups,
33 the most important being contractually 
incorporated non-legislative standardised trade terms, derived from international trade 
organisations. In terms of legal effect, terms such as those contained in the ICC Incoterms 
may, depending on the jurisdiction, have customary or even statutory force. For example, 
under English law they will only have binding effect if the parties have incorporated them 
into the contract and thus adopted them as the common rules which will determine the 
respective contractual duties and obligations of the buyer and seller. This is also the case 
with the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), which are 
formulated by the ICC as rules governing the use of documentary credits.
34 These 
standardised rules will usually be incorporated by express wording of the documentary 
credit to the effect that its use, i.e. the rights and obligations of the parties to the letter of 
credit, is to be governed by the uniform customs and practice for documentary credits. 
However, such is the universal use of these contractual trade terms that, even in the 
absence of incorporation, they will be considered incorporated as a matter of business 
practice since they are so globally  used by banks.
35 The result is that trade is being 
carried out internationally on the basis of the same legal terms, irrespective of the 
political, ideological or economic policies of the national states.
36 Parties will be buying 
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32 See generally Chapter 4, 4.2 and 4.3. Ultimately, however, it is unlikely that the adoption of a 
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33 Murray, Schmitthoff’s Export Trade: The Law and Practice of International Trade (11
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commerce. (1992) Lloyds Maritime and Comparative Law Quarterly, 190. 
35 Goode (2004), 951. 
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goods under the terms of the Incoterms and payment will be made under documentary 
credits, the use of which is governed by the UCP, and in turn the goods will be carried 
under standard form charter parties, bills of lading or airway bills, and will be insured on 
standard terms whilst in transit.  
In addition, trade will often be supported by standard contract forms relating to specified 
international transactions, which dominate international trade in commodities and capital 
goods.
37 A significant source of such contracts is trade associations, such as GAFTA,
38 
meaning that commodities will often be bought and sold under common terms and 
conditions. GAFTA has a range of 80 standard forms of contract with clauses covering, 
amongst others: quality, condition, warranties and guarantees; shipping documents and 
appropriations; payment terms; default and damages. In terms of effect, they will only 
apply where adopted by the parties as the rules governing their contract, subject to 
variation by agreement. The foregoing examples illustrate harmonisation through the 
freedom of traders to regulate their affairs by contract, in the sense that they are avoiding 
the application of unsuitable and conflicting national laws through the adoption of rules 
of international trade and professional organisations.
39 This is also achieved through the 
formulation of their own standard contractual terms and conditions, which are a further 
source of standardised terms when frequently incorporated into contracts between parties 
and intended to apply to all transactions between them.
40  
A distinctive feature of commercial law, as opposed to classical contract law, is that its  
content includes extra-legal usages, customs and codes of behaviour in the business 
community, often encompassed under the designation  lex mercatoria. There is, however, 
some uncertainty as to what the latter encompasses as source of law for international 
trade.
41 Some advance a narrow definition confining lex mercatoria to the unwritten 
customs and practices of merchants being, thus, the result of spontaneous activity on their 
                                                 
37 Murray (2007), 834 & 839.  
38 Grain and Feed Trade Association, as well as others, e.g.. the Federation of Oil, Seeds and Fats 
Association (FOSFA), or the Cocoa Association of London Ltd. 
39 See Cremades and Plehn, The new lex mercatoria and the harmonisation of the laws of international 
commercial transactions, (1983) Boston University International Law Journal 323. 
40 Murray (2007), 834.  
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part, in adopting a particular usage.
42 For others, lex mercatoria encompasses not only 
those unwritten trade rules but is used as an umbrella for all of the foregoing non-national 
sources of law. Thus Teubner advances that lex mercatoria as a body of law has its 
source in worldwide commercial practices, standardised contracts, the activities of global 
economic associations, codes of conduct and awards of international arbitration courts.
43 
What is clear is that lex mercatoria, in whatever form and content, is regarded as an 
important non-national source of international trade law.
44 A further important feature of 
international trade, which has supported the use and thus the creation of a uniform 
international trade law, must also be noted. This is international commercial arbitration, 
particularly to the extent that it allows arbitrators to refer to such non-national sources of 
law, which means that trade is removed to a significant extent from the constraints and 
limitations of national law.
45 Such developments, which evidence dissatisfaction with 
national regulation of trade, cannot be overlooked by those involved in the European 
contract law debate.
46 
Returning to the Commission’s proposals for the review of the acquis, the creation of a 
CFR and the potential adoption of an optional instrument of European contract law on 
this basis, it is, however, necessary to return to an existing example of a harmonised 
instrument at the international level. This is done with a view to identifying both the 
success and potential limitations of this regulatory approach.  
5.2.2. International Harmonisation Case Study – The United Nations Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
47 
Literature assessing the success of this harmonised instrument commonly points to the 
fact that the Convention is in force in 74 States worldwide,
48 encompassing most of the 
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46 Concluded in Chapter 2, 2.3.4.  
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major trading nations of the world, suggesting that the Convention regulates a significant 
number of international sales contracts.
49 It is, however, simultaneously submitted
50 that 
the perceived success and global reach of the Convention can be misleading. In the first 
place, there are many states that have failed to ratify the Convention, which will impact 
upon the sphere of application of the harmonised rules. Further, it is submitted that it 
cannot be considered to form a comprehensive code governing international sales 
transactions. 
 
As with the application of any uniform contract law, the applicability of the Convention 
will depend on the existence of a specific link between the contract, the parties, or the 
place relevant in respect of the contract and a Contracting State and its law.
51 Thus the 
CISG provides that the Convention will apply to contracts of sale of goods between 
parties whose places of business are in different states, when either the states are 
Contracting States or when rules of private international law lead to the application of the 
law of a Contracting State.
52 A number of issues for the application of the Convention 
arise from this article. The first concerns the nature of the contract at issue, which must 
be one for the sale of goods. This is defined by Article 3 as those for the supply of goods 
to be manufactured or produced to the exclusion of contracts for services.
53 Next, it is 
clear that for the Convention to apply the parties to the contract must also have their 
places of business in different states. This constitutes the international element of the 
sales contract but also means that the Convention will not apply to domestic sales 
transactions and one may wish to question why this distinction has been made. The 
approach is advanced on the basis that international sales give rise to problems not arising 
in the domestic context, in particular the problems posed by conflict of laws for 
international sales, which do not arise in domestic transactions. Further, it is often the 
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51 Ibid. 327.  
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preferred solution in regard to scope, as it is less of an intrusion on national sovereignty.
54 
However, it is clear that limiting the scope of application of harmonised rules to those 
contracts involving a cross-border element can in fact lead to greater fragmentation of 
markets as businesses would be forced to apply the law of a Member State to domestic 
transactions but a harmonised system of law to all others.
55  
 
Finally, for the Convention to apply there must be a connecting factor between the 
contract and a Contracting State. This can occur in one of two ways. Firstly and 
uncontroversially, it will apply where the states in which the respective businesses are 
located are party to the Convention, i.e. Contracting States. In the second situation, effect 
will be given to the harmonised rules of the Convention through rules of private 
international law which lead to the law of a Contracting State. This position has proved 
more controversial, as it indirectly extends the scope of application of the Convention's 
rules, which may result in unfair surprise. For example, if parties in two non-Contracting 
States choose what they believe to be the domestic law of a Contracting State as the law 
applicable to their contract, this may result in the application of those rules contained in 
the CISG. This can be seen to go against their intention to have their contract governed 
by the purely domestic rules of their chosen contractual system.
56 As a result, under 
Article 95 of the Convention Contracting States possess a reservation to exclude the 
application of Article 1 (1) (b). The effect is that in such situations the national court at 
issue would not be bound to apply the Convention as part of the national law, where the 
application of choice of law leads to the law of a Contracting State. An interesting 
example of the use of this reservation is the US exercise of their reservation seemingly to 
preserve as much as possible the applicability of its own UCC. However, one cannot 
overlook that although the Contracting State may have good reason for taking this 
position, which may in fact be in the interest of parties from non-Contracting States, the 
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effect will be to considerably reduce the frequency with which the Convention will be 
applied. The reservation allows for the application of other sources of law to govern 
international sales transactions and this acts to undermine the goal of creating an 
international sales code.
57   
 
In addition to Article 95, an exception which is considered to be of diminishing practical 
significance as the number of Contracting States rises,
58 the scheme of the Convention 
contains a number of other provisions which call on courts of a Contracting State to take 
into account other sources of law.
59 For example, Article 90 recognises the increasing 
number of substantive uniform law conventions and thus the possibility that more than 
one may be applicable to the same contract and, thus, that conflict may arise. It therefore 
provides that where a Contracting State is also party to another international agreement 
which contains provisions concerning matters governed by the CISG, then the latter will 
apply, provided that both parties have their respective places of business in states party to 
the former agreement. The Convention thus gives way to the application of another 
source of law, which ultimately undermines its harmonising effect. Another example is 
the reservation created under Article 92, which was intended to allow some Contracting 
States
60 to rely on their regionally harmonised rules of sales contracts rather than the 
provisions of the CISG. The effect of this provision is that these States are not bound by, 
nor is their national law replaced by, the Convention's provision in relation to the 
formation of contract and the rights and obligations of the parties falling under it. A party 
that has its relevant place of business in a State that has made an Article 92 declaration is 
considered as having its place of business in a non-Contracting State for the purposes of 
those parts excluded.
61 Thus, in providing for the possibility of reservations and for the 
explicit application of other sources of law, it can be initially concluded that it is not 
sufficient for contracting parties to rely solely on the rules of the Convention for the 
import and export of goods worldwide. This inference is confirmed by consideration of 
the substantive scope of the CISG.  
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The Convention deals with a specific part of international commercial law; the sale of 
goods, and thus, in so far as the applicable general part of contract law is concerned, the 
Convention refers to the respective laws of the Contracting States and thus the diverging 
rules at this level.
62 The substantive scope of the CISG is further limited by a significant 
exclusion in Article 4, which provides that the Convention shall only govern the 
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer 
arising from such a contract. It explicitly removes from its scope matters relating to 
validity of the contract and the effect which the contract may have on the property in the 
goods sold. As noted
63 it is surprising to have excluded these issues from the substantive 
scope of the Convention given the significance of both as defining characteristics of a 
contract of sale, that is to say, the existence of a valid contract under which property is to 
pass from seller to buyer. But the reason for their exclusion is said to be pragmatic, as the 
law relating to the validity of contracts and the passing of property was considered to 
vary so considerably between States that it would have been an excessively difficult task 
to have formulated uniform rules. The ability to harmonise thus clearly has limits and, 
given the need to have such rules harmonised, it is frustrating that these rules are left 
outside the scope of the Convention.  
 
It is clear that, even where the Convention does apply, there is still considerable scope for 
the application of other national sources of law and, thus, uncertainty and the associated 
additional transaction costs. Ferrari
64 maintains that the CISG creates a false sense of 
certainty as to the applicable law, that is to say that the presumption that this is the 
application of a universal set of contract rules for sale, under a comprehensive, codified 
instrument, is actually dangerous and costly to international traders’ interests. It can lead 
to greater transaction costs in light of the need to identify the potentially applicable 
sources and, as such, it could be advanced that the CISG has failed to fully realise the 
practical benefits that it is in fact pursuing and is merely adding another source and level 
of rules into the mix. This criticism, however, is not unqualified and it is conceded that 
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the contracts and substantive rules that the Convention does cover can be considered a 
success. This is also the case where the instrument's scope and potential to allow for the 
application of other sources of law are actually understood and provided for by the 
contracting parties.
65  
 
As for the nature of the provisions contained within the Convention, it consists wholly of 
dispositive rules. The Convention expressly provides for the parties to exclude the 
application of the Convention in full - being opt-out in form – or to derogate from or vary 
any of its  provisions.
66 The absence of mandatory rules in the instrument, although those 
of the Contracting States continue to apply, is an important concession made by its 
drafters to ensure its acceptance.
67 Indeed, the prevalence of defaults in the Convention 
and similar instruments demonstrates the very nature of the harmonisation process: 
requiring agreement and support for the substantive content by States with different 
economic, social and political ideologies. The resulting provisions are thus often 
perceived as the product of negotiation and compromise, rather than what best meets the 
commercial needs of the market and its participants.
68 Gillette and Scott
69 note that this 
compromise may take several forms. It may, as discussed, take the form of limiting the 
application of the instrument's provisions. It may also result in a tendency to formulate 
vague rules and standard defaults, so as to reduce the risk that Contracting States will 
take offence. This approach vests considerable discretion in the subsequent interpreters, 
be they courts or legislatures, which results in uncertainty and can thus further jeopardise 
the anticipated harmonising effect of the instruments.
70 At worst, it is anticipated that 
compromise will result in omissions,
71 disagreements being resolved by placing the rule 
in the comments or leaving it to the Courts to fill in the gaps. In terms of omissions, one 
could of course point to the exclusion of matters of validity or the passing of property 
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from the content of the CISG. Farnsworth notes that another fundamental omission in the 
case of the CISG is penalties, a matter which involved significant differences between the 
common law and other legal systems and which would have required the inclusion of a 
mandatory rule.
72 
 
The resulting content of harmonised instruments is, therefore, the product of clear 
constraints, both political and practical, in the harmonisation process. This is also a clear 
danger for a harmonised instrument of contract law at European level as, with the minor 
exception of the requirement of writing, we are yet to see a nation ratify a mandatory rule 
of general contract law, in a binding or non-binding international harmonised 
instrument.
73 However, given the distinctive problems created by mandatory rules, 
particularly those of consumer protection, and the intention behind any harmonisation at 
European level being to improve the functioning of the internal market, the exclusion of 
mandatory rules cannot be accepted in this context, at least in regard to those rules 
governing B2C contracts. 
 
Despite the foregoing criticism of the Convention in terms of its limited commercial 
nature, limitations in its scope of content, the potential for the application of other sources 
of law, and the prevalence of dispositive over mandatory rules; it must be contended that 
the CISG still represents a significant example of harmonisation and, more particularly, 
its limits for those advancing the European project. 
 
The international analogy ultimately demonstrates that diversity, in terms of sources of 
law and trade rules, is not in itself a bad thing. International trade regulation is a 
collaboration of levels, sources and actors, yet it is considered, as an organised whole, to 
form a harmonised transnational commercial law.
74 It has been demonstrated that the 
CISG, as a binding, uniform body of rules governing international sales, makes provision 
for the application of other sources of law to parties’ contractual agreements, and as such 
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creates it own hierarchy of sources in establishing which are to take priority over its 
provisions. At the international level, therefore, the inevitable interaction between sources 
of commercial law and rules is accepted and accommodated and, as a result, complete 
uniformity of commercial law has not yet been achieved.
75 A condition however, if the 
harmonising effect and benefits of such are not to be undermined, is that the scope and 
interaction of systems of law must be transparent and understood, if a coherent solution is 
to be achieved.  
 
5.3. The EU Regulatory Response 
 
How, then, does the international analogy assist the understanding of the regulatory 
approach that must be taken to European contract law? The EU is now looking to create a 
simplified regulatory environment in order to enhance business and consumer confidence 
in the internal market by overcoming the limitations of the existing regulatory approach. 
The solution is perceived as a direct response to the fragmentation of contract law caused 
by minimum and sectoral harmonisation, which seemingly demands a full and horizontal 
regulatory response. The proposed CRD therefore seeks to regulate the common aspects 
of the contract of sale for consumer goods in a systematic fashion.
76 In contrast, therefore, 
to the foregoing examples of trade regulation, the facilitation of trade within the internal 
market is first and foremost directed by the EU at B2C transactions. The commercial 
focus of international regulation is not reflected at EU level, where the response 
necessarily includes mandatory rules of consumer protection. Such rules are absent at the 
former levels, where preference for dispositive rules has been adopted, owing to apparent 
difficulties in reaching agreement on the content of such rules between states with 
different social and political backgrounds.
77  
 
However, by analogy with the foregoing examples, although moving towards a horizontal 
approach with the consolidation of four consumer directives, the CRD is targeted in its 
                                                 
75 Although is the subject of debate, with proposals to consolidate the existing proliferation of rules at the 
international level to form a global commercial code, see Schmitthoff (1981), 29 – 31.  
76 CRD Proposal (2008), 2 and discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 4.1.3.  
77 The nature of the task is reflected in Chapter 3, 3.2.    161
nature. It seeks to regulate those issues which raised substantial barriers to trade for 
business and consumers and, more particularly, those relevant to traders in operating their 
businesses and in drafting standard contract terms.
78 This has then been combined with 
vertical revision of the existing sectoral directives, which remains desirable,
79 and no 
attempt has been made to harmonise the general law of contract. In this respect, national 
contractual systems remain largely intact and, by analogy with the limited substantive 
scope of the CISG,
80 it will be necessary to refer to national law on issues such as the 
validity of the contract or the award of damages.
81 It is immediately apparent that the 
CRD may not provide a sufficiently simplified and transparent regulatory environment. 
Further, the CRD will co-exist with the sector-specific acquis, becoming part of a more 
complex regulatory framework at the European level.
82 As a result, the proposal is not a 
comprehensive and systematic regulation of all consumer rights; rather, it consolidates 
four directives, and while accompanied by vertical review, greater coherence is being 
achieved at this level, this is not full coherence.
83 
 
Remaining differences between contract rules at the national level itself creates obstacles 
for the proper functioning of the internal market, which significantly also extend to B2B 
transactions. As the acquis will also continue to interact with these rules, outside the 
scope of the directives, it is clear that this level also requires a regulatory response, which 
has been presented as the optional instrument.
84 Indeed, despite there being no binding 
and comprehensive harmonised instrument of general contractual principles at either 
international or regional level, it is possible that an optional instrument, based on the 
(D)CFR, could present a more comprehensive means by which to achieve the necessary 
simplified regulatory framework that is sought for B2C and B2B transactions in the 
internal market. The Commission envisaged that an optional instrument could cover the 
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general part of contract as well as the law relating to specific contracts considered to be 
of economic importance to the internal market, including contracts of sales, services and 
insurance.
85 As a basis for discussion of the content of such an instrument, therefore, in 
addition to rules of general contract law, the DCFR contains rules governing the specific 
contracts of sales, services, mandate contracts, commercial agency, distribution, 
franchising, and loans and leasing.
86 A series of optional instruments could, thus, govern 
the whole contractual relationship for specific contracts.
87 In this way, the need for 
horizontal regulation within the internal market would not rule out the possibility of 
vertical regulation of specific contracts which is inherent at the international level. An 
optional instrument of this nature would present greater scope for coherence between the 
varying levels of regulation existing in the internal market. Whether or not the CFR itself 
can support such a comprehensive framework will depend on the outcome of the political 
process and, thus, whether or not the CFR is created with this purpose in view.
88   
 
As to the form and effect of the regulatory instrument, the fragmentary state of European 
contract law can, to a considerable degree, be attributed to the use of minimum 
harmonisation and directives as the preferred regulatory approaches. This has meant that 
Member States have been left with a considerable degree of discretion, being bound only 
by the end to be achieved
89 and the need to safeguard a minimum level of protection. 
While both regulatory approaches are important means of integrating European law into 
national systems, their use has put at risk the uniform application and implementation of 
the rules throughout the Member States. Thus it is clear that only a binding instrument, 
akin to the CISG, could ensure the degree of uniformity which is currently necessary 
within the internal market. In order, also, to support the move to full and horizontal 
harmonisation, this suggests that a regulation, as a directly applicable, binding instrument 
which would ensure the implementation of the harmonised instrument in its entirety 
across the Member States is the preferred legal instrument. This conclusion, however, 
                                                 
85 2004 Communication, 20.  
86 Book IV Specific contracts and rights and obligations arising from them, DCFR Outline Edition (2009).  
87 This possibility is discussed in detail in chapter 6, 6.4.  
88 i.e. in addition to the toolbox function which suggests a more limited instrument in terms of content, see 
discussion in Chapter 4, 4.2.3.  
89 Directives are only binding to the end to be achieved, Article 288 TFEU (ex 249 EC).     163
casts further doubts on whether the CRD, in the form of a directive, can create the 
required simplified regulatory environment. Member States will retain discretion in how 
to implement the CRD into national law, and this will not necessarily be in a self-
standing piece of national legislation but, rather, may be implemented in piece-meal 
fashion across the sector-specific legislation implementing the now consolidated 
directives.
90 The single, although incomplete, applicable framework that exists at EU 
level may not therefore be transparent at national level, which will undermine the 
intended harmonising effect and thus the certainty and confidence that the proposal is 
intended to create for businesses and consumers.  
 
The simplification aims would further necessitate that the harmonised instrument apply 
not only to cross-border transactions, but also to domestic. This is necessary in order to 
avoid the creation of a dual regime for those trading both domestically and cross-border, 
who would otherwise continue to suffer from the fragmentation of contract law. For this 
reason, the CRD applies also to domestic contracts
91 and, clearly, in terms of economies 
of scale for businesses the harmonisation effect will be optimised as a result. This, 
however, is not the approach of all harmonised instruments, for example the CISG, 
whose limitation in scope to cross-border transactions is considered to be less of an 
intrusion on national sovereignty.
92 This is just one concession made by such instruments 
in order to ensure acceptance by Contracting States. Clearly, the choices made as to the 
form, nature and effect of harmonised instruments impact upon the national contractual 
systems and, more particularly, national regulatory autonomy. This is especially so when 
full and binding harmonisation is sought. Thus while to date a great deal has been 
achieved by the EU within the acquis, including the creation of binding, harmonised 
mandatory rules of consumer protection not reflected in the international analogy, this has 
been facilitated by some deference to Member States' regulatory autonomy, and notably 
the use of minimum harmonisation. The more ambitious objective of creating a single 
regulatory framework in the CRD, and the transition to full harmonisation, has however 
resulted in compromise on the part of the harmonised instrument. This is readily apparent 
                                                 
90 This regulatory limitation is highlighted by Twigg-Flesner (2009), Q.9.  
91 CRD proposal (2008), 9.  
92 5.2.2.    164 
in the instrument's targeted nature and limited scope and, thus, the continued applicability 
of other sources of law, both the residual sector-specific acquis and the national 
contractual systems. The compromise is also apparent in the choice to implement the 
CRD in the form of a directive, rather than a regulation. Therefore, the regulatory choices 
that have been made, because of the political and practical constraints of harmonisation, 
have served to undermine the simplification aims. 
 
The implementation the CRD in the form of a regulation would, however, have indicated 
that consumer law is no longer a matter for national regulation and this would be 
politically unacceptable for Member States.
93 The protection of consumers within 
national systems is a politically sensitive issue, which reflects the balance that is reached 
between freedom of contract and social justice within the state. It is an expression of a 
nation’s values, which are threatened by full and directly applicable harmonisation.
94 
Thus, although the regulation of consumer law has largely become an issue for the 
European level, through the adoption of directives, Member States have retained the 
ability to intervene when there has been a need.
95 The benefit of the traditional regulatory 
approach was, therefore, that it recognised that consumer law, but contract law in general, 
is a product of Member States' socio-economic, cultural and political backgrounds. The 
effect of minimum harmonisation is, thus, not regressive on national systems and allows 
Member States to develop national law to reflect changes and developments at national 
level, akin to the model law. Ultimately, however, while there are apparent advantages to 
maintaining minimum harmonisation as the regulatory response at this level, it has been 
shown to be a regulatory compromise in itself. It has resulted in the existing 
fragmentation of the acquis, and as such cannot sufficiently simplify the regulatory 
environment.  
 
The regulatory objective in these terms may, however, be realised through an optional 
instrument of European contract law which, owing to its optional nature, would not have 
                                                 
93 Twigg-Flesner (2009), Q.9, and QQ.36-37.  
94 The threat serves as an argument against (mandatory) harmonisation of European contract law, Chapter 
3, 3.2.  
95 Twigg-Flesner (2009), Q.9, and QQ.36-37.    165
to result in compromise. Under the optional regime, harmonised rules would co-exist in 
parallel with national contractual systems, which would remain untouched. The 
regulatory form would thus not represent a threat to national contract law, nor to Member 
States' regulatory autonomy, and regulatory competition between the national systems 
would thrive with a new source of inspiration in a 28
th contractual regime.
96 Thus 
although political decisions would still have to be made, they could result in a more 
ambitious, comprehensive, directly applicable and binding instrument, applying to both 
cross-border and domestic contracts.
97  This would be achieved without compromise on 
the part of either the instrument, and thus the EU, or by the Member States. The optional 
instrument may thus represent the most appropriate way forward for the attainment of the 
regulatory objectives.  
 
With a single and comprehensive framework of European contract law in place there 
would also be scope for the creation of standard terms and contracts. The successful 
development of standardised trade terms to overcome the application of unsuitable and 
diverging national contract law at the international level has not been wholly reflected 
within the internal market.
98 Both individual businesses and trade associations have been 
developing such rules with varying degrees of success, and the Commission’s proposal in 
the 2003 Communication to promote the elaboration of EU-wide standard terms and 
conditions was a direct response to the obstacles arising from diverging national law on 
the inclusion and application of such terms. It was such divergence between national 
contract law, and ultimately the lack of a harmonised European contract law, which led to 
the abandonment of the proposal.
99 The facilitation of cross-border trade through standard 
contracts has, however, regained support. The development of such contracts was the 
intention behind the CRD in the B2C context.
100 Support also comes from the 
Commission and European Parliament for the elaboration of voluntary standard contracts 
for use by businesses on the basis of the CFR as a means by which to support wider 
                                                 
96 See Chapter 3, 3.1.  
97 Subject to the EU’s competence to enact such instrument(s). Discussed in Chapter 6, 6.2.  
98 Discussed in Chapter 2, 2.3.4.  
99 Discussed in Chapter 2, 2.4.  
100 CRD Proposal (2008), 8.    166 
economic activity in the internal market.
101 The existence of a harmonised European 
contract law be it through the CRD,
102 an optional instrument, or as the basis for 
development, the CFR, would enable businesses and trade associations in Europe to 
successfully develop standard contracts. This is not to say that the EU should overlook 
achievements at the international level and the significant standardisation of trade terms 
by international trade organisations, notably the ICC, which will continue to be used by 
commercial parties in the internal market. It has, therefore, been maintained in this 
respect that the Commission need not “reinvent the wheel”, and should recognise and 
make use of what already exists at the international level, as standard terms and 
conditions used in transactions between the EU Member States cannot be separated from 
that work.
103 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The foregoing discussion highlights an underlying and ongoing debate regarding the 
appropriate level at which trade should be regulated.
104 Given the prominence and 
success of the CISG internationally, for example, it can be questioned whether Europe 
should look to the creation of a European sales law which is separate and distinct from 
the latter Convention.
105 The existence of an additional instrument at regional level 
comparable to the CISG requires consideration of the conventions' relationship and 
relative applicability, thereby risking a lack of clarity and thus confusion for market 
participants as to the applicable law. The result for some is the belief that the effect of 
harmonisation at the regional level may in fact be to weaken the process of harmonisation 
                                                 
101 Commission’s Proposal for the Stockholm Programme (2009), 13 and 31. Although the proposal talks of 
the work done on creating a CFR, and thus does not discount the use of the DCFR, if the political CFR is 
too narrow in its ‘toolbox’ function to support such a role. The European Parliament talks directly of 
standard contracts being adopted on the basis of the CFR, European Parliament resolution of 25.11.09 on 
the Stockholm programme, para 101. The Council has rejected the CFR consisting of a set of STC’s which 
could be chosen by parties. This does not, however, appear to rule out the CFR as a ‘toolbox’ acting in 
future as the basis for development, Council Consolidated Conclusions (2009), 4.  
102 At least within the scope of the targeted instrument, where full harmonisation has been achieved.  
103 Bernitz, The Commission’s Communications and Standard Contract Terms, in The Harmonisation of 
European Contract Law (Vogenauer & Weatherill eds.) (2006), Chapter 10, 192.  
104 Goode et al. (2007), 262.  
105 As McKendrick (2006) does, 29.    167
at the international level.
106 The value of harmonisation at the European level, however, 
lies in the distinct market integration goals held by the EU and, thus, the completion of 
the unique regional market which it seeks. It is clear that, while there is not a harmonised 
European law of contract, we do not have a single market, and the benefits of such cannot 
be realised. In practical terms, therefore, action must be taken at this level to organise the 
diversity of sources of contract rules which is inherent in the internal market – those 
derived from the Member States, the acquis communautaire, and the application of 
internationally harmonised rules – to create a single simplified regulatory framework 
supporting the internal market and its participants: businesses, in particular SMEs, and 
consumers alike.
107  
 
The protection of the weaker party has not been shown to be a shared concern of 
international instruments directed at the regulation of trade. Such instruments are 
characterised by their commercial focus, and their absence of mandatory protective rules, 
which mean that they would not be fit for purpose within the internal market. Yet the 
foregoing discussion presents important regulatory examples upon which the EU can 
draw in meeting its objectives. It has demonstrated the range of regulatory choices that 
are available to this end in terms of approach, nature, form and effect. More particularly, 
the discussion has demonstrated where the limits of harmonisation lie in both practical 
and political terms. Harmonised instruments have been shown to be the result of 
negotiation and compromise, and the CISG cannot be considered as creating a fully 
harmonised regime for the transactions within its scope. Such compromises are already 
evident in the Commission’s proposed CRD but, in articulating the way forward, it is 
clear that they cannot be wholly accepted if the objective of regulatory simplification is to 
be achieved. While a possible alternative exists for the attainment of this aim in an 
optional instrument, this proposal must be considered further.  
 
 
                                                 
106 Goode et al (2007), 24.  
107 The creation of such a framework is considered further in Chapter 6.    168   169
Chapter 6 
 
The Optional Instrument 
 
The third proposal arising from the Commission’s 2003 Communication was to examine 
whether distinct problems, arising for the proper functioning of the internal market from 
the divergence in national contract laws, required non sector-specific solutions and, in 
particular, the creation of an optional instrument of European contract law.
1 This proposal 
is not, however, distinct from those already discussed in order to improve the coherence 
and consistency of the acquis communitaire, and thus the identified problems in that 
respect. The CFR was to form the basis for the development of such an instrument and 
was thus an attempt to formulate the rules and principles which would be included within 
it.
2 The Commission envisaged that the creation of such an optional system could 
facilitate the exchange of cross-border goods and services in the internal market
3 by 
providing contracting parties with a body of neutral rules which would be particularly 
adapted to cross-border contracts in the internal market. The Commission undertook, at 
that stage, to reflect upon the opportuneness of such an instrument in parallel to the wider 
project, while also making clear that the results of their examination could only be 
expected some time after the finalisation of the CFR.
4  
 
This chapter will begin by considering the case for the adoption of such an instrument
5 
and will present the state of play to ascertain support for the proposal. It will then 
examine the constitutional thresholds which the proposal must surpass for its adoption, 
before considering how effect would be given to such an instrument within the existing 
EU framework. It concludes that the proposal provides the most appropriate way forward, 
that is to say the most suitable and desirable solution to the existing obstacles to cross-
border trade arising from the current state of European contract law, and examines more 
                                                 
1 2003 Communication, 2.  
2 Ibid, paragraphs 64 and 95.  
3 2003 Communication, para 91.  
4 Ibid. para 54.  
5 In particular one attuned to the needs of SMEs.    170 
specifically how such instruments could facilitate cross-border contracting in both the 
B(SME)2B(SME) and B(SME)2C contexts.  
 
6.1. The Proposal and State of Play 
 
6.1.1. The Proposal  
  
An optional instrument of European contract law is first and foremost a direct response to 
those obstacles identified as arising for the internal market from the divergent state of 
contract law at the national level. It is thus a response to the internal market hypothesis 
which called for the harmonisation of national contract systems as a means by which to 
overcome the resulting uncertainty and associated transactions costs that currently act to 
deter cross-border trade in both the B(SME)2C and B(SME)2B(SME) context. While 
such harmonisation has not received unequivocal support, the optional nature of the 
proposed instrument is a distinct attribute. It means that the objective of facilitating trade 
can be realised within a simplified regulatory framework which also respects Member 
State regulatory autonomy,
6 preserves the national contractual systems and their socio-
cultural and political backgrounds, and thus maintains regulatory competition.
7 The 
optional instrument therefore appears to be an appealing regulatory solution for the 
internal market.  
 
The optional instrument would provide contracting parties with an autonomous system of 
contract law. While its content is linked to that of the CFR, a comprehensive instrument 
including general contract law and the law for specific contracts which are of importance 
for cross-border trade has been envisaged.
8 Such an approach would remove the need to 
refer to the diverging provisions of contract law at the national level, and contracting 
                                                 
6 The importance of which is discussed in Chapter 5, 5.3.   
7 The wider benefits of the optional nature of the instrument are discussed in Chapter 3, 3.1 and 3.4.  
8 2004 Communication, 20.   171
parties would be free to choose the instrument as a law better suited to their legal and 
economic needs.
9  
 
In this way, the proposal overcomes inadequacies in the existing national approach to 
facilitating cross-border trade and, in particular, choice of law.
 10 In the first place, the 
availability of such an instrument would overcome the criticism that the effect of choice 
of law is to localise, inappropriately, an otherwise international transaction. While 
national contract rules are intended for domestic transactions, they are not designed for 
the regulation and needs of cross-border trade. It is considered, therefore, that parties 
would benefit from a modern body of rules particularly adapted to cross-border contracts 
in the internal market.
11 As such it is envisaged that the instrument could provide the 
parties, the economically stronger and weaker, with an acceptable and adequate solution 
as to the applicable law without insisting on the necessity to apply one party’s national 
law over the other.
12 The Commission thus envisages the creation of a neutral contractual 
regime, i.e. not being the national law of either party,
13 or at least initially,
14 being 
familiar to one party to the disadvantage of the other. It will thus form a common law 
between the parties. The instrument could, therefore, address the uncertainty that can 
exists for parties as to the content of the applicable law where, owing to inequality of 
bargaining power in the operation of the choice of law system, the stronger party is able 
to impose their preferred choice of law. This can be particularly detrimental to the 
interests of SMEs in the B2B context as they will lack necessary knowledge of the 
governing law, and will be unable to obtain legal advice in this regard on a cost effective 
basis.
15 It is thus clear that the ‘neutrality’ of the instrument
16 as such  would be 
                                                 
9 I.e. A more suitable law than would have been determined by private international law as the applicable 
law to the contract, 2003 Communciation, para 90.  
10 Highlighted in Chapter 2, 2.4 and Chapter 5, 5.1.  
11 2003 Communication, para 90. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Or preferred choice of national law.  
14 While with use parties will become familiar with the rules in the same way as they are familiar with their 
national contract laws, 2003 Communication, 91.  
15 As the weaker party, Chapter 2, 2.3.5. Also see, 6.4.  
16 The ‘neutrality’ of the proposal in these terms is highlighted by Hesselink, Rutgers and De Booys, The 
Legal Basis of an Optional Instrument of Contract Law, A Short Study for the European Parliament, 
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particularly important in facilitating the active participation of SMEs in the internal 
market.
17 
 
While the review of the acquis and the resulting proposal for a CRD are, therefore, 
responses to obstacles to B2C cross-border trade, the optional instrument presents an 
opportunity to also facilitate cross-border trade in the B2B context. More particularly, it 
provides an opportunity to assist SMEs who, while constituting 99%
18 of businesses 
within the internal market, presently fail to operate effectively within it. The needs of this 
group must be attended to in terms of the regulatory response, and the provisions of the 
optional instrument must therefore further
19 address the existing imbalance in their 
trading capabilities in the B(SME)2B(SME) context.
20  
 
It has been shown that it is where parties’ contractual freedom is limited that greater 
obstacles to trade arise.
21 SMEs in particular, but also the wider business group, would, 
therefore, benefit from the inclusion of harmonised mandatory rules within the 
instrument. This applies to B(SME)2B(SME) transactions, but creates a more significant 
obstacle to cross-border trade in the B(SME)2C context, owing to the mandatory nature 
of consumer protection rules. It is thus envisaged that the optional instrument would also 
apply to B(SME)2C transactions, and to this end would include mandatory rules of 
consumer protection, as an exception to the guiding principle of the instrument; 
contractual freedom. The inclusion of such rules within the instrument would make it a 
very valuable tool, particularly if the applicable mandatory rules of consumer protection 
were to be only those contained in the instrument. This would overcome the major 
obstacle caused in this context from the application of the choice of law regime, which 
will apply the law of the consumer habitual residence where the trader targets their 
activities at the consumer’s home state. A significant disincentive to contract with 
consumers in other Member States would thus be removed for businesses, and consumers 
would benefit from the willingness of businesses to contract. This would, however, 
                                                 
17 2003 Communication, para 91.  
18 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/sme_policy.htm. 
19 I.e. beyond the benefit for SMEs of the neutrality of the proposal in this regard. 
20 Discussed in Chapter 2, 2.3.5. and 2.4.  
21 Chapter 2.4.    173
depend on the ability of the instrument, once chosen as the applicable law, to exclude the 
application of conflicting mandatory rules.
22  
 
If this could be achieved in the B(SME)2C context then the optional instrument, where 
chosen as the applicable law, could also present a means by which to overcome one 
source of fragmentation of the acquis communautaire: the divergent rules and levels of 
consumer protection provisions across Member States, which has arisen from minimum 
harmonisation. Thus, although the optional instrument starts as a proposal to overcome 
obstacles to cross-border trade arising from divergent national contract law, it is apparent 
that this could also overcome obstacles at EU level. As such, it could achieve a result 
similar to that sought by the acquis review
23 and the proposed CRD with which it shares 
the objective of creating a simplified regulatory environment to facilitate trade in the 
internal market via full harmonisation.
24 However, since the optional instrument would 
also apply to B2B transactions, and to this end assist SME’s, it is a more all-round 
regulatory response to the current obstacles. Whether the creation of such an instrument 
is possible and, thus, whether such objectives can be realised must, however, be 
considered.  
 
6.1.2. The State of Play  
 
The proposal met with support from the European Parliament, which called for the 
elaboration of a body of rules based on the CFR to be offered to contracting parties, who 
would have the option of using it voluntarily on an opt-in basis. Beyond the creation of a 
body of general contract rules, it was felt that substantial benefits, both to the effective 
functioning of the internal market and in terms of increased cross-border trade, would 
arise from the creation of specific optional instruments in the areas of consumer and 
insurance contracts. The European Parliament thus advanced that these sectors should be 
                                                 
22 Acknowledged by the Commission in the 2004 Communication, 21.  
23 Chapter 4, 4.1.2.  
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an early priority and called on the Commission to proceed in this direction.
25 The Council 
received the proposal with some caution, calling for continued reflection on the need for 
such a measure and for this to be pursued in close collaboration with Member States.
26 In 
this way, the Council’s position reflected the uncertain and divided opinions articulated 
by national governments in their responses to the Action Plan. While some welcomed the 
proposal as an innovative solution to the existing legal conflicts in cross-border 
contracting,
27 other responses were negative,
28 and several expressed reservations about 
the potential complexity of the preparatory work required, which meant this was not a 
short term proposal.
29 Fundamental questions also arose in terms of the competence of 
the EU to adopt such an instrument. In particular, the need for it to comply with the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity was highlighted.
30 Businesses too, that is to 
say those who could benefit greatly from the adoption of such an instrument, reserved 
their position on whether an optional instrument would be useful until work on the CFR 
was complete.
31 
 
The general reaction to the initial proposal therefore highlighted a need to both clarify 
and justify the creation of such an instrument. This was evident in the 2004 
Communication where the Commission reiterated that it would continue to examine 
whether an optional instrument was required to solve problems in the area.
32 It was also 
reflected in the general parameters that were presented in this Communication, to be 
taken into account during the discussion on the opportuneness of such an instrument.
33 In 
particular, questions that had to be considered included the identification of the problems 
that were being addressed, consideration of the overall policy objectives in terms of 
desired impacts, what would happen in a ‘no change’ scenario and the degree to which 
                                                 
25 European Parliament Resolution on the Communication from the Commission – A More Coherent 
European Contract Law – An Action Plan, P5_TA (2003), 0355, 14.  
26 Council Resolution on “A More Coherent European Contract Law”, OJ 2003/C 246/1, 2 para 3.  
27 Response of Portuguese Government, discussed in the Summary of Responses to the 2003 
Communication, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/analyticaldoc_en.pdf, 14.  
28 In particular that of the UK Government, Ibid. 14.  
29 Simultaneously expressed along with support by the Portuguese Government, 14.  
30 Response of the Danish Government, 14.  
31 Summary of Responses (2003), 16.  
32 2004 Communication, 8.  
33 Ibid. Annex II.    175
other solutions, both more and less ambitious, already offered adequate solutions to the 
existing problems. The creation of an optional instrument of European contract law was 
not, therefore, at this stage presumed and appeared as residual, to the extent that the 
problems to which it would be directed could be solved by other options. Following the 
2004 Communication, therefore, only minor reference was made to the Commission’s 
reflection. In the first annual progress report, the use of a so-called ‘28
th regime’ of 
contract law was only discussed in the context of the possible creation of such 
instruments in the insurance and mortgage contract sectors.
34 No reference was made to 
the ongoing reflection in the second progress report on European contract law, which 
focused  upon the elaboration of the CFR and the prioritisation of consumer acquis 
contract law issues that had occurred in that context.
35  
 
While the European contract law project was under the control of DG SANCO, this 
meant the prioritisation of work on the CFR and, more particularly, the completion of the 
review of the acquis and the creation of the resulting CRD proposal to that end. However, 
with the project now under the responsibility of DG JFS  we see, in the wider context of 
justice and home affairs, a renewed interest in the idea of a ‘28
th’ legal regime in order to 
support economic activity in the internal market.
36 It is thus once again viewed as a 
means of putting contractual relations on a more secure footing for overcoming the 
existing difficulties experienced by traders in the internal market, which continue to 
prevent them from benefiting fully from the opportunities that are on offer.
37 The original 
rationale and need for such an instrument retains its validity, and it is now pertinently 
seen as a tool to assist businesses to overcome the current economic crisis.
38 The optional 
instrument is therefore the single, directly applicable, legal framework that is necessary 
for contracting in the internal market.
39  
 
                                                 
34 First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review (2005), 12.  
35 Second Progress Report on the Common Frame of Reference (2007).  
36 Commission Proposal for the Stockholm Programme (2009), 3.4.2.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 (2010), 18-19. Demonstrates an ongoing and long 
term commitment by the Commission to pursue the proposal.  
39 Proposal for the Stockholm Programme (2009), 3.4.2.    176 
The Commission’s ongoing and long-term commitment to progressing towards an 
optional instrument of European Contract law
40 is shared by the European Parliament.  It 
has recently advocated that the political CFR should result in an optional and directly 
applicable instrument, which contracting parties could choose as the governing law of 
their contract.
41 Thus the involvement of the CFR, as originally intended, in the 
elaboration of an optional instrument remains a possibility.
42  Even the Council - which 
has unreservedly rejected other possible uses of the CFR, including as the basis for a 
European civil code,
43 in favour of the preferred toolbox function
44 - has not explicitly 
foreclosed the possibility of the CFR acting as the basis of an optional instrument.
45 The 
way forward to pursue this proposal therefore remains open.  
 
6.2. Constitutional Thresholds  
 
While the EU Treaties do not provide specific competence for the EU to harmonise 
private law, the basis of EU intervention in the area of contract law has traditionally lain 
in its harmonisation programme pursued under Article 115 TFEU (ex 94 EC) and more 
frequently Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC). This has allowed for the approximation of the 
laws of Member States which directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
internal market. As such, in accordance with Article 5 TEU (ex 5 EC) and the principle of 
conferral (i.e. that the Union can only take action within the limits conferred upon it in 
the Treaties, to attain the objectives set out therein) a measure adopted under Article 114 
TFEU must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions of the internal 
market. That the EU has no general power to regulate the internal market was confirmed 
in  Tobacco Advertising;
46 a mere finding of disparities between national rules is not 
sufficient to justify recourse to Article 114 TFEU. The differences must have a direct 
                                                 
40 Europe 2020 Communication, 19.  
41 European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council – An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen, 
Stockholm programme P7_TA-PROV(2009)0090, para 99.  
42 On this function of the CFR, see Chapter 4, 4.2.3.  
43 Or as an instrument consisting of a complete set of standard terms and conditions of contract law. 
44 Consolidated Council Conclusions on the setting up of a Common Frame of Reference, (2009), 3  
45 Ibid.  
46 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419.    177
effect on the functioning of the internal market and it must be shown that the 
approximation of laws genuinely has as its object the improvement of these conditions. 
Where such obstacles to trade can be shown to exist, Article 114 TFEU authorises the EU 
legislature to intervene by adopting appropriate measures, in compliance with the legal 
principles in the Treaties or identified in case law, in particular the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity.
47 The proposal must overcome all of these hurdles if an 
optional instrument is to be adopted.  
 
It has been advanced, in light of the Commission’s Action Plan and the results of the 
Clifford Chance Survey, that divergence between Member States' contract laws do create 
obstacles to trade within the market. Although it has been shown that their effect is not to 
exclude trade, the differences do significantly deter the pursuance of cross-border 
contracting. They thus distort the functioning of the market and stand in the way of 
market completion. As such it is possible to conclude that the harmonisation of national 
contract laws, at least those integral to cross-border trade, is necessary and that the EU 
would have competence to this end. It is, however, unlikely that Article 114 TEFU can in 
fact serve as the legal basis of an optional instrument, owing to the optional nature. The 
Court of Justice of the EU has drawn a distinction, in deciphering the correct legal basis 
for harmonisation measures, between those measures which approximate the existing 
laws of the Member States (i.e. the harmonising directives typical of the existing acquis 
communautaire in the area) and those which create a new system of rights co-existing 
with national systems, as is inherent in the nature of the current proposal.  
 
The distinction was drawn in the case of Re: SCE,
48 concerning the legal basis of 
Regulation (EC) No.1435/2003, which laid down a single statute applicable to the 
European Cooperative Society (SCE).
49 The regulation created a new legal form, distinct 
from a national cooperative society, in order to remove barriers to trade resulting from 
divergent national law and regulation. It sought to allow such companies to carry out the 
organisation of their companies on an EU-wide scale, in much the same way as is 
                                                 
47 Article 5 TEU (ex 5 EC).  
48 Case C- 436/03 European Parliament v The Council [2006] ECR I-3733.  
49 Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE).   178 
envisaged by an optional instrument of contract law. The instrument was adopted on the 
basis of Article 352 TEFU (ex 308 EC); however, the European Parliament maintained 
that it should have been adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. The European 
Parliament advanced a broad interpretation of ‘approximation’ used in that Article, so 
that the provision encompassed not only measures seeking to remove barriers arising 
from divergence in national law, but also measures aiming at overcoming territorial 
boundaries of the national legal order, so far as necessary for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market.
50 To this end, they maintained that the approximation 
of the laws of Member States could also be achieved by supplementing national law 
through creating new European legal forms.
51 The Council, on the other hand, advanced 
that ‘approximation’ necessarily implied substitution for national provisions and the 
Court agreed. The regulation, which left unchanged different national laws, could not be 
regarded as having the aim of approximating the laws of the Member States applicable to 
cooperative societies, but rather its purpose was to create a new legal form in addition to 
the national forms and to this end it had been correctly adopted on the basis of Article 
352 TFEU.
52 
 
The result is that, although the internal market integration threshold of Article 114 TFEU 
is in all likelihood surpassed, the proper legal basis for an optional instrument is Article 
352 TFEU. Termed as the flexibility provision,
53 the Article provides the EU with 
competence to act to attain one of the objectives of the Treaties but only where the 
Treaties have not otherwise provided the power to do so, for example, in Article 114 
TFEU. It is on this basis
54 that the EU has created such private law forms as the Societas 
Europea (European Company) and the EU Trade Mark, which exist in addition to the 
various national forms and which provide the parties with a choice between the two.
55 
They thus share key features with a proposed optional instrument. It is also pertinent to 
note that they have all been adopted as regulations, and this would be the preferred form 
                                                 
50Re: SCE, para 21. 
51 Ibid. Para 20.  
52 Re: SCE, para 44.  
53 See, Chalmers, Davies and Monti, European Union Law, 2
nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, 214.  
54 But under the earlier provision of Article 308 EC.  
55 See, Hesselink et al. (2008), Legal basis study, 34.   179
of an optional instrument as a directly applicable, binding alternative. This would ensure 
the implementation of the instrument in its entirety and the future uniformity of its 
provisions between Member States. While Article 352 TFEU forms an extensive Treaty 
basis, it has been somewhat narrowed from the earlier provision of Article 308 EC
56 
which did not define those Treaty objectives to which the Article refers. The objectives 
are now stated in Declaration 41 to the Lisbon Treaty and include the establishment of the 
internal market,
57 characterised by the abolition of obstacles to the fundamental free 
movements, including goods and services.
58 This further confirms that the latter Article 
can serve as the legal basis for the adoption of an optional instrument, which has as its 
object the improvement of the conditions and functioning of the internal market.  
 
As to the optional instrument that can be adopted on this legal basis, to the extent that 
divergence in national contract rules create obstacles to trade, a comprehensive 
contractual instrument can be anticipated. This accords with the CFR forming the basis of 
the instrument, and the intention that the CFR is to cover all stages of contractual 
relations.
59 In this way the optional instrument could overcome the limited substantive 
scope of the CRD.
60 The ability to comprehensively regulate issues of general contract 
law on this legal basis could then support sector-specific instruments, at least those of 
importance to the internal market.
61 Optional instruments would then be expected to 
govern the whole contractual relationship. However, this would also require the inclusion 
of rules from those areas of law with which the law of contract interacts.
62 For example, 
an optional instrument governing the contract of sale could also include rules of property 
law, in so far as  the passing of property in the goods forms an integral part of the 
contract. The inclusion of rules outside of the contractual scope of the optional instrument 
                                                 
56 Owing to what is considered to be an overly ambitious interpretation of the Article as a legal basis. See, 
Chalmers et al, (2010), for how the provision has previously been interpreted, from 214.  
57 Article 3 (3) TFEU.  
58 Article 23 TFEU (ex Article 14 EC).  
59 See 4.2.3.  
60 Discussed in 4.1.3 and 5.3. Thus the optional instrument would contain rules on validity and the award of 
damages, which the CRD leaves to national law.  
61 2004 Communication, 20, and 4.2.3 and 5.3.  
62 The content of the optional instrument is considered further in 6.4.    180 
would be justified where national divergence in such rules creates obstacles to trade,
63 
and thus their inclusion would facilitate the proper functioning of the internal market.
64 
Greater incorporation of the rules of the DCFR could thus be justified in the optional 
instrument than that which is envisaged for the legislative toolbox.
65As stated, however, 
the clear limitation is that those rules beyond the initial contractual scope must be directly 
relevant to the internal market objective, if their inclusion is to be justified on this legal 
basis.   
 
As a regulatory response to the existing obstacles to cross-border trade, the optional 
instrument would apply to both B(SME)2C and B(SME)2B(SME) contracts. The issue 
that arises, however, is whether Article 352 TFEU could serve as the legal basis for an 
instrument of such width. The contract acquis has to date focused on the B2C relationship 
and, specifically, the protection of the consumer. This has been adopted for the most part 
on the basis of Article 114 TFEU with the aim of market completion.
66 There is therefore 
little doubt that the optional instrument governing B(SME)2C contracts could be adopted 
on the latter article, save for its optional nature, which means that Article 352 TFEU 
provides the necessary legal basis. While the contract acquis has been more limited in the 
commercial context, there is good reason to think that an instrument applying to 
B(SME)2B(SME) contracts could also be adopted on this legal basis. In the first place, 
the optional legal forms of the SCE and European Company (SE) have both been adopted 
on the basis of this Article, with the intention of assisting companies to pursue their 
activities on an EU-wide scale. Obstacles arising for businesses operating in the internal 
market have therefore prompted legislative action at the EU level, and a number of 
significant measures have been adopted in the commercial context
67 on the basis of 
                                                 
63 The 2004 Communication confirms that significant obstacles appear to arise from the interaction between 
contract and property law in the Member States, 11. See further, Chapter 2, 2.3.1.  
64 As well as reducing the need to refer to national law where the optional instrument applies. On the need 
for this extended approach to be taken to optional instruments see the discussion in 6.4.  
65 This was also suggested in Chapter 4, 4.2.3.  
66 Hesselink (2007), SMEs in European Contract Law, 20.  
67 One such example is the Commercial Agency Directive which contains rules intended to protect self-
employed commercial agents (Council Directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the 
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents), discussed by Hesselink, Ibid. 8. The directive 
was, however, adopted on the basis of Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 EC); as Article 114 TFEU was 
introduced post the adoption of this directive by the Single European Act.    181
Article 114 TFEU. More specifically, it is possible to draw upon the existing acquis to 
allow for the creation of an instrument attuned to the needs of SMEs on this basis. For 
example, the Directive on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions
68 sought 
to address the administrative and financial burden that is placed on businesses, and in 
particular SMEs who suffer from a weak bargaining position in such circumstances, 
which results in and from, 
69excessive payment periods and late payment.
70  
 
While the latter directive recognises the need to address the imbalance in the case of 
SME’s, they are treated within the wider business category. In contrast to consumers, the 
acquis has not sought to treat SMEs as a distinct group for regulatory purposes,
71 despite 
the apparent need to so. It is acknowledged, for example, that SMEs may sometimes be in 
a similar situation as consumers
72 when they buy certain goods or services. The Green 
Paper on the review of the acquis thus raised the question of whether SMEs should 
benefit to a certain extent from the same protection provided for consumers.
73 This now 
appears to be the direction in which the acquis is developing. For example, the Citizen’s 
Rights Directive,
74 which forms part of the telecoms reform package, and was adopted on 
the basis of Article 114 TFEU, provides that the provisions on contracts therein should 
apply not only to consumers but also to other end users, primarily micro-enterprises and 
SMEs, which may prefer a contract adapted to consumer needs,
75 where they so request.
76 
                                                 
68 Directive 2000/35/EC on combating late payment in commercial transactions.  
69 I.e. administrative and financial burdens. 
70 Directive on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, recital 7. See discussion of the 
directive in Schulte-Braucks and Ongena, The Late Payment Directive – a step towards an emerging 
European Contract Law (2003) European Review of Private Law 519, 524.  
71 Hesselink (2007), 8.  
72 Hesselink (ibid. 20) maintains that the case for harmonising contract law for the benefit of SMEs may in 
fact be stronger than that for consumers.  SMEs are more likely to be repeat players and thus more affected 
by the existing divergence in contract law.  
73 Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis (2007), Q. B1.  
74 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data 
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
O.J. L 337/11 pp 11-36. 
75 Ibid. Recital 21.  
76 Recital 21. The consumer contract provisions will thus not automatically apply and this reservation is 
intended to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens for providers and the complexity related to the 
definition of SME. It highlights the issue of how to extend protective measures to SMEs within the optional   182 
This suggests that an optional instrument which is adopted with the objective of 
facilitating cross-border contracting for SMEs, while also applicable to the wider B2B 
context, could, save for the optional nature of the instrument, be adopted on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU. Article 352 TFEU thus presents the proper legal basis for the adoption 
of such an instrument.  
 
The proposal will still have to surpass the thresholds of proportionality and subsidiarity.
77 
It would have to be shown that it is both a necessary and suitable response to the 
identified problems and that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by Member States. Therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed 
action, it can be better achieved at EU level. The principles pose little problem. Not only 
has it been shown that harmonisation in this area is necessary, the creation of an optional 
instrument has also been shown to be the suitable response to the problems created for the 
market: it would facilitate trade by enhancing legal certainty and reducing the associated 
costs which currently act to deter trade. The optional nature of the harmonised instrument 
would also be the least restrictive means by which to achieve this result. National contract 
systems would be unaffected and it would also be respectful of national regulatory 
autonomy, maintaining the social, cultural and legal diversity which is inherent in the 
internal market and should not be lost through harmonisation.
78 In this way, the principle 
of proportionality is satisfied but the proposal also respects the idea underlying the 
principle of subsidiarity.
79 It is clear that, to the extent that obstacles to the functioning of 
the internal market arise from divergent national law, the objective of action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by Member States individually. The multifarious development of 
national laws demonstrates that action is necessary at the EU level.
80 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
instrument, and the problems that can arise from categorical protection to SMEs by analogy with 
consumers, which is discussed in 6.4.1. 
77 Article 5 TEU (ex Article 5 EC) 
78 The maintenance of such diversity being an important consideration in articulating the future approach to 
the harmonisation of European contract law, see Chapter 3.2.2.  
79 Hesselink, The Values Underlying the Draft Common Frame of Reference: What role for fairness and 
social justice, A Short study note prepared for the European Parliament (2008), available at, 
http://www.jur.uva.nl/csecl/news.cfm/5F7839CD-1321-B0BE-A41B920971C302EC#p6, 67. 
80 See for example, C-491/01 British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco [2002] I-11453, para 181.    183
6.3 The Applicability of the Optional Instrument 
 
With the legal parameters of the proposal established, it is necessary to consider how 
effect is to be given to possible optional instrument(s). This requires, first, that the legal 
nature of such instruments, whether opt-in or opt-out in nature, is determined.  
 
The principal argument in favour of an opt-in instrument is that it would optimise the 
parties’ freedom of contract if they could choose to apply the rules as the governing law 
of their contract where it is suited to their economic or legal needs better than the 
alternative national contractual regime.
81 Such an approach would be wholly in 
accordance with the optional nature of the instrument which, by remaining distinct from 
the national contract systems, would respect the need to maintain the existing legal and 
cultural plurality inherent in the internal market, as well as being the more respectful 
approach to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. It would thus be more 
likely than the alternative to receive political approval. The prospect of an opt-out 
instrument does, however, have merits and could be particularly useful for SMEs, as 
freedom of contract within the choice of law system does not always assist this group in 
cross-border trade. The principle presumes the existence of equality of bargaining power, 
which is commonly not the case for SMEs contracting with larger enterprises, and an opt-
out regime would be more appropriate. It would allow the parties to maintain their 
freedom of contract, to the extent that they could opt out, but would provide the SME, 
commonly the weaker party, with a suitable default regime.
82 In light of the arguments 
advanced in favour of an opt-in regime, however, it is clear that such an approach would 
be too intrusive and too close to the codification of national contractual systems to be 
likely to gain political support. The likely outcome is, therefore, opt-in instrument(s) of 
European contract law and the issue arises as to how the parties are to ‘opt’ for such 
rules. 
 
 
                                                 
81 2003 Communication, para 92.  
82 Hesselink, SME’s in European Contract Law (2007), 26.    184 
6.3.1. The Optional Instrument and Rome I 
 
The applicability of an optional instrument as the 28
th contractual system, and governing 
law of a contract, is foremost an issue of choice of law. An important part of the 
regulatory proposal to assist contracting in the internal market will, therefore, be the 
relationship between the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations and the optional instrument. This will determine the extent to which the 
optional instrument can form the simplified regulatory framework that is required by 
contracting parties in this context. In particular, the inclusion of harmonised mandatory 
rules within the instrument would make the optional regime a valuable tool for trade, 
particularly in the B2C context. This, however, will be dependant upon the ability of the 
optional instrument to affect the application of national mandatory rules, which otherwise 
apply under the scheme of Rome I.  
 
Coherence between the two systems is thus paramount to the realisation of the objectives 
in creating and giving effect to an optional instrument. Indeed, the harmonisation of 
choice of law rules and of substantive contractual provisions, share similar objectives.
83 
They are both a means by which to organise legal diversity and in doing so they are 
intended to provide contracting parties with legal certainty and greater confidence in the 
stability of legal relationships.
84 Within the European context, the harmonisation of both 
types of rules has been joined by a shared concern for the proper functioning of the 
internal market, and ensuring the right conditions for free movement among the Member 
States.
85 The Commission has thus reinforced the importance of coherence between the 
optional instrument and the European choice of law system,
86 so that effect can be given 
to the optional instrument within the scheme of the latter.  
                                                 
83 See Speech of Vogelaar, DG for the Internal Market and Approximation of Legislation in, Giuliano and 
Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ C 282, 31.10.80, 
pp 1-50, para 2. Also, Chapter 2, 2.1.3.  
84 Ibid. para 1.  
85 Vogelaar, para 2, and Cheshire, North and Fawcett, Private International Law, 14th ed. Oxford: OUP, 
2008, 668 -9.  The Rome I Regulation was thus adopted on the basis of Article 61 (c) EC, by which 
reference is made to Article 65 (b) EC which seeks to promote compatibility of the rules applicable in the 
Member States concerning the conflict of laws in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the 
internal market. See Recital 6 of Rome I to this end.  
86 2004 Communication, Annex II, 19.    185
Freedom of contract would be fully realised in the internal market if contracting parties 
could expressly choose the optional instrument as the governing law. The choice of non-
state law such as the optional instrument has, however, traditionally been precluded by 
the European choice of law system. Article 3 of the Rome Convention, which preceded 
the Rome I Regulation, permitted only the choice of law of a State,
87 and as such 
deprived businesses of a valuable option in being able to choose more appropriate non-
national rules to govern their cross-border contracts. In this respect the Rome Convention 
was considered to be out of date and in dire need of reform.
88 The conversion of the 
Rome Convention into an EU instrument, and the debate generated by the Commission’s 
Green Paper
89 in 2002 on the modernisation of the choice of law regime was, therefore, 
an opportunity to reform and extend Article 3. The proximity in timing also to the debate 
on European contract law, lead to an intention on the part of the Commission to 
coordinate the conversion with the contract law project in order to ensure coherence with 
the proposed optional instrument.
90
   
 
Reform of the choice of law regime in this way had, however, traditionally been ruled out 
owing to the absence of a full and consistent body of European contract rules which could 
justify the extension of the freedom of choice embodied in Article 3 of the Rome 
Convention.
91 Those who argue against allowing the choice of non-state rules have 
pointed to the need to ensure that such rules are balanced: complying with the needs of 
individual justice and capable of providing sufficient legal certainty.
92 Previous 
harmonisation attempts at this level, notably PECL, have been found to be lacking in both 
respects. While it was envisaged that the principles could be applied to contracts via 
Article 3,
93 they were simultaneously criticised for containing wide lacunae which would 
necessitate gap filling
94
 and it is acknowledged that they fail to take adequate account of 
                                                 
87 Lagarde, Le nouveau droit international prive des contrats après l entrée en vigueur de la Convention de 
Rome du 19 juin 1980, RCDIP, 1980. 287, 300. 
88 Juenger, The lex mercatoria and Private International Law, (2000) Uniform Law Review 177, 183 -4.  
89 Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final.  
90 2004 Communication, Annex II, 19.   
91 Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention, 3.2.3.  
92 Drobnig, The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws, (1998) Uniform Law Review 385, 387.  
93 PECL, Article 1:101(2).   
94 Drobnig (1998), 392.   186 
social and welfare values.
95 Ultimately, previous harmonisation attempts have compared 
unfavourably with national contractual systems. The Commission’s original proposal for 
Rome I
96 did, however, provide that the parties may choose as the applicable law, 
principles and rules of substantive law of contract recognised both internationally or in 
the EU,
97 including PECL.  
 
In the legislative process reference to substantive principles and rules recognised in the 
EU was abandoned in favour of those rules recognised internationally.
98 The justification 
given by the European Parliament was that while the freedom of the parties to choose the 
applicable law comprised the right to choose rules of substantive law of contract 
recognised internationally, such principles and rules must comply with certain minimum 
standards in order to be eligible. In particular, such principles should be created by an 
independent and neutral body, their content should be balanced and contain mandatory 
rules, and they should regulate rights and duties in a reasonably comprehensive way.
99 An 
example of rules considered as meeting these conditions were the Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts,
100 and by implication, and in light of earlier 
criticism, not PECL, obviating the need to refer to such rules and principles at the EU 
level. Further, at that stage, the European Parliament considered it undesirable to refer in 
the regulation to the CFR, as it did not politically exist at that time. As such, it was 
unclear what shape the contract terms would take and on what legal basis it would be 
adopted. It is now clear, however, that an optional instrument, originating with the EU, 
would necessarily satisfy those standards of the European Parliament in order to serve as 
a governing law. This is particularly if the instrument is to realise its objective in creating 
a simplified regulatory environment.
101 However, in terms of choice of law under Rome 
                                                 
95 See Chapter 3, 3.2.2.   
96 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final 2005/0261 (COD).  
97 Article 3 (2) of the Rome I proposal.  
98 Draft European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (COM (2005) 0650 
– c6-0441/2005/0261 (COD).  
99 Ibid. Amended recital 7. 
100 Ibid.  
101 I.e. The instrument will have to be balanced, containing mandatory rules, and will necessarily regulate 
rights and duties in a comprehensive way.    187
I, while the instrument does not preclude the contracting parties from incorporating by 
reference into their contract non-state rules,
102 they cannot make an express choice of 
such rules as the governing law of their contract.  
 
The possibility that parties may opt-in to an optional instrument as the governing law of 
their contract has, however, still been provided for in Rome I. Recital 14 provides that 
should the EU adopt, in an appropriate legal instrument, rules of substantive contract law, 
such instrument may provide that the parties may choose to apply those rules. This opens 
the way for a coherent application of the two instruments, and while an express choice of 
the optional instrument as a non-state law under Article 3 has thus been precluded, an 
express choice of the instrument as the governing law need not be ruled out.  
 
It would be possible to draw on the legal nature of the instrument as a Regulation, i.e. as a 
directly applicable contractual regime, which is implemented into national law in its 
entirety. The contractual rules would be common across all the Member States and would 
co-exist with the national contract provisions. It could, therefore, be characterised as a 2
nd 
domestic system.
103 The parties’ choice would, therefore, be for a system of national law, 
which is permitted under Article 3 of Rome I. The characterisation of the optional 
instrument as domestic law means that it could also apply as the governing law of 
domestic transactions.
104 The instrument would thus benefit from universality of 
application,
105 and this would optimise the benefits of harmonisation for those who opt-
in
106 to the instrument as the applicable law.
107 
                                                 
102 Rome I, recital 13.  
103 The characterisation of the optional instrument as a 2
nd domestic regime is also utilised by the Principles 
of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL), in regard to an optional instrument in the area of insurance 
contract law. See Principles of European Insurance Contract Law, prepared by the project group on a 
restatement of European contract law, I 45, (Munich: Sellier, 2009).  
104 This can be distinguished from purely domestic contracts which, at the choice of the parties, are 
governed by the law of another Member State. This is governed by Article 3 (3) of Rome I, but this article 
would not apply in the case of the optional instrument, as this would form domestic law.  
105 A dual regime would not have to result where businesses and consumers could not contract under the 
optional instrument in domestic contracts, but only cross-border contracts.  
106 Although not as a choice of law under Rome I in domestic cases, but rather through a substantive choice, 
discussed below.  
107 Unlike the CISG, where an ‘international element’ is required in order to determine applicability, this 
limitation would be neither suitable nor justified in the context of the internal market. As opposed to the 
international context, the optional approach can be seen to be less of an intrusion on national sovereignty.    188 
In accordance with Recital 14, it would be necessary for the optional instrument to 
provide the right for parties to expressly choose the 2
nd domestic system as the governing 
law of their contract within the scheme of Rome I, in accordance with Article 3, and thus 
begin to articulate the relationship between the two instruments.
108 The availability and 
right of the parties’ to choose the optional system could be contained in a substantive 
provision
109 within the instrument.
110 It is then envisaged that when the parties choose the 
law of a Member State as the applicable law of their contract under Rome I, the 
substantive rule of the Regulation would allow them to opt-in to the 2
nd domestic system 
which would then become the applicable law of their contract.
111 This, however, would 
be a convoluted and unnecessary means of giving effect to the parties’ intention to apply 
the optional instrument as the applicable law. Parties should be free in the first place to 
expressly choose the optional instrument, or 2
nd domestic system, as the governing law of 
their contract. This should be possible under Article 3 as the choice of the parties would, 
owing to the characterisation of the Regulation, be for the choice of a law of the Member 
States, and not a non–state law.
112 The formalities of the choice of law would then be 
governed by Article 3.
113  In this way the optional regime would also retain its status as 
the 28
th contractual regime within the EU. To expect the parties to first choose the 1
st 
contract law of a Member States would be contrary to their intention where they wish the 
2
nd regime to apply as the governing law, and would undermine the intended neutrality of 
the optional regime.
114 Parties will benefit from the enhanced certainty and transparency 
of the applicability of the optional contract regime under Rome I, where they expressly 
choose it. Indeed, the optional regime should only apply where expressly chosen by the 
                                                 
108 Further issues in regard to the relationship would need to be clarified within the optional instrument, in 
particular, the relationship between the national mandatory rules applicable under Rome I, and those of the 
former instrument. Discussed further below.  
109 As opposed to giving effect to the instrument through a choice of law rule, which would be subject to 
Article 23 of Rome I. 
110 The use of a substantive rule to this effect in the Regulation is discussed by Heiss and Downes, Non-
Optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law. Reflections from a Private International Law 
Perspective, (2005) 5 ERPL 693, 707.   
111 Ibid. It would still be necessary under this approach to exclude the application of national mandatory 
rules, see Heiss and Downes further, 708.  
112 Recital 13.  
113 I.e. Article 3 (1) requires that the choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case.  
114 I.e. the availability of the optional instrument would no longer overcome the shortcomings of party 
autonomy under the choice of law system, particularly for SMEs. See, 6.1.1.    189
parties. With the need for legal certainty in mind it would be undesirable for the optional 
system to otherwise apply by virtue of Article 4 of the Regulation in the absence of a 
choice. This latter Article should continue to operate to objectively refer to the law of a 
1
st domestic system so that parties, who have not expressly chosen the instrument, will 
not be subject to any unfair surprise by its application.  
 
In order to serve as the applicable law, however, regard must be had to the expected 
scope of the applicable law under Rome I. Article 12 provides that the law applicable to a 
contract shall govern, in particular, issues of interpretation, performance, and the 
consequences of breach, including the assessment of damages. It shall also govern the 
various ways of extinguishing obligations, prescription and limitations of actions, and 
finally, the consequences of nullity of the contract. Failure on the part of the instrument to 
regulate these issues, risks the choice of the 2
nd domestic system being treated as a partial 
choice, and that regulatory gaps in the instrument, as the governing law will arise.
115 The 
need for the application of other sources of law to fill those gaps would compromise the 
intended autonomous nature of the instrument, and the creation of the simplified 
regulatory environment.  
 
The need for the optional instrument to form a comprehensive contractual regime is 
reinforced, and is tenable on the existing scope of the DCFR.
116 Even then, however, the 
DCFR recognises that issues may arise relating to matters within the scope of the 
instrument, but which are not expressly settled by it. In this case, as the DCFR provides, 
issues should first be settled, in so far as possible, in accordance with the general 
principles underlying the instrument.
117 In this way, the optional instrument can maintain 
its autonomous nature, at least within its scope. Where such interpretation cannot settle 
matters, or for issues which arise outside of the scope of the instrument, it will be 
                                                 
115 See Heiss and Downes (2005), 701, who express these concerns in response to the envisaged scope of 
the optional instrument in the Commissions 2003 and 2004 Communications, and in the alternative to the 
PECL as an applicable law. In either case, the instrument would form an insufficient lex causae.  
116 These matters are regulated by the DCFR. See discussion of the scope of coverage of the DCFR, in 
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desirable in the interest of certainty to apply the law that would have applied to the 
contract under Rome I, as was advanced by the PECL.
118 The optional instrument would 
contain a clause setting out its intended field of application and providing for the 
autonomous interpretation and development of the instrument within its scope, as the 
DCFR does.
119 It has been envisaged, therefore, that the optional instrument would 
contain a scope clause which would also articulate the relationship between the optional 
instrument and Rome I,
120 i.e. that Rome I would not apply to matters regulated by the 
optional instrument,
121 or conversely, that for matters outside of its scope the contracting 
parties would be directed to the applicable law under Rome I. The Commission envisaged 
that such a clause could take effect as a special conflict of law rule that would enjoy 
precedence over Rome I by virtue of Article 23 of the conflict of law system.
122  
 
Further consideration must, however, be given to the relationship between the optional 
instrument and Rome I. The applicability of mandatory rules of other legal systems, 
which apply despite an effective choice of law, presents an issue for any proposal which 
seeks to give effect to the optional instrument within the system of Rome I. Their 
application would undermine the inclusion of mandatory rules within the optional 
instrument itself, and ultimately its value as a tool for trade in the internal market.
123 The 
optional instrument must, therefore, affect the application of the applicable mandatory 
rules under Rome I.  
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6.3.2. The Relationship with National Mandatory Rules 
 
The extent to which the application of national mandatory rules can be excluded where 
the optional instrument is the governing law of the contract, however, raises fundamental 
issues which must be addressed. 
 
In the first place, the optional instrument will need to include its own mandatory rules if 
the national rules are to be excluded. From an internal market perspective it has been 
shown that it is mandatory rules of consumer protection that have created the greatest 
obstacles to cross-border trade in the B2C context. The issue that arises, therefore, is 
whether an optional instrument could adequately represent the interests which are 
protected under Article 6 of Rome I? The Commission has gone further to envisage that 
overriding national mandatory rules could also be excluded where the optional instrument 
applies as the governing law of the contract.
124 Article 7 of the Rome Convention, now 
Article 9 of Rome I, formerly provided for the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the forum and of a third country with which the situation had a close 
connection. The application of such rules thus similarly carries for contracting parties the 
risk of uncertainty and increased transaction costs, thus acting to deter economic 
activity.
125  
 
Derogation from Article 9 therefore receives support. It is considered that this would 
significantly enhance the utility of the optional instrument, and its impact on the 
functioning of the internal market,
126 as parties would know which mandatory rules are 
applicable to their contractual relationships.
127 Article 9 is intended, however, to give 
effect to a narrower type of national mandatory rule that those under Article 6. While 
rules within the scope of the latter Article cannot be derogated from by contract and so 
operate as a limitation on the freedom to choose the applicable law, rules applicable 
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under Article 9 will override the applicable law.
128 They are concerned with safeguarding 
the Member States public interest, such as their political, social or economic 
organisation.
129 Given the importance of such rules to the Member States, the issue of 
whether an optional instrument could adequately represent and protect such interests is 
even more acute. It will, therefore, be necessary to have regard to the nature of those rules 
given effect to under Articles 6 and 9 of Rome I, in order to ascertain whether the 
optional instrument can contain sufficiently protective and representative rules. Only if 
the instrument can will the exclusion of national mandatory rules be justified.
130  
 
If it is found that an optional instrument cannot satisfy this requirement, then as effect 
will be given to the instrument within the scheme of Rome I, national mandatory rules 
should continue to apply.
131 There may be good reason why this should be the case, and it 
will be pertinent to consider the object of the conflict of law provisions which support the 
application of the law of a Member State other than the applicable law. This in turn must 
be balanced against the object of the optional instrument in terms of facilitating internal 
market trade. It is first necessary, therefore, to ascertain what types of national rules fall 
to be considered as mandatory rules within the meaning of Article 6 and 9 respectively, in 
order to determine whether such rules can be included within an optional instrument. In 
this regard, the competence of the EU to enact such rules must also be borne in mind.  
 
Article 6 of Rome I operates so that the parties choice of law cannot deprive the passive 
consumer of the protection afforded to them by provisions which cannot be derogated 
from by agreement, i.e. domestic mandatory rules of consumer protection, in the law of 
their habitual residence. The object of the Article is thus to protect the consumer as the 
weaker party to the agreement,
132 and presumes that the law of their habitual residence 
will provide the best protection of their interests.
133 The concern that has arisen in regard 
to the applicability of the optional instrument is, however, that if this was joined by 
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derogation from Article 6 then the choice of the instrument would exclude higher national 
levels of protection, and thus result in a situation of reduced social protection.
134 This 
result would not only be unsatisfactory, but would also have practical implications for the 
adoption of optional instruments.  
 
Rutgers highlights,
135 that if the optional instrument does not contain sufficiently 
protective rules then Member States are more likely to stick to the application of their 
own mandatory rules and will be less willing to give up their competence in that area. 
Thus either the Member States will not agree on the enactment of an optional instrument 
which excludes conflicting national mandatory rules,
136 or they may be inclined to 
continue applying their own national mandatory rules where the optional instrument is 
the governing law, in order to apply higher levels of protection.
137  T h i s  w o u l d  
significantly undermine the utility and value of the optional instrument. A risk is that if it 
is found that Article 9 of Rome I cannot or should not be derogated from, the opportunity 
would exist for national courts to apply national mandatory consumer protection rules, 
i.e. those that should be given effect to under Article 6, as overriding mandatory rules 
under Article 9. Mandatory consumer protection rules could thus prevail over those of the 
optional instrument.
138 
 
The foregoing concerns need not be overstated, however, and derogation from Article 6 
need not result in social dumping. Significantly, such arguments overlook the CRD 
proposal which would precede an optional instrument in moving to a full harmonisation 
approach for B2C sales and services contracts across the Member States. Thus should the 
EU adopt an optional instrument governing sales and services contracts,
139 the CRD 
provisions, which are classified as mandatory rules of consumer protection by the 
proposal,
140 will be decisive in establishing the level of consumer protection within the 
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optional instrument. That level of protection clearly cannot be less than that provided 
under the CRD,
141 and there may be good reason to emulate those provisions of the CRD, 
in the interest of coherence between the two instruments.
142  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the full harmonisation approach of the CRD will make the 
adoption and applicability of the optional instrument less contentious within the shared 
scope of the provisions. The potential for conflict between national mandatory rules and 
those of the optional instrument, and concerns of a loss of consumer protection will, 
however, continue to exist outside of that shared scope. The narrow scope of the CRD 
proposal and its dependence upon national law has been a significant criticism of the 
instrument, and a significant advantage of the optional instrument as a regulatory 
response is, therefore, its extended scope.
143 The issue arises, therefore, of how the 
derogation from Article 6 may be made acceptable to Member States so that they will 
forego their competence in that area. It is clear that the instrument will have to provide 
consumers with a high level of protection, and comprehensively and adequately protect 
the consumer’s interests which are protected at the national level. If this is achieved the 
incentive for Member States and their national courts to continue to apply their own 
mandatory rules of consumer protection within the narrowed scope where potential for 
conflict exists
144 will be much reduced.
145 It also means that Article 6 could be derogated 
from in full. Effect could be given to the derogation by a conflict of law clause within the 
optional instrument, which would have precedence over the rule in Article 6 by virtue of 
Article 23 of Rome I. It would then be desirable in terms of certainty, particularly for 
national courts applying the optional instrument as the applicable law, that the mandatory 
nature of the consumer protection rules of the instrument is made clear,
146 i.e. that parties 
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may not, to the detriment of consumer, exclude the application of such rules, or vary their 
effect. 
 
The competence of the EU to enact an optional instrument to include mandatory rules of 
consumer protection is already widely evident in the consumer acquis,
147 which attributes 
mandatory status to its provisions, including the CRD in Article 43.
148 As regards the 
competence of the EU to enact consumer rules which go beyond the scope of the CRD, 
the limitation in scope of the latter instrument has been explained in terms of the change 
in regulatory approach.
149 While the CRD seeks full harmonisation on a non-optional 
basis it threatens national regulatory autonomy. This has resulted in a compromise, both 
in the scope of the instrument, and in the scope of the EU’s competence to enact 
consumer protection rules. It has been advanced, however, that an optional instrument 
can provide a more suitable regulatory approach to the realisation of the regulatory 
objectives of the CRD, without undermining Member States regulatory autonomy. The 
optional instrument can, therefore, result in a more comprehensive instrument which is 
necessary in the internal market, and if Article 6 of Rome I is to be derogated from.  
 
Overriding mandatory rules on the other hand are to be construed restrictively,
150 and 
form a more limited category of mandatory rules.
151 Article 9 seeks to ensure the 
applicability of those rules to which a Member State
152 attaches such importance that they 
should apply whatever law is otherwise applicable to the contract.
153 In the first instance, 
therefore, Article 9 (2) safeguards the application of the mandatory rules of the forum. In 
this regard the interest of the Member State in ensuring that they can continue to apply 
such rules in cases before them is clear from the imperative nature of the rules,
154 and has 
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proved uncontroversial. The application of third country rules by the forum to contracts 
before them has, however, been more contentious. This has been principally because of 
the uncertainty that the provision could give rise to and for this reason the Rome 
Convention allowed Member States to exercise a reservation in regard to the then Article 
7 (1).
155 As to why effect should be given to the mandatory rules of another Member 
State it is considered, in the first instance, that the application of a foreign law is justified 
when that law expresses a policy of the foreign state, and the connections of the case with 
that state are such as to give it a legitimate interest in having its policy applied.
156 It is 
further advanced that the forum should defer to the interests of other States for reasons of 
comity, and thus they should mutually regard and respect each others interests.
157 A 
number of reasons have been given for why this should be the case. Chong refers to, 
among others, a motivation to preserve relations with friendly foreign states, a need to 
foster international cooperation, and to do justice between the parties. There is also an 
element of self-interest, to the extent that deference to another Member States interests 
will invite reciprocal action that will advance the forum’s policies in cases before courts 
in other Member States.
158 
 
It is for the law of the Member State from which the rule originates to determine whether 
or not a rule is mandatory in the overriding sense.
159 The task will, however, fall upon the 
forum to determine this in light of its own legal system in the case of Article 9 (2), and in 
accordance with the law of the third State in the case of Article 9 (3). The approach to 
categorisation is thus highly subjective as well as discretionary, i.e. effect only may be 
given to overriding mandatory provisions. This adds to the criticism of the uncertainty 
which results from this provision for the contracting parties, and will present a difficult 
task for the forum. National rules will not always provide for their overriding effect, and 
the approach to categorisation of overriding mandatory rules may vary even within a 
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single state.
160 An example of an overriding statute which does provide for its overriding 
mandatory nature is the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Section 27 (2) provides that the 
Act is to have effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies the law of another 
country outside the UK, where it appears that the intention was to enable the party 
imposing the choice of law term to evade the operation of the Act.
161 Where the 
mandatory nature of the provision is not provided, however, little guidance has been 
given as to what rules fall to be considered within this category. Rules that have been 
regarded as overriding mandatory rules have concerned rules on import and export 
prohibitions, anti-trust laws, and exchange regulations.
162  
 
Article 9 (1) of Rome I, therefore, introduces a definition for overriding mandatory 
rules,
163 drawing on the Court of Justice’s categorisation of Belgian public order 
legislation in the case of Arblade.
164 The case ultimately, however, concerned the 
compatibility of the national legislation, which was concerned with the protection of 
workers, with the Treaty fundamental freedoms. It was not, therefore, the Courts 
intention to formulate its own definition of this category of rules, rather it was a 
definition chosen by the European Commission.
165 The Court categorised the legislation 
at issue in terms of its classification under Belgian law as public order legislation. The 
latter term was understood as applying to national provisions, compliance with which has 
been deemed to be crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order in 
the Member State concerned as to require its compliance by all persons present on the 
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national territory of that Member State, and all legal relationships within the state.
166 It 
will be sufficient, therefore, that the Member State with whom the rule originates regards 
it as crucial for safeguarding its public interests, such as it political, social or economic 
organisation. Categorisation will remain subjective to that Member State,
 167  and to the 
construction in those terms of the national court hearing the case at hand.
168  
 
While the new definition makes way for an EU wide approach to categorisation, the issue 
of how it is to be interpreted and applied, if any differently from the pre-Rome I approach 
of national courts, remains to be considered. At the heart of the definition, and Arblade, 
are rules concerned with the public interest. This has lead some to interpret the provision 
as meaning that rules pursuing private interests cannot be categorised as overriding 
mandatory rules.
169 Such a narrow construction would be contrary to the view of those 
who see Article 9 as going beyond the public and general interests to also protect private 
interests, and in particular weaker parties, including, employees, franchisees, and 
commercial agents.
170 Indeed, national courts have been willing to protect private and 
individual interests that are not covered by the special conflict of law rules of Rome I, i.e. 
beyond the consumer and the employee.
171 Bonomi gives an example of the French Cour 
de cassation en banc which, with the intention of protecting the weaker business, 
recognised the nature of an overriding mandatory rule in an action between a sub-
contractor and its employer.
172 This has not, however, been the approach of all Member 
States. Germany, for example, has taken a narrow construction to the categorisation of 
overriding mandatory rules, which includes only those provisions which concern the 
public interest, to the exclusion of private interests.
173  
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It is, however, the wider construction that the Commission intended in utilising the 
definition in Arblade,
174 which itself concerned rules which were directed at the 
protection of employees. The Commission’s Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome 
Convention categorised mandatory rules of consumer protection, falling under Article 6, 
as public policy provisions, i.e. those which are designed to guarantee a country’s social 
and economic order.
175 This suggests that they see protection of the weaker party as 
‘public policy’, and thus capable of constituting an overriding mandatory rule. It should 
also be noted that in regard to the relationship between Articles 6 and 9, the Green Paper 
considered that while the scope of the two articles is not identical, Article 6 does not 
interfere with the possible application of overriding mandatory provisions under Article 
9. The latter Article can provide complementary protection where the conditions for 
application are satisfied.
176 The concern appeared to be that a contrary interpretation, i.e. 
one that held that when the conditions of Article 6 are not met, Article 9 could also not 
apply, would deprive a mobile consumer, who already does not enjoy the protection of 
Article 6, of what was considered to be the “safety valve” of the public order acts.
177 This 
interpretation of the relationship between the articles further suggests that the protection 
of the weaker party is a concern of overriding mandatory rules. It equally highlights the 
potential for national courts, in the application of the optional instrument as the governing 
law, to categorise national consumer mandatory rules
178as overriding mandatory rules.  
 
The latter construction of overriding rules, so as to include the protection of the weaker 
party, is clear from the decision in Ingmar.
179 The case concerned the scope of 
application and thus mandatory nature of Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agency 
Directive, which guarantees a right of compensation to the commercial agent after the 
termination of a commercial agency contract.
180 The Court observed that the Directive 
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was designed to protect commercial agents and, in the case of Articles 17 and 18, to 
provide protection after the termination of the contract. The regime established by the 
Directive for the purpose of protecting the weaker party was considered mandatory.
181 
This categorisation was confirmed by Article 19 of the Directive which provides that the 
parties may not derogate from the rules to the detriment of the commercial agent before 
the contract expires.
182 The Court finally drew upon the wider purpose of the Articles 
which was to protect for commercial agents freedom of establishment and the operation 
of undistorted competition in the internal market. This required that the provisions be 
observed throughout the EU if those Treaty objectives were to be obtained. The Court, 
therefore, also made a link between the purpose of the Directive and wider public 
interests, which will often be the case. As Hellner highlights, few rules protect only a 
purely private interest, and will be joined by protection of the general interest.
183 As such, 
together with the Commission’s interpretation of the relationship between Articles 6 and 
9 of Rome I, there could be said to be few rules outside the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules.
184 It is thus advanced that less attention should be paid to the definition 
of overriding rules, and greater attention given to the condition for their application in 
geographical terms, i.e. as rules that are applicable to any situation within their scope, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract.
185  
 
Article 9 attempts to limit the scope of application, and thus impact of such rules in a 
number of ways. In the first place, although it has been advanced that a wide 
categorisation of overriding mandatory rules can result from the definition, the existence 
of the definition may have a limiting effect. It has been considered
186 that the reference to 
rules deemed to be ‘crucial’ for safeguarding the public interest, and for maintaining the 
political, social and economic organisation of the state may restrain national courts from 
categorising national rules as overriding rules too easily. This could act to prevent 
significant derogations from the optional instrument as the applicable law.  
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The next limitation arises in Article 9 (3), which governs the application of overriding 
mandatory rules of third countries. It has been advanced that it is in this context that 
greater uncertainty has arisen for contracting parties as under Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Convention effect could be given to the overriding mandatory rules of any country with 
which the situation had a close connection. The result was that mandatory rules of several 
systems might have been applicable, and thus the parties could not identify which laws, 
other than the governing law and that of the forum, would apply to their contract.
187 It 
was on this basis, and in light of concern for the uncertainty and transactions costs which 
could arise from this situation that lead Member States to opt-out of Article 7 (1), and for 
the Commission to propose the inclusion of overriding mandatory rules within the 
optional instrument. These concern have, however, somewhat abated with the new 
Article 9 (3). This provides only for the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have 
to be or have been performed. Greater foreseeability is thus ensured for contracting 
parties, and preference is given to the law of the place of performance, which recognises 
that the performance obligation is central to the contract.
188 It is this Member State which 
has the necessary ‘close connection’ with a contract so as to have a legitimate interest in 
having its law applied.
189 
 
In a further limitation, Article 9 (3) provides that those overriding mandatory rules of the 
place of performance will only apply in so far as they render the performance of the 
contract unlawful. This provision reflects the fact that the applicability of third country 
mandatory rules has traditionally been concerned with situations of illegality, and 
particularly where that has been concerned with the performance of the contractual 
obligation.
190 Indeed, despite the reticence shown by the UK to Article 7 (1) of the Rome 
Convention, it is an established common law principle that the British court will not 
enforce contracts which are illegal according to the place of performance.
191 Unlawful, as 
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termed by Article 9 (3),
192 need not be interpreted so narrowly as to only include rules 
giving rise to criminal sanctions, and it is also understood to include any overriding 
mandatory rule which renders the contract, or a particular clause void or 
unenforceable.
193 Cases involving the application of third country overriding mandatory 
rules in this context have commonly concerned import and export restrictions. An 
example is the case of Foster v Driscoll,
194 which concerned a contract governed by 
English law to import alcohol into the United States at a time when it was prohibited, and 
which rendered the contract void.
195  
 
While uncertainty will continue for contracting parties in regard to the categorisation and 
thus identification of overriding mandatory rules, certainty will in fact be enhanced in 
regard to the application of third country rules with the clarified approach of Article 9 (3). 
To the extent that the new rule reflects the existing approach of national courts, however, 
the changes may not lead to a substantial reduction in the potential scope of application of 
such rules.
196 The presence of a definition and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
197 to 
interpret that may, however, mean that national courts will be less inclined to categorise 
rules as being overriding in any case. This is particularly with the guidance of Rome I 
that such rules shall only apply in exceptional circumstances.
198 On balance, therefore, 
the need to derogate from Article 9, where the optional instrument forms the governing 
law of the contract, may not be as great as assumed by the Commission in the 2004 
Communication.
199 
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It is also clear that difficulties may arise for the inclusion of such rules within the optional 
instrument in terms of their identification. A review of relevant literature refers only in 
the abstract to the type of rules and interests which fall to be considered under this 
category of rules,
200 and the difficulty lies in the subjective and discretionary approach to 
categorisation. Rules considered to fulfil the definition in Article 9 (1), owing to the 
nature of such rules, i.e. those regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, will not be static or homogeneous across the Member States. It is, therefore, 
also unlikely that consensus could be reached among the Member States as to the content 
of such rules, and thus for the optional instrument to comprehensively identify and 
regulate those interests and rules so that the Member States will give up their competence 
in this area.
201 This is evident from the way in which Member States have construed the 
scope of the provision in regard to public/private rules.   
 
The task of identifying overriding mandatory rules may, however, be easier in regard to 
those of EU origin, as it will be possible to draw upon the approach to categorisation in 
the case of Ingmar. In the first place, the rules of the acquis may in fact provide for their 
overriding nature, as was the case in Ingmar.
202 Overriding status may, however, also be 
attributed though consideration of the purpose served by the rule at issue.
203 The rule in 
Ingmar, while concerned in the first instance with the protection of the commercial agent 
as a weaker party, also sought to protect the freedom of establishment and the operation 
of undistorted competition in the internal market. The purpose of the rules at issue were 
thus inextricably linked to ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market, and 
thus served a clear public interest which is distinct of the EU legal system. The purpose 
of such rules, therefore, also clearly corresponds with the EU’s competence to harmonise 
private law rules, which is not a general competence but one to ensure the establishment 
                                                 
200 I.e. rules concerning import and export prohibitions, anti-trust laws and exchange regulations.  
201 A concern already expressed by Rutgers and Colombi Ciacchi in regard to consumer protection rules 
under Article 6, discussed below.  
202 The Commercial Agency Directive, at issue in the case, provides that a number of Articles cannot be 
derogated from, including an obligation on the principal to act in good faith, Article 5. It has already been 
discussed that the CRD provides for its mandatory nature in Article 43. Recital 59 extends the imperative 
nature of the Directive to where the law applicable to the contract is that of a third country, where all other 
elements relevant to the situation are at the time of the choice located in one or more Member States.  
203 Necessarily if the provision does not provide for its overriding status.    204 
and functioning of the internal market.
204 It could thus be envisaged that if a sector-
specific optional instrument were created to govern commercial agency agreements, then 
it could contain, and categorise as mandatory, those mandatory rules of the Commercial 
Agency Directive.  
 
It is not clear, however, that the EU would have competence to harmonise those 
overriding mandatory rules at the national level,
205 where they can be identified, and 
where the examples given go beyond the contractual and internal market scope and legal 
basis of the instrument.
206 For example, while import and export restrictions will 
constitute overriding mandatory rules in Member States and pose restrictions to the free 
movement of goods within the internal market, they have been regulated negatively by 
the EU and thus examined for their compatibility with the fundamental freedoms, rather 
than being harmonised.
207 Articles 34 and 35 TFEU thus prohibit restrictions of imports 
and exports, unless they can be justified on grounds provided in Article 36 TFEU, 
including public morality, public policy or public security. Where the restrictions are not 
directly discriminatory,
208 they can also be justified by reference to wider, non-
exhaustive, objective justifications which can be invoked by the Member States.
209 
Resulting restrictions must also comply with the principle of proportionality, and thus be 
suitable and not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the Member State’s 
objective in proposing the rule, i.e. not disproportionately restrict the fundamental 
freedom.  
 
The wider inference is thus that restrictions to the application of overriding mandatory 
rules already exist, as they can be examined by the Court of Justice for their compatibility 
with the EU fundamental freedoms.
210 This was the case in Arblade.
211 Here the Court 
                                                 
204 See, 6.2.  
205 I.e. beyond those implementing EU mandatory rules.  
206 For discussion of Article 352 TFEU as the legal basis, see 6.2.  
207 A positive form of integration.  
208 I.e. protectionist in their intent.  
209 In the area of goods the objective justifications are referred to as mandatory requirements. See Case 
120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, 
para 8. These may relate, for example, to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public 
health, the fairness of commercial transactions, and the defence of the consumer.  
210 See, Rutgers (2006), 204.   205
highlighted that national public order legislation is not exempt from compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaty.
212 While accepting that the protection of workers can constitute 
an overriding justification relating to the public interest, the Court undertook a rigorous 
review of the proportionality of the application of the rule.
213 Unjustified or 
disproportionate restrictions on the fundamental freedoms by the application of 
overriding mandatory rules will not, therefore, be tolerated.  
 
The approach of the Treaty and the Court in accepting justifications for such restrictions 
also recognises, however, the Member States interests in applying national mandatory 
rules which protect the national interests, and which are otherwise given effect to under 
Article 9 of Rome I. Given the nature of overriding mandatory rules, i.e. those seeking to 
protect the public interest, and the non-exhaustive approach that the Court has taken to 
objective justifications in regard to restrictions to the fundamental freedoms, it is clear 
that Member States and their national courts would have little difficulty in justifying the 
application of overriding national mandatory rules. Given that the object of the optional 
instrument is to facilitate trade in the internal market, the more significant issue will be 
that of proportionality. The issue will be whether the application of the national 
mandatory rule goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the end sought by the Member 
State, in terms of restricting free movement. With the application of national mandatory 
rules being reviewed for compatibility with the Treaty fundamental freedoms it could 
then be anticipated that the categorisation of Article 9 rules by national courts will take 
on an objective element.
214 The national court would thus have to ask whether the 
application of the rule would pose a disproportionate interference with the fundamental 
freedoms. This would be particularly so now that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
over both the definition of Article 9(1), and can thus review national categorisation of 
rules in terms of that definition, and also over the review of restrictions to the 
fundamental freedoms. The Court can thus draw on the relationship between the two in 
                                                                                                                                                   
211 See, Bonomi (2008), 291.  
212 Arblade, para 31.  
213 Although the application of the principle of proportionality will ultimately be a question for the national 
court.  
214 See, Dickinson (20087), 67, who is in favour of the adoption of an objective approach to categorisation 
of overriding mandatory rules reflecting the approach of the Court concerning restrictions to the 
fundamental freedoms.     206 
terms of any potential disruption to the optional instrument as the applicable law from 
overriding mandatory rules. 
 
From the foregoing it is clear that it may be neither possible to comprehensively include 
overriding mandatory rules within an optional instrument, nor necessary, as their 
application can be reviewed. Indeed, neither PECL nor the DCFR seek to preclude the 
application of national overriding mandatory rules. Significantly, Article 1:103 (2) of 
PECL allows for effect to be given to those mandatory rules of national, supranational 
and international law which, according to the relevant rules of private international law, 
are applicable irrespective of the law governing the contract.
215 This provision is 
considered to apply to those overriding national mandatory rules which apply under 
Article 9 of Rome I.
216 As such, PECL, which like the optional instrument sought to 
create an independent legal order,
217 would take effect subject to overriding mandatory 
rules of both national and EU origin. This is confirmed by Article 15:102, which provides 
for the effects on a contract of an infringement of a mandatory rule applicable under 
Article 1:103. In the first instance, it provides that the effects will be those prescribed by 
the mandatory rule, in order to respect the provisions of the applicable law.
218 This 
provision can also be found in the DCFR II.-7:302. However, unlike PECL, the DCFR 
does not contain a provision akin to Article 1:103, and thus we are not to know the origin 
of mandatory rules which are infringed. If it is to be inferred from the scope of PECL, 
however, it would provide for the effects of infringement of mandatory rules of both EU 
and national origin.
219 It is thus implicit that the DCFR also takes effect subject to 
overriding mandatory rules, and that scope exists for the application of other sources of 
law within that system.  
                                                 
215 These are to be distinguished from those rules which may be rendered inapplicable by the parties choice 
of the principles as the governing law, i.e. domestic mandatory rules (Article 1:103(1)).  
216 At the time, Article 7 of the Rome Convention. See, MacQueen, Illegality and Immorality in Contracts: 
Towards European Principles (in) Towards a European Civil Code, Hartkamp et al. (eds.), 3
rd ed. 
Nijmegen: Kluwer Law International, 2004, 416.  
217 Ibid. 415.  
218 MacQueen (2004), 420.  
219 As Rutgers does infer. Rutgers, The DCFR, Public Policy, Mandatory Rules, and the Welfare State, (in)  
The Politics of the Draft Common Frame of Reference, Somma (ed.), The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009, 121.    207
It can be submitted that the optional instrument, like any governing law under the Rome I 
system, must similarly recognise the interest of other contractual systems in having their 
mandatory rules applied where Article 9 so prescribes. Indeed, the optional instrument 
will rely on the willingness of the Member States, and their national courts, to apply the 
instrument without undermining the objectives of the optional regime by applying their 
own mandatory rules. This is particularly so as not to undermine the derogation from 
Article 6. Allowing for the application of overriding mandatory rules where the optional 
instrument applies as the governing law will thus invoke considerations of comity, and 
encourage cooperation by national courts, including in the interpretation of Article 9 (1), 
so as not to undermine the objectives of the optional instrument.
220  
 
Mandatory rules, such as those in Ingmar,
221 which can be identified, particularly from 
within the EU acquis, must however be included within the optional instrument. 
Although, such rules can be categorised as being of an overriding nature, this designation 
within the optional instrument would not be necessary. It is not the intention that 
mandatory rules of the instrument would apply other than when it applies as the 
governing law of the contract, and therefore apply by virtue of Article 9.
222 The intention 
is the creation of an independent and autonomous contractual regime, and thus such rules 
should be included and categorised as mandatory so that parties will know with greater 
certainty
223 the mandatory rules that will apply to their contract, and reduce the need for 
the application of mandatory rules of other systems. The inclusion of mandatory rules, 
beyond those of consumer protection will, therefore, increase the utility of the instrument 
for those operating in the internal market.  
 
While the optional instrument remains subject to Article 9, there will be scope for the 
application of overriding mandatory rules of other Member States. Their application will, 
however, be subject to scrutiny for compatibility with the fundamental freedoms, and 
                                                 
220 I.e. keeping disruption by the applicability of national mandatory rules to a minimum.  
221 I.e. those which may seek to protect a weaker party, but which are inextricably linked to market 
integration and the proper functioning of the internal market.  
222 See discussion on Article 4 of Rome I, above.  
223 Although some uncertainty will remain, as Article 9 will still apply. Certainty will be significantly 
enhanced in B2C contracts with the derogation from Article 6.   208 
thus subject to justification and proportionality. Where the interests that the mandatory 
rule seeks to protect are already sufficiently protected by the optional instrument, the 
application of such rules would be disproportionate. This is clear from the judgement in 
Arblade, where the Court held that the application of the national public order rules at 
issue would not be justified nor proportionate where the public interest is already 
safeguarded by the law of the applicable Member State.
224 This could be formalised in the 
scope clause,
225 which governs the relationship between the two instruments,
226 so that 
Article 9 will only apply to matters which are not regulated by the optional instrument. 
This would explain the continued application of national overriding mandatory rules 
where the optional instrument applies as the governing law, subject to scrutiny in terms of 
compatibility with the fundamental freedoms, and with the definition in Article 9(1). It 
would also ensure the application of the mandatory rules of the optional instrument, 
which would provide certainty for contracting parties.  
 
The former scrutiny of the categorisation and application of overriding mandatory rules 
also presents a safeguard for the application of the mandatory consumer protection rules 
of the optional instrument. Attempts by national courts to apply national mandatory 
consumer rules would not be justified or proportionate, as the interests which they seek to 
protect will be adequately represented in the optional instrument. Indeed, while the 
optional instrument ensures a high level of consumer protection, and comprehensively 
includes rules of consumer protection present at the national level,
227 the need and 
incentive for Member States to categorise their consumer mandatory rules as Article 9 
type rules will be reduced in any case. The autonomous nature of the optional instrument 
can thus be ensured in this respect.  
 
                                                 
224 The case concerned the freedom to provide services. To the extent that the interests at issue were already 
protected by rules of  the Member State of establishment, and the defendants had already complied with 
these, it would be disproportionate to also require compliance with the rules of the state in which the 
service was being provided, para 80 (3).  
225 In addition to the full derogation from Article 6 of Rome I.  
226 Discussed in 6.3.1.  
227 Drawing in the first place on the common core of rules provided in the CRD, which means that the risk 
of conflict between the mandatory consumer rules of the Member States, and those of the optional 
instrument is significantly reduced.    209
It has, therefore, been maintained that the applicability of the optional instrument can be 
ensured within the Rome I system as a directly applicable contractual regime, which will 
co-exist alongside national contract law as a 2
nd domestic system. It has further been 
shown that it would be possible for the optional instrument to exist to a great degree 
autonomously from the national systems, and thus to create the simplified regulatory 
environment required by contracting parties in the internal market. In order to ensure the 
applicability of the optional instrument, however, it would also be necessary to exclude 
the application of the CISG. This applies as part of the wider regulatory framework in the 
B2B context, and in light of potential overlap in subject matter between the two 
instruments potential for conflict exists. It would be possible to exclude the application of 
the instrument as while that is opt-out in nature,
228 the optional instrument should be opt-
in. It will be for the parties, therefore, to tacitly exclude the application of the CISG 
through the choice of the optional instrument as the governing law. This is provided for 
in Article 6 of the CISG.
229 
 
 
6.4. The Optional Instrument as a Tool for SMEs  
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that an optional instrument provides a suitable and 
desirable response to the obstacles for cross-border trade arising from the existing state of 
European contract law. It would create the simplified regulatory environment required in 
the internal market for the benefit of both B(SME)2B(SME) and B(SME)2C transactions. 
As an optional regime it would provide the parties with a neutral, non-national system of 
law, adapted to cross-border trade and, therefore, overcome the inadequacies of trade 
regulation in the internal market. These attributes mean that optional instruments could be 
particularly useful for SMEs because of their capped capabilities to trade currently in the 
internal market. Support thus exists for the creation of such instrument(s) which are 
particularly attuned to the needs of this group.  
                                                 
228 As a result of which parties who fail to make a choice of law become unwittingly subject to the 
(unknown) provisions of the CISG. This is particularly SMEs.  
229 2004 Communication, 21.    210 
To this end, the creation of an optional instrument which would create the regulatory 
framework for the most common commercial and consumer transactions, those of sales 
and services, would be beneficial.
230 This would be the first of a number of vertical 
instruments governing specific contracts which, drawing on the existing scope of the 
DCFR, could include distribution, lease, franchise etc. In terms of the content of this 
instrument it could draw on Book IV of the DCFR which provides specific rules for 
contracts of sale and for the provision of services.
231 The instrument would then include, 
and comprehensively regulate, general contract law throughout the life cycle of the 
contract, drawing on the content of the DCFR.
232 Such an extensive instrument in these 
terms is necessary if the optional instrument is to provide a sufficient lex causae under 
Rome I where chosen as the applicable law
233 and if it is not to result in regulatory gaps. 
The need to refer to national law would undermine the intended autonomous nature and 
utility of the optional instrument, which would then be subject to similar limitations of 
the CISG. For example, while the latter instrument governs the contract of sale and the 
rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from such a contract,
234 it does not 
concern itself with the validity of the contract.  
 
With the motivation to create an autonomous contractual framework it would also be 
desirable to include related, but non-contractual, issues which commonly arise. For 
example, it would not be sufficient to provide harmonised rules on sale and not on the 
effect of those rules on the transfer of property. The existing divergence between national 
property law on this matter would remain and be exacerbated in light of the 
harmonisation of the contractual rules. This would justify their inclusion within the 
optional instrument. Another issue that would commonly arise is the effects in restitution 
of withdrawing from a contract and this should also be regulated within the instrument.
235 
                                                 
230 As sales and services are often the subject of mixed contracts, it is suggested in order to enhance 
certainty and avoid the risk of regulatory lacunae, that they should form one instrument. As is the intended 
approach of the CRD.  
231 Parts A and C respectively.  
232 Books II and III, see discussion in Chapter 4, 4.2.2. It being intended in any case that the political CFR 
will comprehensively include rules of general contract law alongside the consumer provisions, 4.2.3.  
233 This being a parameter of the content of the instrument, discussed in 6.3.1.  
234 Article 4 CISG.  
235 As in the case of both the proposed CRD (Articles 16 and 17), and the DCFR Outline Edition (2009), 
III.-3:510.    211
It has been highlighted that competence would exist under Article 352 TFEU to enact a 
comprehensive contractual instrument. This could support sector-specific instruments, at 
least those of importance to the internal market, which would be accompanied by 
provisions outside of the contractual scope of the optional instrument where their 
inclusion would facilitate the functioning of the internal market. Indeed, as the proposal 
for an optional instrument is narrowed to govern several specific contracts, the need to 
include within the instruments related rules from outside of the contractual scope will 
increase, along with the competence to harmonise such rules on this basis.
236  
 
The foregoing will form the minimum content of the optional instrument for both B2B 
and B2C contracts. A significant addition will then be harmonised rules of consumer 
contract law
237 and in this regard consistency must be ensured between the fully 
harmonised provisions of the CRD and those of the optional instrument within the shared 
scope.
238 The instrument should reflect a structural division in this respect between the 
rules applicable to B2B contracts and those which will apply only to B2C contracts. The 
division should be clear to the instruments’ intended users, i.e. lawyers, but also 
significantly businesses, consumer advisors, and consumers themselves.
239 It is clear that 
in creating an instrument attuned to the needs of SMEs in particular, who will have 
limited resources to receive legal advice, that a clearly structured and comprehensible 
instrument must result. The DCFR thus presently provides for distinct consumer rules 
within the general structure of the instrument
240 so that, for example, the pre-contractual 
duty of disclosure in B2C contracts is clearly distinguished from and follows the duty 
owed in B2B contracts.
241 Concerns in regard to the utility of the DCFR to otherwise 
serve as the basis of the optional instrument have, however, been discussed in chapter 4. 
In particular, it is clear in regard to the placing of contract rules within the wider 
                                                 
236 I.e. If the intention is to create autonomous instruments governing the whole relationship.  
237 Containing all consumer protection required by EU law (discussed below), along with general rules of 
contract law, the optional instrument would solve 99% of the cases likely to arise, Beale (2008), 15.  
238 The need for consistency has been highlighted in 6.3, and consideration is given to how this is to be 
achieved in 6.4.2.  
239 Beale (2009), highlights, however, the difficulty in drafting provisions that will be understandable to 
even the majority of consumers, 299.  
240 I.e. we do not see the enactment of such provisions in their own code or section, but rather they form 
qualifications of the general law, see Whittaker (2009), 628-9.  
241 With distinct provisions and approaches, see discussion in Chapter 4, 4.2.2.    212 
categories of juridical acts and of obligations,
242 that such distinctions will not prove 
necessary, nor user friendly in a contractual instrument. This structural division of the 
DCFR should not therefore appear in the optional instrument.
243 
 
The inclusion within the optional instrument of consumer protection rules considered as 
mandatory in the Member States, together with the derogation from Article 6 of Rome I, 
overcomes a significant obstacle to cross-border trade in the B2C context. It thus forms a 
significant incentive for all businesses wishing to engage in cross-border contracting, but 
in particular SMEs who are not well placed to deal with differences between such 
rules,
244 to opt-in to the optional regime. The incentive for consumers to opt-in to the 
instrument is less clear. This is particularly as they will loose the protection of the 
mandatory rules of their habitual residence and further concerns will arise for consumer 
protection as the optional instrument will harmonise such rules on a full harmonisation 
basis. While SMEs have much to gain therefore from the creation of a simplified 
regulatory environment, the risk is that, like the CRD proposal, the result may well be a 
business driven instrument.
245 Concerns in regard to consumer protection can, however, 
be overcome if a high level of consumer protection is sought. Consumer will then stand 
to benefit under the optional instrument from welfare gains That is to say, the availability 
of the optional regime should lead to greater willingness by businesses to engage in 
cross-border trade, and thus result in greater competition between suppliers, in more 
choice, and better prices. Further consideration must however be given to the optional 
instrument in the B(SME)2C context to assess the extent to which the intended benefits 
of the regime will be realised.
246  
 
If an optional instrument is to facilitate trade by SMEs, however, it must also address 
potential imbalances that arise with their contracting partners. It will be necessary for the 
instrument to also introduce protective provisions in favour of the (weaker) SME. The 
instrument could, for example, in line with the approach of the DCFR, protect this group 
                                                 
242 See further, Whittaker (2009), 628.  
243 Discussed in 4.2.2.  
244 Unlike large businesses.  
245 See discussion in regard to the CRD in Chapter 4, 4.1.3, and further discussion in 6.4.2.  
246 Considered further in 6.4.2.    213
by extending marketing and pre-contractual duties to B2B relations, and by controlling 
the substantive fairness of standard terms which can often be imposed on the weaker 
party as a result of the imbalance.
247  
 
The result may, however, be that large businesses will be reluctant to subject their 
dealings to what may pose an unfamiliar
248 and uncertain law,
249 which seeks to limit 
their contractual freedom even in the B2B context. The implication is that SMEs will not 
benefit from the rebalance in contractual position that the instrument seeks to achieve, or 
the wider benefits that it intends to bestow.
250 This concern should not, however, be 
overstated. There is a clear incentive for SMEs to opt-in to the instrument while 
contracting with each other,
251 and while this group accounts for 99% of businesses in 
Europe there is still considerable scope for the optional instrument to govern a significant 
number of transactions in this context. However, given that the definition of SMEs is 
wide,
252 imbalance in respective contractual bargaining positions will exist even within 
this category. It must also be accepted, therefore, that even within the SME group not all 
will need or wish to be subject to the protective regime.
253 The issue arises, therefore, of 
how businesses can be persuaded to use the optional instruments between themselves 
even if one of them is a large(r) business.  
 
In cases of unequal bargaining power businesses can often offer their standard contract 
terms, including their choice of law, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, as it will often be more 
cost efficient to do so.
254  In this situation it may be open to the weaker party to shop 
                                                 
247 How protection is to be afforded to SMEs is considered further in 6.4.1.  
248 Although concerns with regard to unfamiliarity should not be seen as a good reason for not going 
forward with the adoption of such instruments.  With use businesses will become familiar, and there are 
clear incentives for businesses to utilise such instruments, discussed further below.  
249 See, Heiss and Downes (2005), 697.  
250 For example, enabling the use of EU-wide standard contract terms.  
251 I.e. parties of the same bargaining position who can benefit from the neutrality of the instrument.  
252 Discussed below in 6.4.1.  
253 As either the weaker or stronger party respectively.   
254 This forms the premise for the use of such contracts. See generally, Beale, Bishop and Furmston, 
Contract: Cases and Materials (4
th ed.), London: Butterworths, 2001, Chapter 38, Standard form contracts, 
and Chapter 5, 5.2.1.1.     214 
around for more favourable terms,
255 but they may still find themselves bound to accept 
the governing law of the standard contract for a variety of reasons.
256 For example, the 
choice of the optional instrument as the governing law may not exist in the particular 
market as competitors use the same standard contract terms, there may not be another 
supplier of the goods or services, or the weaker party not wish to loose what would be a 
lucrative contract and thus they are left with little choice but to accept the choice of law. 
The alternative is, however, that they pay for the protection of the optional instrument.
257 
Schwartz contends that most buyers will be able to avoid any one term if they concentrate 
their entire resources on doing so.
258 However, the stronger party may still be unwilling 
to negotiate the contract as the cost of doing so and any new risk undertaken by them as a 
result of the change in governing law, including that arising from the limitation of 
contractual freedom, may exceed the gains of the entering into the contract.
259 The effect 
of a change in the governing law for that party would be significantly different to the 
removal of a single, self-contained disclaimer for non-conformity, for example.
260 Opting 
into the optional instrument may well have an effect on the standard contract terms as 
they stand, however, such effects will be unknown at an early stage. The weaker party 
may also be left unable or unwilling to pay as the cost of avoiding a term will often be 
more than the value of the risk it represents. It will reflect the cost to the business of 
having to make two types of contracts, for example, one governed by the optional 
instrument and one governed by the stronger party’s preferred choice of law.
261 
 
Enjoying the protection and benefits of the optional instrument should not however come 
at an excessive price. It may only take a margin of buyers to shop around for more 
                                                 
255 This possibility is highlighted by Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2
nd ed), 85, in Beale et al. (2001), 
952.  
256 See further, Trebilcock, An economic approach to unconscionability (in) Studies in Contract law (Reiter 
and Swan eds.), in Beale et al. (2001), 954.  
257 As the supplier, the SME may have to accept a reduction in the contract price that the other (stronger) 
party is willing to pay to reflect the risk that they undertake where the contract is governed by the optional 
instrument.  
258 Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process (1974) 49 (3) Indiana Law Journal 
367, 371.  
259 Ibid, 372-3. 
260 The example used by Schwartz. The calculation of the cost of removal would be more straightforward in 
that example.  
261 Schwartz (1974), 373.    215
favourable terms in a workably competitive market to put pressure on suppliers to adjust 
their terms or else risk loosing customers to their competitors.
262 Thus if enough SMEs 
were to ask for the optional instrument to act as the governing law of the contract, and 
were willing to pay for greater protection initially,
263 then this may bring about a greater 
willingness by large businesses to contract on this basis.
264 Indeed, incentive may soon 
exist for larger businesses to have all contracts governed by the optional instrument in 
order to save the cost of offering a number of different contracts on this basis and thus to 
enjoy the economies of the standard form contract. This will depend, however, on there 
being a sufficient amount of demand and therefore on SMEs being aware of the 
availability and benefits of the optional regime as the governing law of their contracts.
265 
 
It is clear from the outset, therefore, and as intended, that it is SMEs who stand to benefit 
the most from the availability of the optional instrument in both the B2C and B2B 
context. Large businesses have little need for such an instrument, and while it may be 
possible to persuade such businesses
266 to opt-in to the optional instrument in the B2B 
context, this may come at a price. It is also clear that while the optional regime will limit 
the contractual freedom of such parties, they will seek certainty and predictability in the 
approach that the instrument takes to protecting the SME, and thus to any new risks that 
they undertake towards the weaker party where they opt-in to the instrument. Further 
consideration must therefore be given to how protection is to be extended to SMEs under 
the optional regime, and thus to how a balance is to be achieved between these competing 
interests.
267  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
262 Trebilcock, in Beale et al. (2001), 954-5.  
263 Although not an excessive amount.  
264 In these terms also see Schwartz (1974), 373.  
265 In this regard see further the related discussion on the need for consumers to also be aware of the 
availability and benefits of the optional regime, 6.4.2.  
266 Including those SMEs who do not need or desire such protection.  
267 Already touched upon in the context of the discussion of the DCFR in Chapter 4, 4.2.2.    216 
6.4.1. B(SME)2B(SME) 
 
The most straightforward approach to the protection of SMEs would see the extension of 
EU consumer protection provisions to all SMEs in B2B contracts. This approach gains 
support to the extent that it treats like situations alike, on the basis that the SME is in an 
analogous position to the consumer, and would benefit from the same protection.
268 The 
need to extend protective measures to SMEs, by analogy with consumers, has been 
considered by the Commission
269as a regulatory response to the existing imbalance. 
However, as SMEs account for 99% of all businesses in Europe, this would amount to a 
fundamental policy change in this area
270 and it is unlikely that such a categorical 
approach to protection is justified. It would result in the overprotection of those who 
although within the definition of ‘SME’ do not need or may not want such protection. 
The SME will not always be as vulnerable as the consumer.  
 
A slightly more restrictive approach would be to extend protection only where the SME 
is contracting with a larger business and not to SME2SME contracts. Alternatively, it 
could be extended only when dealing with a small business within the definition of 
‘SME’, and thus would include SME2SME contracts, but only where a presumed 
imbalance in bargaining positions is present. This approach was proposed by the Law 
Commissions of England and Scotland in seeking to extend the consumer controls over 
unfair terms to contracts between businesses and small SMEs.
271 The latter group was 
defined as being of 9 or fewer employees, in accordance with the Commission’s 
definition of micro-enterprises.
272 In doing so the proposal sought to protect the least 
sophisticated businesses, which are so small that they are unlikely to have expertise in 
                                                 
268 Hesselink, SMEs in European Contract Law, (2007), 14.  
269 See discussion in 6.2. 
270 Protective SME rules would become the norm with there being a separate non-protective regime as the 
exception for contracts between large businesses.  
271 Law Commissions’ Final Report on Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com no 292, Scot Law Com no 
1999), 2005.  
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contracting or the resources to seek legal advice. They were thus presumed to be in a very 
similar position to consumers.
 273  
 
While this approach is intended to provide businesses with certainty and predictability as 
to when protective provisions will apply,
274 and would appear to offer a narrower 
approach than extending protection to all SMEs, it would in fact have a more uncertain 
and wide impact than that. In the first place, it was conceded that it would not always be 
straightforward to determine the size of a business, and that some businesses would 
approach contracts uncertain of whether they were dealing with a small business.
275 It in 
then the case that 92% of businesses within the EU
276 are classified as micro-
enterprises.
277 The extension of protection to this group would thus amount to a 
significant limitation on contractual freedom which is not apparent from the rule, and 
which again would not be justified.  
 
The problem for such an approach lies in the arbitrary fashion in which SMEs are 
distinguished from other businesses. Currently, the European Commission defines SMEs 
as ‘enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover 
not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
43 million.’
278 As has been seen, however, this definition can be further broken down into 
micro (less than 10 employees), small (between 10 and 50 employees), and medium-sized 
(between 50 and 250 employees) businesses, and can cover many different types of 
businesses, i.e. from self-employed persons and family businesses to companies financed 
by venture capital, and from craft to high-tech companies.
279 In extending protection to 
SMEs, and particularly in deciphering which ones, it is again clear that categorical 
                                                 
273 Law Commission Report (2005), para 5.35. The report confirmed the limited capabilities of small SMEs 
to trade effectively and safely even in a domestic setting.  
274 Ibid. para 5.37.  
275 Law Commission Report (2005), para 5.47.  
276 94% within the UK. Ibid. para 5.14.  
277  European SMEs under Pressure, Annual Report on European Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
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278 Commission Recommendation (2003), Annex, Article 2, Para 1. 
279 Hesselink, SME’s in European Contract Law, (2007), 4.    218 
protection, based on the number of employees or annual turnover,
280 will lead to arbitrary 
results. While a business with 9 employees would attract protection, a business with 11 
employees would not.
281 It may be the case that a business with more employees will be 
in greater need of protection than a smaller one and, as already highlighted, businesses 
falling with the category of protection may not in fact need or desire the protection of 
such a regime. The Law Commissions’ proposal acknowledged this fact with a number of 
exceptions. The proposal sought to exclude those businesses from protection which, 
although satisfying the size criterion, were felt to operate in such a sophisticated 
environment that it would not be appropriate for them to be treated as small businesses, 
or the contract was one which fell into a field which was already sufficiently regulated in 
order to prevent overregulation.
282 While such exceptions would become necessary with a 
categorical approach, it is clear that certainty and predictability would be further 
undermined.
283 Ultimately, while a categorical approach to protection would not reflect 
the realities of the current situation, nor greatly ensure certainty or predictability in the 
protection regime, it does not pose an appropriate approach for the optional instrument.  
 
A better approach would, therefore, not seek to limit the protective provisions of the 
optional instrument to particular categories of SMEs. In this respect, it has already been 
highlighted
284 that the DCFR provides an appropriate solution, through its combined use 
of general principles and objective standards,
285 and the generalisation of the acquis 
provisions to B2B contracts. The intention behind doing so was seemingly to protect 
SMEs in cases of inequality of information and bargaining power
286 and the result is a 
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more balanced approach which is attuned to the needs of this group.
287 An example of the 
DCFR's approach, already encountered,
288 is the creation of a pre-contractual duty of 
disclosure on businesses, to provide such information concerning goods and services as 
the other party can reasonably expect.
289 In assessing what information the other party 
can reasonably expect to be disclosed in B2B contracts, what is deemed to be reasonable 
is judged against an objective standard of good commercial practice.
290 In this way the 
test of ‘reasonableness’ is narrowed, so some direction is given as to what should be 
considered in the assessment and application of this open norm. At the same time, the 
decision on whether this standard has been met should entail subjective consideration of 
factors such as the parties’ relative experience, the available information and their 
respective bargaining positions. In this way, the term ‘reasonableness’ provides a flexible 
means by which to achieve a fair and just balance between the parties’ interests according 
to the circumstances.
291  
 
Similar concerns however arise for the use of such an approach, as those in regard to the 
proposals for categorical protection.
292 In the first place, while the duty of disclosure is 
extended to all B2B transactions, this implies a significant limitation on contractual 
freedom in the commercial context, and thus a significant extension of protection. The 
advantage of this approach is, however, that it should reflect the reality of the situation 
between the parties. Thus unlike the categorical approaches, the result should be that only 
those SMEs requiring protection will receive it.
293 It is also clear that the intention behind 
the use of such an approach is not to limit contractual freedom.
294 The DCFR clearly 
                                                 
287 Evidence of Vogenauer to the House of Lords EU Committee (2009), Q. 43, as well as being more 
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distinguishes in the application of the standards of protection which it applies to B2B and 
B2C contracts, with a higher threshold put in place for a breach to be found in 
commercial transactions.
295  
 
This distinction can be seen, for example, in the way in which the DCFR regulates unfair 
terms, which is another area that warrants greater protection of the weaker party where 
inequality in their bargaining position exists with their contracting partner.
296 In the case 
of B2C contracts a term is to be regarded as unfair if it is supplied by the business and it 
significantly disadvantages the consumer, contrary to good faith and fair dealing.
297 A 
higher threshold for intervention with the substance of the contract is, however, put in 
place for the regulation of standard terms in commercial contracts. In this context, a term 
is deemed to be unfair if it forms part of the standard terms supplied by one party and its 
use is such as to grossly deviate from good commercial practice, contrary to good faith 
and fair dealing.
298 Thus once again we see the use of the objective standard of good 
commercial practice, but the need for the use of the standard term to ‘grossly’ deviate 
from this standard further narrows the opportunity for intervention in the parties contract 
vis-à-vis the B2C context. In this way the DCFR takes a more cautious approach to 
protecting the weaker party in cases of inequality of bargaining power than we would see 
in the B2C context
299 as this is balanced with the need to preserve freedom of contract.
300 
 
The second concern that arises, however, is that this balance is achieved at the expense of 
certainty and predictability, which would be undermined by the DCFR’s approach.
301 In 
the first place, therefore, the protective provisions would apply in principle to all B2B 
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contracts, and uncertainty would also arise from the use of objective standards.
302 Both 
features are, however, also advantages of the approach. It has been demonstrated that 
approaches which seek to categorise and thus limit those SMEs who would fall within the 
protective scope of such measures provide little more certainty or transparency for 
businesses as to when protection will be extended. It is also clear that while they extend 
consumer protection to large groups of SMEs it amounts to a significant and often 
unjustified limitation on contractual freedom in the B2B context.  
 
It is clear that on balance, therefore, the current approach of the DCFR presents the most 
appropriate way forward for extending protection to SMEs, and it does so within 
acceptable parameters for those larger businesses which will become subject to the 
protective regime. While the inclusion of general principles and objective standards can 
provide the necessary flexibility to achieve a fair contractual balance in the specific 
circumstances of the case, the potential uncertainty that may arise should not be 
overstated nor justify not pursuing this approach. Experience in Member States, including 
Germany and France, has in fact shown that the lack of formal legal certainty in the 
approach is largely compensated for by substantive foreseeability.
303 Ultimately, larger 
parties will know that protection will be provided to the weaker party in unbalanced 
contractual situations but that, in cases of more or less equal bargaining positions, their 
contractual relationships will be unaffected.
304  
 
6.4.2. B(SME)2C: The ‘Blue Button’ 
 
In the B2C context, one manifestation of the optional instrument that is proposed is the 
‘blue button’, in the context of internet shopping.
305  Here, as an alternative to contracting 
under the law of the consumer’s habitual residence, the business can highlight the 
availability on their website of contracting under the optional contractual regime. This 
would be symbolized by a ‘blue button’ which is envisaged as a European flag. By 
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clicking on it, the consumer would agree that their contract will be governed by European 
sales law and this would lead to the retailer’s EU-wide standard terms and conditions,
306  
including a choice of law clause for the optional instrument. It should be highlighted that 
the ‘blue button’ is not distinct from the optional instrument in the B2B context, it is 
merely one manifestation and a means by which to make the availability and benefits of 
the optional system visible to the consumer.
307    
 
E-Commerce is the principal form of distance sales
308 within the internal market with 
51% of EU traders engaged in internet-based sales.
309. It is relatively uncommon, 
however, for consumers to purchase good or services in another Member States via the 
internet and, while in 2008 the number of consumers buying at least one item over the 
internet was 33%, the number of cross-border sales via this medium accounted for only 
7%.
310 At the same time, only 21% of those retailers selling via the internet are currently 
conducting cross-border transactions.
311 A tangible gap between domestic and cross-
border internet-based sales therefore exists.
312 The problem for e-commerce as a cross-
border retail channel, and thus the reluctance of both groups, is the model example of the 
established internal market hypothesis. It can thus be explained in terms of a lack of 
consumer confidence in cross-border transactions and unwillingness on the part of 
businesses to provide goods and services to consumer in other Member States. Since 
consumers are not taking full advantage of the opportunity to shop online in other 
Member States
313 and businesses are not fully exploiting this retail channel in the cross-
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border context,
314 some form of action is needed to improve the regulatory environment 
and make it more conducive to such trade.
315 The area of internet sales is, therefore, an 
apt context for trialling the utility of an optional instrument in this context.  
 
Presently, the CRD is presented as the response to such problems.
316 It intends to 
decrease the existing fragmentation, simplify the regulatory framework, and increase 
consumer confidence through a high common level of consumer protection.
317 It has been 
seen, however, that the CRD proposal fails to fully satisfy these objectives
318 and that in 
regulatory terms they may be better realised by the adoption of optional instruments of 
European Contract law. More specifically, in the context of B(SME)2C transactions, and 
as the first instrument, one in the form of a ‘blue button’ applicable in the e-commerce 
context.
319 Unlike the CRD, the optional instrument can provide the single, directly 
applicable and complete regulatory framework that is required for trade in the internal 
market. This framework would not be dependant on other sources of law and thus subject 
to the same problems of multi-level governance that have plagued EU regulation of such 
issues to date
320  and which would persist under the CRD proposal.
321  
 
A particular limitation of the CRD as the regulatory response is its limited scope and 
targeted nature. This has already been discussed in terms of the relationship that exists 
between the CRD and the sector-specific acquis, in Chapter 4. It also, however, leaves 
many important issues outside of its scope, which also fall outside of the scope of the 
acquis.
322 Such issues will be regulated totally or partially by national law, upon which 
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the CRD is dependant in its application. A clear shortcoming of the proposal in this 
respect is that it fails to spell out adequately the consumer’s remedies. For example, while 
the proposal lays down specific and detailed information duties, the consequences of 
breach of these duties is to be determined in accordance with the applicable national law, 
and Member States are to provide for effective contract law remedies.
323 The proposal is, 
therefore, dependant upon the applicability of another source of law, which remains 
fragmented between Member States. In this respect, it has also been discussed that the 
remedies of the CRD for lack of conformity
324 will co-exist with national remedies in the 
creation of a dual regime, for example, with the immediate right to reject in UK law.
325  
 
This approach serves to undermine the move to full harmonisation that the proposal seeks 
to make.
326 The relationship that exists between the CRD and national law will, in the 
first place, cause great uncertainty for Member States.
327 For example, what remedy must 
the Member State provide to be considered an effective response in the case of breach of 
the information duties?
328 While the desire to limit interference
329 with the general 
contract law of the national systems may be welcomed from the perspective of preserving 
the national legal systems and regulatory autonomy, this is a further compromise made by 
the proposal.
330 The result is that it fails to provide the necessary certainty and 
simplification that is needed and thus fails to meet its objectives in this respect. It is 
advanced, therefore, that it would be better to remove the reference to national law and 
for the proposal to spell out what is required in detail.
331  
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325 Chapter 4, 4.1.3.  
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While businesses are intended to benefit from the move to full harmonisation under the 
CRD, it is clear that this will not the case.
332 Many of those rules outside of the scope of 
the CRD, owing to the B2C context, will be regarded as mandatory consumer protection 
rules within the meaning of Article 6 of Rome I, which the parties will not be free to 
derogate from.
333 The business directing their goods and services at consumers in other 
Member States will, therefore, continue to comply with the divergent mandatory laws of 
the Member State. The maintenance of the current situation in this respect means that the 
incentive to engage in cross-border B2C contracts will still not exist. In order to benefit 
from a full harmonisation regime, businesses will be better off opting into the 
comprehensive optional instrument, which will fully harmonise those mandatory rules of 
consumer protection which fall outside of the scope of the CRD. It is clear that for the 
consumer also, a good degree of uncertainty will remain under the CRD framework, 
where consumer remedies are part of that dual regime and will continue to be regulated at 
both the EU and national levels. This, together with the decision to implement the CRD 
in the form of a directive, which will allow Member States to give effect to its provisions 
in a piecemeal fashion across national law, means that the proposal will not result in a 
single and transparent statement of consumers’ rights. This will serve to undermine the 
confidence in European consumer law which the review of the acquis sought to create in 
consumers. An optional instrument, in the form of a regulation, and thus as a 
comprehensive, directly applicable statement of such rights, would clearly be a more 
appropriate way forward in these terms for both consumers and businesses.  
 
Where chosen as the applicable law of the contract, the parties can also overcome the 
fragmentation found at the EU level. Businesses will no longer be subject to diverging 
levels of consumer protection, because of the full harmonisation approach of the 
instrument. The optional instrument can also incorporate the inconsistent and fragmented 
acquis to be found currently in the sector-specific instruments within its horizontal 
framework. In this regard it has been shown that the (D)CFR, which could provide the 
basis of the optional instrument, offers a more suitable basis upon which to simplify and 
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rationalise the acquis than that which has been achieved under the CRD proposal.
334 It is 
questionable, therefore, whether it is desirable and necessary to advance with the much 
criticised CRD proposal while the objectives of action can be realised by optional 
instrument(s). In response, however, there are good reasons why both instruments must 
feature as part of the regulatory response.  
 
In the first place, those objectives can only be realised by the optional instrument where it 
chosen as the applicable law. While clear incentives exist for the parties to opt-in to the 
instrument, where this is not the case, fragmentation both at the EU and national levels 
will persist. It will, therefore, still be necessary to advance harmonisation on a horizontal 
and full basis to address the causes of fragmentation that exist within the acquis, and at 
the EU level. The need for the CRD thus remains, and the proposal now proceeds to this 
end.
335 If both proposals are to advance, however, and co-exist as two, fully harmonised 
instruments, drawing on the same sources, governing the same transaction, and 
originating with the same Directorate-General then coherence between the two regimes 
must be achieved.  Inconsistencies within their shared scope would cause a new source of 
fragmentation at the EU level which would not assist businesses or consumers.
336  
 
As to how coherence is to be achieved, as the adoption of the CRD will likely precede 
that of the optional instrument, the provisions of the CRD must be incorporated into the 
latter. This will be the case if the (D)CFR is to form the basis of the optional regime as 
the political CFR will itself now reflect the provisions of the CRD.
337 The result will be a 
common core of fully harmonised, mandatory
338 rules of consumer protection.  
 
Outside of the common core of rules, and in light of the limited scope of the CRD, there 
is still significant scope for the optional instrument to regulate, and as a source of that, for 
the (D)CFR to make an impact on the contractual framework, as the starting point for 
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rules and for political consideration. It has already been highlighted that the CRD leaves 
many important issues to be regulated by national law. As many of these rules will be 
considered mandatory in their Member States, in order to ensure the applicability of the 
mandatory rules of the optional instrument over national rules, in accordance with the 
derogation from Article 6 of Rome I, the optional instrument must regulate such rules 
comprehensively in order to adequately protect the consumer interests which are 
protected at the national level.
339 Such matters include
340 the position with negotiated 
terms, controls over price, general rules on validity, and many rules concerning 
remedies.
341 It is the ability of the optional instrument to, for example, spell out the 
consumer’s remedies fully, and thus to regulate contract law issues comprehensively 
beyond the scope of the CRD, that presents a real advantage of the optional instrument. 
This will allow the optional regime to exist independently of the national systems.  
 
The relationship with the CRD within the shared scope of the instruments, and for 
reasons of coherence already advanced, means that the CRD will be decisive in 
determining the level of consumer protection within the optional instrument.
342 This gives 
rise to concern, however, in light of earlier criticism made of the level of protection 
achieved under the CRD proposal, which sees the reduction and removal of important 
consumer rights within the regime. It has even been questioned whether the proposal 
meets the Treaty requirement of ensuring a high level of consumer protection to which it, 
and the optional instrument is bound.
343 The effect is that, at least within the shared scope 
of the instruments, and if action is not taken to address the level of protection in the CRD 
as a precursor also to that of an optional instrument, which would be desirable,
344 then 
consumers may well loose out under the optional instrument in terms of protection. This 
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has already been pointed out in regard to the CRD, which is considered to be a business 
driven instrument.
345 Such criticism will, however, often accompany a move to full 
harmonisation which removes Member States regulatory autonomy to maintain higher 
levels of protection, and thus risks current levels of protection enjoyed in the Member 
States. Howells & Schulze
346 thus question at a fundamental level, how a maximal 
harmonisation approach can enhance consumer confidence rather than minimum 
harmonisation set at a high level, as the latter may well be needed to give consumers 
confidence when buying in other Member States.
347   
 
Benefits, however, can arise for the optional instrument as a regulatory response because 
of its close relationship with the CRD. As the latter proposal would also represent 
consumer protection provisions at the national level, both businesses and consumers will 
be familiar with the core rights within the optional instrument. As such, unfamiliarity 
with the new contractual framework created under the optional instrument need not prove 
a significant reason for parties choosing not to opt into the instrument as the applicable 
law in this context. The relationship also means that the risk posed to the consumer of 
opting into the instrument is reduced. The concern that arose was that by opting into the 
optional regime, businesses could opt out of national consumer protection rules, which 
would potentially provide more consumer friendly rules on a minimum harmonisation 
basis than those under the optional instrument. As already explained,
348 however, this 
concern need not be overstated as national consumer law will already be fully harmonised 
within the scope of the CRD, and this will be reflected in the optional instrument. 
Acceptance and use of the optional instrument as the governing law is thus made easier 
with the adoption of the CRD, although opposition to the level of protection will remain 
in regard to the latter. 
 
It is outside of the shared scope of the instruments that the level of protection achieved by 
the optional instrument becomes more contentious, and where fresh concerns may arise in 
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regard to a loss of consumer protection or social dumping by the optional instrument.
349 It 
is clear therefore, and as already discussed,
350 that a high level of consumer protection 
must be achieved, alongside the comprehensive regulation of consumer issues 
commensurate with the national level. The initial source of the optional instruments’ rules 
outside of the scope of the CRD will be the DCFR. The level of protection achieved by 
these rules should, however, be assessed in light of corresponding national provisions of 
consumer protection. This will be necessary in order to ensure that a high level of 
protection is achieved and to avoid the critcism that arises in regard to the reduction and 
loss of protection caused by the CRD vis-à-vis the experience and level of protection 
currently afforded by Member States under a minimum harmonisation approach.
351  
 
It has, however, been advanced that businesses may not wish to opt–in to an optional 
instrument if the level of protection is too high, i.e. a higher level than would otherwise 
be applicable under national law,
352 and which thus protects their interests less.  It is 
clear, however, that this view overlooks the fact that businesses, who are more likely 
(than consumers) to be repeat players, will have much to gain from the possibility of 
having to deal with only one legal system in relation to all their contracts throughout 
Europe.
353 Such benefits,
354 and significantly the reduction in transaction costs, may 
result in a willingness by business stakeholders to accept a high level of protection. This 
will be necessary if consumers too are to agree to the use of the optional instrument, as if 
they, and their representatives, i.e. consumer associations, are not convinced by the 
adequacy of the level achieved by the instrument, it will fail to obtain their support. 
Ultimately, the consumer is free not to opt-in to the optional instrument, and would 
continue to benefit from the level of protection that they enjoy in their Member States
355 
                                                 
349 See discussion Ibid. In particular, reference to those concerns of Rutgers (2006).  
350 6.3.2.  
351 See, Howells and Schulze (2009), 25.  
352 See, for example, Lurger, 'The Common Frame of Reference/Optional Code and the various 
understandings of social justice in Europe', in: T. Wilhelmsson, E. Paunio, A. Pohjolainen (eds.), Private 
Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2007), 177 – 199. 
353 One standard contract, one legal department, etc. Hesselink (2008) Common Frame of Reference and 
Social Justice, Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2008/04, 3.  
354 Which would not be equally realised under the CRD.  
355 Although this will not be significantly different given the relationship between the optional instrument 
and the CRD, and thus national law.     230 
under private international law. The repercussion is, however, that they may loose the 
opportunity to buy a particular product at a more competitive price because businesses 
may refuse to contract under the law of their habitual residence which, even with the 
CRD, remains fragmented. The choice nevertheless exists for the consumer, and it is 
important, therefore, that they should be able to make an informed choice. They must be 
aware of both the benefits and the risks. This includes that by opting into the optional 
regime they are opting out of the mandatory rules of consumer protection which apply 
outside the scope of the CRD. This may, therefore, mean differences in terms of their 
protection, and this would need to be detailed locally. To this end, Beale has envisaged, 
for example, that local consumer organisations could arrange for automatic on-line advice 
to pop up as to the risks, if any, that the consumer will take by clicking on the ‘blue 
button’.
356 This could also make clear that the core of consumer protection in the optional 
instrument is that found in their national systems, and thus that they would be contracting 
under a contractual system that would be largely familiar. Then, that outside of that core, 
a high level of protection is sought, and as such there is little risk posed to the consumer 
by clicking on the ‘blue button’.  
 
Returning then to the ‘blue button’ proposal, a distinct feature of this is the visual 
availability of contracting under the optional instrument. With the optional regime 
maintaining a high level of consumer protection, this visibility could be central to 
enhancing consumer confidence and trust in cross-border E-transactions, which is 
presently undermined.
357 It could be envisaged that the use of the ‘blue button’ may come 
to influence consumers' choices and encourage them to purchase goods or services from 
businesses in other Member States. Brand recognition and the presence of national 
certification schemes have been demonstrated to influence consumer choice.
358 In 
particular, trust marks at the national level have been used successfully in order to assure 
                                                 
356 Beale (2009), 295.  
357 Similar effect could be achieved in other contexts of distance selling, such as catalogues and mail, where 
the extended use of trustmarks is also prevalent, see for example the Dutch Home-Shopping Association, 
Thuiswinkel.org, Gateway to Holland (2009), 29, on file with author.  
358 E- Commerce Report (2009), 12.    231
the consumer not only of the security of the transaction,
359 but also of the reliability of the 
trader.
360 However, although it has not been possible to achieve a sustainable trust mark 
at EU level,
361 it may be that the optional instrument could perform an analogous role to 
such schemes.  
 
The visual ‘blue button’ would identify to the consumer that the business, in offering to 
contract under the law of the optional instrument, will respect the rules and standards 
contained therein. Thus, similar to the codes of practice to which businesses sign up to 
with trustmarks and with similar effect, the consumer would be confident of the rules and 
the high level of protection that would apply.
362 Indeed, it has been highlighted that a lack 
of a well known trust mark or e-commerce label at EU level has worked against cross-
border selling.
363 The creation of an optional instrument in the form of a ‘blue button’ 
could, therefore, go some way to meeting an identified need in this context, increasing 
both consumer confidence and cross-border transactions, and thus further realising the 
objectives of action. Attainment of this outcome will, however, depend upon consumer 
recognition and awareness of the ‘blue button’: of what it represents, and the benefits that 
it provides. This could be aided by awareness campaigns and will require endorsement, 
both at the EU and national levels. Indeed, while the existing fragmentary state of the 
acquis has rendered it difficult to conduct consumer education campaigns at the European 
level, this would be possible with the fully harmonised optional instrument and its 
unambiguous statement of consumer rights.
364 Indeed, the need to publicise and promote 
the availability of the optional instrument applies equally to businesses and, in particular, 
                                                 
359 Ibid. The risk of fraud and thus unwilling to disclose card details on the internet is also a real concern in 
this context. When asked about the main reason for not wanting to buy via the internet product or service 
that is cheaper or better in another Member State, 31% gave the latter reason.  
360 For example, the Dutch Home- shopping Association (Thuiswinkel.org). 
361 E- Commerce Report (2009), 18.  
362 The ‘blue button’ will of course not be a ‘trustmark’. It will not involve features such as accreditation 
and monitoring in the traditional sense.  
363 Summary of Response of the European Consumer Centres (ECC’s), E- commerce report (2009), 54.  
364 The use of consumer awareness campaigns was considered as a policy option to overcome the negative 
effects of the fragmentary state of the acquis in the impact assessment accompanying the CRD proposal 
((PO2), 21), which identifies the need to provide consumers with adequate information about their rights 
and how to exercise them as an objective. CRD proposal (2008), 2.    232 
to SMEs if they are to benefit, and Member States could be required to take appropriate 
measures to promote awareness of this option among both groups.
 365 
 
6.5. Conclusion  
 
The optional instrument can provide the single, comprehensive, and directly applicable 
contractual framework that is required for trade in the internal market. Where chosen by 
the parties as the applicable law of their contract it can overcome the existing 
fragmentation at both the national and EU levels. It is clear in regard to the latter level 
that the proposal is capable of overcoming much of the criticism that is directed at the 
proposed CRD owing to its limited scope and targeted nature which sees the move to full 
harmonisation being undermined. The objectives of the CRD in this respect, and in the 
B2C context, can be better achieved by the optional instrument. This is due to its 
extended scope which can result in the comprehensive regulation of consumer rights on a 
full harmonisation basis, and it is this inclusion of mandatory rules which forms the 
principal benefit of the optional regime for businesses, and in particular SMEs, in this 
context. While the incentive for consumers to opt-in to such a regime is less clear, it is 
clear that, like businesses, they will be better off under the optional regime than under the 
CRD proposal. While businesses will benefit more significantly from the full 
harmonisation approach of the optional instrument, this will benefit consumers in terms 
of welfare gains. The optional instrument can also result in the single and transparent 
statement of consumer rights
366 which is needed by both groups, and while it should 
provide for a high level of consumer protection, it may act as a platform for enhancing 
consumer confidence in cross-border transactions.  
 
It has been maintained, however, that the CRD still has an essential role to play as part of 
the regulatory response. While it precedes the optional instrument on a full harmonisation 
basis, it is also an important precursor to that and facilitates the acceptance and use of the 
                                                 
365 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 November 2009, the 
“Citizen’s Rights” Directive, part of the telecoms reform package, discussed in 6.2.  While it allows SMEs 
to request consumer contracts for a telecoms contract, it requires that Member States should take 
appropriate measures to promote awareness amongst SMEs of this possibility, recital 21. 
366 Including all EU consumer rights.    233
optional regime. For coherence, therefore, the CRD will inform the development of the 
optional instrument. While the optional instrument derives benefits from its relationship 
with the CRD, it will also be subject to the limitations and criticisms of the latter 
proposal. Those limitations have been discussed in this chapter in regard to the level of 
consumer protection secured under the CRD, and as part of a wider discussion of the 
proposal in Chapter 4. The relationship with the CRD may, therefore, also impact 
negatively upon the optional instrument within the shared scope, and on the extent to 
which the intended benefits of the optional regime can be realised. This is unless the 
limitations of the CRD are not first addressed.
367  
 
Beyond that, and in the B2B context, the optional instrument continues to offer an 
attractive regulatory option. With the need to create an optional instrument particularly 
attuned to the needs of SMEs it has been maintained that the instrument must address the 
imbalance that can exist when small and inexperienced market actors seek to contract 
with larger businesses. The inclusion of protective measures to this end will thus make 
the instrument particularly useful for this group, who stand to gain most from the optional 
regime. While larger businesses are not in need of the envisaged instrument in either the 
B2B or B2C context, it is clear that the availability of the optional instrument can still be 
to the significant benefit of the wider business group
368 and to consumers as part of an all 
round response to the obstacles faced by both groups at the national and EU levels. It has 
further been shown to be a desirable regulatory solution which, owing to its optional 
nature, allows for the wider issues and objectives that impact upon the harmonisation 
debate, and the suitability of the way forward in those terms to be satisfied, within a 
contractual framework which first and foremost seeks to overcome obstacles to cross-
border trade arising from the current state of European contract law. It is understandable, 
therefore, that the adoption of such instruments is regaining significance on the political 
agenda. Moving forward, there is a very strong case for pursuing this regulatory proposal.  
                                                 
367 Necessary future action is discussed in Chapter 7.   
368 With SMEs forming the vast majority of that.    234   235
Chapter 7 
 
 
This Way Forward 
 
 
In order to overcome obstacles to cross-border trade arising from the present divergent 
and fragmentary state of European contract law, the European Commission advanced 
three proposals for future action. As a response to obstacles at the European level, the 
Commission proposed the review of the acquis communautaire, which has resulted in a 
proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive, and the creation of a Common Frame of 
Reference. At the national level, the Commission has continued to pursue the idea of a 
harmonised instrument of European contract law in order to overcome the divergence in 
national contract systems, through the proposal to adopt optional instrument(s) of 
European contract law.  The most appropriate way forward for European contract law, on 
the basis of these proposals, has been determined by an assessment of the suitability and 
desirability of the respective proposals and progress to date.  
 
The optional instrument has been shown to be the most suitable and desirable regulatory 
response. An optional instrument can provide the single, comprehensive and directly 
applicable legal framework necessary for cross-border
1 transactions in the internal 
market. Drawing on the content of the (D)CFR, an extensive contractual instrument can 
be envisaged which would comprehensively regulate rules of general contract law in 
order to support the creation of sector-specific instruments. It would then be necessary for 
the instrument to govern related issues which arise outside of the contractual scope of the 
instrument.
2 The inclusion of such rules will be necessary in order to create an 
autonomous regulatory framework to govern entire contractual relationships, without the 
need to refer to divergent national rules.  
 
It has been demonstrated that the relationship that will exist between the optional 
instrument and European private international law will be integral to the achievement of 
                                                 
1 Although also capable of applying to domestic transactions or else fragmentation will continue in this 
respect, Chapter 6, 6.2. 
2 For example, rules on the passing of property, or the restitutionary effects of a party’s withdrawal from a 
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that independent framework. It has been maintained that effect should be given to the 
instrument within the system of Rome I as an express choice of a ‘2
nd’ domestic system 
under Article 3 Rome I. In order to maintain the autonomous nature of the instrument, 
however, the choice of the optional instrument must be accompanied by a derogation 
from Article 6 of Rome I, and from the application of the mandatory rules of the 
consumer’s habitual residence in B2C contracts. Such rules must be regulated 
comprehensively and adequately within the optional instrument to ensure their 
application over those of national law. While the inclusion of overriding mandatory rules 
within the optional instrument and derogation from Article 9 Rome I would further 
minimise disruption to the application of the instrument, it has been maintained that this 
may be neither possible nor necessary. Controls already exist to ensure that the 
application of the optional instrument, as the governing law, is not unduly undermined by 
the application of such rules.
3 The autonomous nature of the instrument can thus be 
realised.  
 
It is also clear that while the optional instrument can comprehensively and horizontally
4 
regulate B2C contracts on a full harmonisation basis, including harmonised mandatory 
rules of consumer protection,
5 it can overcome fragmentation at the EU level.
6 The 
proposal, therefore, provides two levels of regulatory response within one instrument, and 
ensures coherence between those levels of regulation. It would then be possible to treat a 
contract of sale, for example, between parties in different Member States as if they were 
contracting within a single state.  
 
While this aim was sought by the review of the acquis,
7 the resulting proposal for a CRD 
fails to achieve it. The proposal was presented as a compromise, because of what it 
sought to achieve, namely, full and binding harmonised rules on the consumer sale of 
                                                 
3 However, to the extent that rules of overriding mandatory nature, particularly those of EU origin, are 
included in the optional instrument, Article 9 will only apply to the extent that the national interest at issue 
is not already protected by the optional instrument, Chapter 6, 6.3.2.  
4 In comparison to the sector-specific approach of the existing acquis, which is continued in the CRD 
5 Including those of EU origin.  
6 Chapter 6, 6.4.2.  
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goods to replace national law on these issues.
8 Not only does this objective threaten 
Member State regulatory autonomy within the scope of the proposal, but contentiously, 
also the level and nature of consumer protection currently enjoyed in Member States. The 
result is an instrument of limited scope, which necessarily co-exists with the sector-
specific acquis and is dependant on the application of national contract law. The proposal, 
even with the continued vertical revision of the acquis and enhanced coherence at this 
level, does not adequately achieve its intended horizontal application, and cannot provide 
the certainty and simplification of the regulatory environment necessary to be presented 
as the regulatory solution and tool intended to facilitate trade in the internal market.  
 
This objective can be better achieved through the adoption of optional instruments, and it 
is clear that both businesses and consumers will be better off under the optional regime 
than under the proposed CRD. It is however SMEs, as intended, who have the most to 
gain from the availability of optional instruments. In the B2C context, therefore, it has 
been maintained that it is SMEs who will principally benefit from the harmonisation of 
consumer protection measures on a full harmonisation basis, and thus have the greatest 
incentive to opt-in. For consumers, however, while the move to full harmonisation and 
the derogation from the safeguard of Article 6 Rome I may serve to undermine 
confidence, a high level of protection must be sought by the optional instrument, and 
consumer rights must be regulated comprehensively. Then consumers stand to gain from 
the creation of a single and transparent statement of consumer rights. It is clear that both 
groups will benefit from the distinct ‘visibility’ of the proposal. First, they will benefit 
from the transparency and certainty created by the optional regime as a directly 
applicable, and thus single and complete contractual framework. As a result, businesses, 
in particular SMEs, will be more willing to supply goods and services to consumers in 
other Member States, and consumers, with enhanced confidence in cross-border 
transactions, will be more willing to buy goods from traders in other Member States. The 
visual ‘blue button’ will then highlight the ease and accessibility of cross-border 
contracting under the optional instrument for both groups.
9 It will no longer be the case 
                                                 
8 Chapter 5, 5.3.  
9 Chapter 6, 6.4.2.    238 
that transactions are perceived as more difficult simply because they are occurring across 
borders. Through the optional instrument, citizens will participate with greater ease and 
lower costs in cross-border transactions, and will then positively “see” the tangible 
benefits that the internal market has to offer.
10  
 
In the B2B context, it has been advanced that the utility of the optional instrument, one 
that is particularly attuned to the needs of the SME, will be greatly enhanced by the 
inclusion of protective provisions in order to readdress the contractual imbalance that can 
arise in this context. While this will result in limitations on contractual freedom in 
commercial dealings however, it is clear that there will be little incentive for larger 
parties in similar bargaining positions to opt-in to the instrument, and a reluctance on 
their part to become subject to the protective regime vis-à-vis the weaker party. The need 
to be protect SMEs must, therefore, be balanced against the need to preserve freedom of 
contract, and thus the approach taken must ensure that only those parties in need of 
protection receive it. The approach of the DCFR to protection in this respect presents the 
most appropriate way forward. The protection of the weaker party, and the realisation of 
other advantages in this context for SMEs may however, at least initially, come at a price 
before those benefits can be enjoyed in the longer term.  
 
In the wider debate too, the optional instrument has been shown to be a suitable and 
desirable regulatory form for the harmonisation of European contract law. From an 
economic perspective,
11 the proposed instrument utilises both centralised and 
decentralised regulation. Optional instruments thus have the distinct advantage of 
enhancing regulatory competition within the internal market, providing a valuable 
alternative governing law for businesses wishing to contract. At the same time, the 
addition of a 28
th contractual regime may also result in greater convergence between the 
national contractual systems: decreasing, incidentally, the divergence that currently acts 
as an obstacle to cross-border trade. A significant strength of the proposal is, therefore, 
that an influential contractual regime, attuned to the needs of cross-border trade in the 
                                                 
10 i.e. larger markets, with a more competitive supply of goods and services to the benefit of both 
businesses and consumers 
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internal market, can be created without jeopardising the existing national contract 
systems and their socio-cultural and political backgrounds.  
 
It is clear that the (D)CFR is capable of forming the foundation for the future regulatory 
approach to European contract law. The strength of the draft instrument lies in its ability 
to bring together the two debates that have been presented. It thus serves as a basis by 
which to overcome the identified obstacles to cross-border contracting at both the 
national and European levels, while ensuring that the issues and objectives involved in 
the wider debate as to the way forward come to the foreground.
12 In the first place 
therefore, and as highlighted, the comprehensive contractual framework created by the 
draft text, which successfully represents the political choices and balance between 
freedom of contract and social justice that need to be made in the creation of a 
harmonised European contractual system, means that the (D)CFR will serve as a suitable 
basis for optional instruments. The approach of the DCFR to the simplification and 
rationalisation of the consumer acquis, in order to offer a more horizontal and coherent 
approach, also means that it would serve as a good basis for the review of the acquis 
which would culminate in a horizontal instrument of European consumer contract law. In 
this way, and functioning in both intended roles, a coherent regulatory response can be 
achieved at the European level through the CFR.  
 
Developments mean, however, that the relationship between the proposals will not be 
entirely as originally envisaged. As the Commission now proceeds with the CRD as the 
result of the acquis review, before the adoption of a political CFR, coherence and 
consistency in the regulatory response is rather to be achieved through the CRD, which 
will form the basis of the future regulatory approach, at least in the B2C context.  
 
In terms of what this means for the future relationship between the instruments, 
beginning with the CRD and CFR, it has been shown that the DCFR, at least informally, 
fed into the CRD proposal and the influence of the DCFR can be found within the 
                                                 
12 Despite early concern in regard to the Commission’s narrow technocratic agenda, which have impacted 
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instrument. Differences however remain between the instruments and in the interest of 
consistency and coherence, and while the CRD can serve as a framework for the future 
development of the contract law acquis in this area, it is clear that the CRD provisions 
will now feed into those of the DCFR. As regards to the relationship between the CRD 
and optional instrument, it is clear that while both instruments seek similar objectives, to 
govern the same transactions,
13 and both originate from within the same DG, coherence 
and consistency in terms of the regulatory approach at this level will be necessary. Within 
the shared scope of the instruments, therefore, provisions of the CRD will be incorporated 
into the optional instrument. This is consistent with the CFR continuing to serve as the 
basis of the optional instrument, as the CFR itself will incorporate the provisions of the 
CRD. It is outside of the common core of consumer mandatory rules that will result from 
the relationship between the CRD and optional instrument, however, that greater scope 
exists for the (D)CFR to impact upon the contractual framework of the optional 
instrument. Outside of this shared scope
14 and in the B2B context, and thus in regard to 
provisions of general contract law, the CFR can act as the starting point for the rules of 
the optional instrument.
15 The rules of general contract law contained within the CFR will 
also provide the wider contractual framework within which the CRD will exist, and the 
EU will legislate.
16 There is still very much a role for the CFR to play in the final 
regulatory response.  
 
The benefits arising from the relationship between the CRD and optional instrument have 
been outlined in terms of facilitating the acceptance and use of the optional instrument 
within the B2C context.
17 Moving forward in terms of the regulatory response, however, 
greater issues arise in regard to the relationship because of the limitations of the CRD. 
These deficiencies, discussed below, must be overcome if the CRD is to form the basis of 
the optional instrument in the B2C context, or else they will be incorporated into and thus 
undermine the optional contractual framework. They must also be overcome if the CRD 
is to address the existing fragmentation at the EU level where the optional instrument is 
                                                 
13 I.e. consumer sales and services.  
14 While still in the B2C context.  
15 Also providing a source of rules for specific contracts, and protective provisions in the B2B context.  
16 Chapter 4, 4.3.  
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not chosen as the governing law of cross-border contracts,
18 and thus if it is to serve as a 
suitable framework for consumer contract legislation in the Member States on a full 
harmonisation basis.    
 
In terms of necessary action, therefore, it has already been noted that the CRD fails to 
meets its simplification aims. It has sought consolidation of the review directives, while 
maintaining sector-specific distinctions, and fails to address existing regulatory gaps 
which arise as a result. As such, provisions of the CRD require greater coherence and 
clarity and thus as the proposal stands it does not form a sound basis for a horizontal 
instrument of European consumer contract law, nor for the ongoing review of the acquis. 
In this respect, it has been maintained that the (D)CFR would form a more suitable basis 
and legislative toolbox and that while the CFR will draw upon the CRD, it is desirable 
that the CFR also include recommendations for improvements to the acquis derived rules. 
It could then be hoped that the CFR can serve in the future as a basis for the continuing 
review of the acquis and also, while the opportunity exists, provide the CRD itself with 
greater certainty and horizontal application. A more coherent European contract law 
could result at this level, and this would benefit the coherence of the common core of 
consumer mandatory rules in the optional instrument.  
 
In light of significant concerns in regard to the reduction and removal of important 
consumer rights within the CRD, action must also be taken to address the level of 
protection achieved by the proposal. In the first respect, concerns have arisen where the 
proposal adopts as a maximum, the existing minimum level of protection. Such a 
development would not enhance consumer confidence and action must be taken to 
address the level of protection in this respect to ensure, in line with Treaty expectations, 
that a high level of protection is achieved. These concerns arise not only in regard to the 
fully harmonised regime of the CRD, which will detrimentally impact on national 
consumer protection, but also within the common core of consumer rights within the 
optional instrument. The CRD is this respect acts as a limitation on the extent to which 
the optional instrument itself can provide a high level of protection and thus serve to 
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increase consumer confidence in cross-border contracting. It had been advanced that a 
higher level could be achieved under the optional instrument because of it optional 
nature.
19 The relationship with the CRD, however, undermines this.
20 In this regard, the 
CRD proposal could give greater consideration to the adequacy of the level of protection 
created therein vis-à-vis national standards and take action on this basis. Indeed, in light 
of calls for clarification of the impact of the proposal on existing levels of consumer 
protection in the Member States,
21 the Commission created a comparative table to this 
end. 
 
Concerns in regard to the level of protection have, therefore, been acknowledged by the 
Commission, negotiations on the proposal are ongoing, and new options for improvement 
are being presented in order to create a more acceptable proposal.
22 Rather than directly 
addressing the level of protection that is achieved,
23 however, the Commission is 
advancing more “practical solutions”,
24 and is currently reviewing whether the proposal 
is sufficiently targeted towards those issues that have the most benefit from a single 
market point of view.
25 The result of this review would be a more limited and targeted 
application of the full harmonisation approach in order to alleviate existing concerns. One 
way in which this is envisaged is, in the short-term, only to fully harmonise those rules on 
distance contracts, and thus those of the Distance Selling Directive – e.g. that apply for e-
commerce, where it is maintained consumer confidence and legal certainty for businesses 
is crucial. Direct selling
26 would, however, continue to be subject to minimum 
                                                 
19 As opposed to the binding nature of the CRD.  
20 Although a high level can still be achieved outside of the shared scope.  
21 In light of concerns outlined here.  
22 See the speech of Commissioner Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship An ambitious Consumer Rights Directive: boosting 
consumers' protection and helping businesses, Madrid, 15 March 2010, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/91&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
23 Which would have been to the advantage of the level of protection in the optional instrument.  
24 Commissioner Reding, 15
th March 2010.   
25 Ibid.  
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harmonisation, where it is maintained that greater differences exist between national laws 
at this stage.
27  
 
This regulatory proposal is, however, not to be welcomed. Not only does it avoid 
addressing the issue of the level of protection in the CRD directly, it would further 
undermine the need for certainty and coherence in that regime. The effect is that the 
move to full harmonisation would be further undermined, and a further source of 
fragmentation would arise. A dual regime would be created for businesses and 
consumers, depending on whether the sale contract occurred, for example, on-line, or 
face-to-face. If the intention is, therefore, to limit the detrimental impact of full 
harmonisation on domestic transactions, and thus on those consumers that do not wish to 
engage in cross border transactions, this will not be the case. Direct transactions may well 
be between parties from different Member States, for example, the tourist purchasing 
goods while on holiday in another Member State. While distance transactions may be 
between parties in the same Member State via an internet sale. The distinction would also 
have the effect of further undermining the horizontal nature of the instrument, which 
already distinguishes in its provisions between distance and off-premise contracts.
28 Such 
an approach would then exacerbate the related and unaddressed regulatory gaps in the 
acquis in regard to, for example, the use of mixed off-premise and distance marketing 
strategies.
29 Not only would it be unclear to parties which rules apply, i.e. those for 
distance, or off-premise contracts, but also what level of harmonisation will apply, and 
thus whether it is sufficient for the business to comply with the exhaustive requirements 
of the CRD, or whether it must also look to the law of the consumer’s habitual residence. 
While a differentiated approach to harmonisation may, therefore, produce a more 
politically acceptable result in regard to the impact of the full harmonisation approach of 
                                                 
27 Press Release, Consumer rights: Full harmonisation no longer an option, on a meeting of Commissioner 
Reding and the European Parliament Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee, 17
th March 
2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/063-70800-076-03-12-911-
20100317IPR70798-17-03-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm.  
28 Discussed in Chapter 4, 4.3.  
29 Discussed Ibid, and 4.1.3.    244 
the CRD, it would clearly fail to achieve the certainty and simplification of the regulatory 
environment that is sought by the Commission.
30  
 
The removal of important consumer rights within the CRD proposal, which results in the 
creation of a dual regime, and the CRD being dependant upon the application of national 
law,
31 must also be addressed. A number of options have been discussed, for example, in 
order to achieve greater clarity in the relationship between consumer remedies under the 
CRD and national contract law.
32 One proposal sees national provisions on remedies, 
such as the UK’s right to reject, being integrated into the proposal.
33  Progress to date on 
the proposal, however, evident in the UK’s opposition to the loss of the national right to 
reject, suggests that achieving agreement on the full harmonisation of these issues is 
highly unlikely. This is, therefore, another area where differentiated harmonisation is 
envisaged for on-line sales and direct contracts, in an attempt to address those areas most 
beneficial to the functioning of the internal market, and thus to advance ongoing 
negotiations on the proposal.
34 The result will, however, once again be compromise on 
the part of the proposal and, thus, fragmentation of the regulatory environment. It is clear 
that the objectives of the review cannot be fully realised while the proposal continues to 
seek some degree of full harmonisation in a binding form to replace provisions of 
national contract law, as opposed to an optional regime.   
 
In terms of the way forward for the CRD proposal in this respect, therefore, limitations in 
its scope and relationship with national law may have to be accepted. In this regard, the 
CRD must be transparent as to its scope so that it is understood by both businesses and 
consumers who seek to benefit from the instrument.
35 Indeed, benefits can still arise from 
the proposal where these limits are properly understood. Certainty will be increased, for 
                                                 
30 The Commission had discounted this approach in regard to the scope of the review proposal as it would 
result in fragmentation, undermining consumer confidence and would not provide the necessary 
simplification of the regulatory environment, Chapter 4, 4.1.2. and CRD proposal, 7.  
31 Discussed in Chapter 4, 4.1.3.  
32 The resulting uncertainty in regard to this relationship was criticised in Chapter 6, 6.4.2.  
33 Commissioner Kuneva, Speaking in the European Parliament, 4 May 2009, Oral question with debate O-
0076/09; Debate: CRE 04/05/2009.  
34 Commissioner Reding (2010).  
35 Chapter 5, 5.2.2.    245
example, as a result of the fully harmonised 14 day withdrawal period, replacing the 
diverging periods which currently exist. The proposal for differentiated harmonisation, 
however, should not be pursued. The narrowing of the full harmonisation scope of the 
CRD in this way would in fact make the need for an optional instrument greater, if parties 
are to benefit from a full harmonisation regime in the near future. Then, however, the 
optional instrument would no longer benefit from the full core of fully harmonised rules 
of consumer protection within the existing CRD proposal, which would have aided its use 
and acceptance. The limitation of full harmonisation to distance contracts would, 
however, have little effect on the ‘blue button’ proposal in the e-commerce context. Yet it 
would mean that the optional instrument,
36 like the CRD, would still contain rights within 
the shared full harmonisation scope that are not considered to offer a sufficiently high 
level of protection.
37 Outside of that, where minimum harmonisation at the EU level 
would remain, it is clear from the experience of the CRD and reaction to that, that the 
existing minimum can only serve as the starting point for the full harmonisation approach 
of the optional instrument, and that a higher level can and must be ensured. The adoption 
of an optional instrument in this context may thus prove more contentious,
38 however, to 
the extent that it can achieve the fully harmonised, comprehensive and directly applicable 
framework for trade in the internal market, which will leave national systems intact, it 
must be pursued.  
 
Progress towards achieving the objectives of the European contract law project is 
imperative at a time when the EU is looking to strengthen the internal market in order to 
facilitate cross-border trade as a means of assisting Europe out of economic crisis. The 
need for, and desirability of, optional instruments to support trade in the internal market 
is therefore clear. It is through such instruments that citizens will realise the benefits of 
the internal market. A caveat must, however, be made. This is that optional instruments 
and the broader regulatory response can only address one factor which serves to render 
cross-border trade more difficult and costly, namely the present state of European 
                                                 
36 And thus the ‘blue button’.  
37 Moving forward it is clear that addressing the level of protection within the CRD would have been a 
better approach than narrowing the full harmonisation scope of the proposal 
38 Although not as significantly as it does not affect existing national levels of protection, as the CRD does.    246 
contract law. Other factors capable of impeding cross-border trade will remain, and this 
will prevent the creation of a wholly level playing field within the internal market.
39 
While some issues can be addressed through further action at the EU level, such as 
through promoting and strengthening cross-border redress mechanisms, which will be 
necessary in particular to assist consumer participation in cross-border trade,
40 other 
factors which affect the behaviour of market participants such as language, cultural 
differences and distance cannot. As a regulatory solution, however, the optional 
instrument is nonetheless a significant means by which to make it easier and less costly 
for businesses and consumers to conclude cross-border contracts in the internal market. 
With political will and momentum now mounting behind the development of optional 
instruments, therefore, the EU’s resources are properly placed with the development of 
the final CFR, which can still serve as the basis of the optional instruments, and for the 
continuing review of the consumer acquis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Highlighted in Chapter 3, 3.2. 
40 Chapter 6, 6.4.2. Action is needed, in particular, to address the practical issues which influence consumer 
willingness to engage in cross-border transactions, such as after-sales issues and the accessibility of redress.    247
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